Causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa : an assessment by Abdalla, Yousif Ismael
  
 
CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:  
AN ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yousif Ismael Abdalla 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in 
Agriculture at Stellenbosch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. N. Vink        December 2007 
 i
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own work and that I 
have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any university for a degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature: ……………………..     Date: ………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2007 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 ii
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Regional food security is considered one of the major challenges for the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries. SADC is one of the regions in the world currently 
facing widespread transitory and chronic food insecurity (malnutrition), as well as persistent threats 
of acute food insecurity (famine). The objective of this thesis, therefore, was to investigate and 
assess the prevailing causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa. 
 
The research revealed that transitory and chronic food insecurity (malnutrition) in the SADC region 
exists due to the problems experienced with both the supply and demand sides of the food security 
equation. However, though SADC has made limited attempts to tackle the problem of food 
insecurity in the region, the Community did not appear to learn from the 1991/92 food insecurity 
crisis when it recurred in 2001/02. This study consequently recommends that further investigations 
take place into the primary data available in an attempt to address various issues relating to the 
causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa in order to ensure long-term food security. Such issues 
include the following: mobilising agriculture to increase food production rapidly enough to meet the 
needs of the growing population of the region; bridging the prevailing gap between the public 
actors, on the one side, and the private and informal actors, on the other, in order to deliver effective 
food security services to the needy in the region; the designing of well-targeted food pricing 
policies as an interim compromise between the social concerns relating to high and volatile food 
prices and long-term economic growth and food security in the region; and the identification of the 
role of women as food producers and agents of food security in the region. 
 
On the supply side, the main food availability problems in the region lie on the agricultural level. 
Low productivity and frequent disasters have been of a cyclic nature in SADC, leading to additional 
difficulties with supplies. Such difficulties have been compounded by the inadequate political 
support of the sector; a lack of investment therein; the instability of the world market; and an 
increasingly unfair trade environment. Other major dimensions of the problem include: the 
imposition of trade barriers, such as tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers, particularly the complex 
and confusing tariff structure imposed by the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries 
against other non-SACU SADC countries; the high cost of transport, especially in landlocked 
countries, which has come about as a result of the weakening of the capacity and efficiency of the 
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transport system in the region, due to a lack of investment in, as well as the poor performance of, 
the transport sector. A lack of a diversified production structure in the SADC region was cited as 
the main obstacle to the successful trade integration and economic development of the region. 
 
Looking at the demand side, the main food access problems in the region consisted of a lack of food 
entitlement (poverty) due to the weak economic growth resulting from unsuccessful macro-
economic policies; a poor balance of payments situation; highly skewed patterns of income and 
wealth distribution, resulting from maladministration due to short-sighted past colonial policies; 
high levels of unemployment and land tenure insecurity; the failure of governance, both as regards a 
lack of accountability and opposition to democratisation; and financial mismanagement. Rapid 
population growth in the region resulted in an escalation in the demand for agricultural products, in 
particular foodstuffs, and the reduced availability of arable land. The widespread preponderance of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) infection 
was complicating the task of fighting hunger and undermining any attempts to strengthen the 
livelihoods of the poor by depleting the adult agricultural labour potential in Southern Africa. A 
lack of financial resources and institutional capacity (in the form of policy gaps) were the main 
constraints to the implementation of successful poverty and food insecurity alleviation programmes 
in the region, as comprehensive government intervention aimed at maintaining food security in the 
region for most Southern Africans was unfeasible in the near future. 
 
The research was conducted using the qualitative method of literature study, which proved a useful 
descriptive and analytical framework for revealing significant causes of food insecurity prevailing 
both in individual, households and at national levels in the SADC region. The study focused mainly 
on the availability, and the ability to acquire, food, in an attempt to see how balance could be 
achieved between the supply and demand sides of the food security equation by means of relevant 
investigations. Documentary data were consulted in investigating the problem, in the light of the 
fact that publications, such as books, academic journals and documents, illustrate the problem most 
clearly. 
 
In the planning of policy interventions, food insecurity in Southern Africa appears open to 
improvement in the long term only if the actual income of households is increased, so that they can 
afford to obtain enough food. Such improvement can take place in two ways: Firstly, by giving the 
people who face transitory and chronic food insecurity the opportunity to earn enough to ensure that 
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they can maintain an adequate food supply through domestic production, by improving agricultural 
yield, and hence ensuring food security, at household level, and secondly, by means of the 
facilitation of trade (in the form of food imports), by eliminating tariff, non-tariff and technical 
barriers, and investing in the development of the transport infrastructure in the SADC region. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Voedselsekerheid in die streek word as een van die vernaamste uitdagings vir die lidlande van die 
Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap (SAOG) beskou. Die SAOG is een van die streke van 
die wêreld wat tans wydverspreide kortstondige (transitory) en chroniese voedselonsekerheid 
(wanvoeding) asook aanhoudende bedreiging van akute voedselonsekerheid (hongersnood) in die 
gesig staar. Die doel van hierdie tesis was daarom om die heersende oorsake van 
voedselonsekerheid in Suider-Afrika te ondersoek en te bepaal. 
 
Hierdie navorsing het getoon dat kortstondige en chroniese voedselonsekerheid (wanvoeding) in die 
SAOG-streek bestaan as gevolg van die probleme wat aan sowel die vraag- as aanbodkant van die 
voedselsekerheidsvergelyking ondervind word. Alhoewel die SAOG beperkte pogings aangewend 
het om die probleem van voedselonsekerheid in die streek aan te pak, skyn die Gemeenskap egter 
nie uit die voedselonsekerheidskrisis van 1991/1992 te geleer het toe dit weer in 2001/2002 
voorgekom het nie. Hierdie studie beveel gevolglik aan dat die beskikbare primêre data verder 
ondersoek word in ’n poging om aandag te skenk aan die verskeie kwessies wat met die oorsake 
van voedselonsekerheid in Suider-Afrika verband hou ten einde langtermyn-voedselsekerheid te 
verseker. Sodanige kwessies sluit die volgende in: die mobilisering van die landbou om 
voedselproduksie vinnig genoeg te verhoog om aan die behoeftes van die streek se groeiende 
bevolking te voldoen; die oorbrugging van die heersende gaping tussen die openbare akteurs aan die 
een kant en die private en informele akteurs aan die ander kant, ten einde doeltreffende 
voedselsekerheidsdienste aan die behoeftiges in die streek te lewer; die ontwerp van ’n goed gerigte 
beleid oor die prysbepaling van voedsel as ’n tussentydse kompromie tussen die maatskaplike 
aangeleenthede wat met hoë en onbestendige voedselpryse verband hou, en langtermyn- 
ekonomiese groei en voedselsekerheid in die streek; en die identifisering van vroue se rol as 
voedselprodusente en agente van voedselsekerheid in die streek. 
 
Wat aanbod betref, lê die vernaamste probleme ten opsigte van die beskikbaarheid van voedsel in 
die streek op die vlak van die landbou. In die SAOG is lae produktiwiteit en gereelde rampe siklies 
van aard, wat bykomende probleme ten opsigte van voorraad tot gevolg het. Sodanige probleme is 
deur die volgende vererger: die ontoereikende politieke ondersteuning aan die sektor; ’n gebrek aan 
belegging in die sektor; die onstabiliteit van die wêreldmark; en ’n toenemend onbillike 
handelsomgewing. Ander vername dimensies van die probleem is die volgende: die instelling van 
handelsbelemmeringe, soos belemmeringe binne en buite tariefverband asook tegniese 
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belemmeringe, in die besonder die ingewikkelde en verwarrende tariefstruktuur wat gehef word 
deur lidlande van die Suider-Afrikaanse Doeane-unie (SADU) op ander SAOG-lidlande wat nie 
lede van SADU is nie; die hoë vervoerkoste, veral in lande sonder seehawens, wat as gevolg van die 
verswakking van die kapasiteit en doeltreffendheid van die vervoerstelsel in die streek onstaan het, 
as gevolg van ’n gebrek aan belegging in asook die swak prestasie van die vervoersektor. ’n Gebrek 
aan ŉ gediversifiseerde produksiestruktuur in die SAOG-streek is genoem as die vernaamste 
struikelblok vir die streek se suksesvolle handelsintegrasie en ekonomiese ontwikkeling.  
 
Wat vraag betref, het die vernaamste probleme ten opsigte van toegang tot voedsel in die streek 
bestaan uit ’n gebrek aan die reg op voedsel (armoede) as gevolg van die swak ekonomiese groei 
wat uit onsuksesvolle makro-ekonomiese beleid spruit; ’n slegte betalingsbalanssituasie; uiters 
skewe patrone in die verdeling van inkomste en rykdom, wat spruit uit wanadministrasie as gevolg 
van kortsigtige voormalige koloniale beleid; hoë vlakke van werkloosheid en onsekerheid oor 
grondbesit; die mislukking van bestuur, ten opsigte van ’n gebrek aan toerekenbaarheid asook 
opposisie teen demokratisering; en finansiële wanbestuur. Snelle bevolkingsgroei in die streek het 
gelei tot ’n toename in die vraag na landbouprodukte, in die besonder voedingsmiddele, en die 
verminderde beskikbaarheid van bewerkbare grond. Die wye voorkoms van MIV/vigs het die taak 
om honger te bestry, gekompliseer en enige pogings om die armes se lewensbestaan te verbeter, 
ondermyn deur die volwasse arbeidspotensiaal in die landbou in Suider-Afrika uit te put. ’n Gebrek 
aan finansiële hulpbronne en institusionele kapasiteit (in die vorm van beleidsgapings) was die 
vernaamste beperkinge ten opsigte van die implementering van suksesvolle programme vir die 
verligting van armoede en voedselonsekerheid in die streek, aangesien omvattende 
regeringsintervensie gemik op die handhawing van voedselsekerheid in die streek vir die meeste 
Suider-Afrikane in die nabye toekoms onuitvoerbaar was. 
 
Die navorsing is gedoen deur ’n literatuurstudie as kwalitatiewe metode te gebruik. Dit het gedien 
as ’n nuttige beskrywende en analitiese raamwerk om beduidende oorsake van voedselonsekerheid 
in sowel individuele huishoudings as op nasionale vlak in die SAOG-streek bloot te lê. Die studie 
het hoofsaaklik gefokus op die beskikbaarheid van voedsel en die vermoë om voedsel te bekom, in 
’n poging om te bepaal hoe balans tussen die vraag- en aanbodkante van die 
voedselsekerheidsvergelyking deur middel van tersaaklike ondersoek bewerkstellig kan word. 
Dokumentêre data is in die ondersoek van die probleem geraadpleeg, op grond van die feit dat 
publikasies, soos boeke, vaktydskrifte en dokumente, die probleem die beste omskryf. 
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In die beplanning van beleidsintervensies skyn daar slegs ruimte vir verbetering ten opsigte 
voedselonsekerheid in Suider-Afrika op die langtermyn te wees as huishoudings se werklike 
inkomste verhoog word, sodat hulle kan bekostig om genoeg voedsel te bekom. Sodanige 
verbetering kan op twee maniere geskied: Eerstens, deur mense wat kortstondige en chroniese 
voedselonsekerheid in die gesig staar die geleentheid te bied om genoeg te verdien om te verseker 
dat hulle ’n voldoende voedselaanbod deur plaaslike produksie kan handhaaf, deur landbou-
opbrengs te verbeter, en sodoende voedselsekerheid op die vlak van die huishouding te verseker, en 
tweedens, deur handel (in die vorm van voedselinvoer) te fasiliteer, deur belemmeringe binne en 
buite tariefverband asook tegniese belemmeringe uit die weg te ruim, en deur in die ontwikkeling 
van die vervoerinfrastruktuur in die SAOG-streek te belê. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.1 World food situation 
The heads of state and government representatives gathered at the World Food Summit in 
November 1996 in Rome, Italy, to reaffirm the right of all to have access to safe and nutritious 
food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free 
from hunger (FAO, 1996). According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the 
United Nations (UN), the delegates committed to achieving food security for all and an ongoing 
effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of 
undernourished people to half the present level by no later than 2015 (FAO, 1996). 
 
The FAO (2005) estimates the number of undernourished people in the world in 2000–2002 to be 
852 million. This figure includes 815 million in developing countries, 28 million in countries in 
transition, and 9 million in developed market economies (see Figure 1). By region, the largest share 
of the total number of undernourished is found in Asia and the Pacific, with 60%, followed by sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), which accounts for 25% of the total. 
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Source: Adapted from FAO (2005). 
Figure 1. Undernourished population by region, 2000–2002 (millions) 
 
According to the FAO (2005), the proportion of the population that is undernourished varies 
between the different developing country regions (see Figure 2). The highest incidence of 
undernourishment was detected in SSA, where 33% of the population was found to be 
undernourished. Such a figure is well above the 16% estimated for Asia and the Pacific and the 10% 
estimated for both Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Near East and North Africa. 
Asia and the Pacific (519)
Sub-Saharan Africa (204)
Latin America and the Caribean 
(53)
Near East and North Africa (39) 
Countries in Transition ( 28)
Developed market economies (9)
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Source: Adapted from FAO (2005). 
Figure 2. Percentage of population undernourished by region, 2000–2002 
 
In 1960, the world’s population reached 3 billion, with a third being chronically undernourished. 
Forty years later, the world’s population has doubled to 6 billion, but food production has grown 
even faster, and the number of people who are chronically undernourished has fallen (FAO, 1999; 
2000, cited in Wiebe, 2003). Despite these achievements, challenges nevertheless remain, as more 
than 800 million people, most of whom live in Asia and Africa, are still chronically undernourished 
(Wiebe, 2003). The FAO estimates that one out of every eight people in the world suffers from 
chronic malnutrition, while the World Bank (WB) estimates that almost 400 million people suffer 
from a severe food deficiency and an additional 350 million cannot afford even the minimum diet 
necessary for good health (World Bank, 1986). For most of such people, food security depends on 
the production and income that they receive from agriculture. 
 
1.1.2 Food situation in Southern Africa 
The food problem has deeper historical roots in developing countries than is usually appreciated. 
Colonial agricultural policies of the past were such that food production was not given a priority at 
central government level. For example, Eicher (1982), Hansen (1981) and Dinham et al. (1984, 
cited in Kalibwani, 2005) all agree that, during the entire colonial period, food production was not a 
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priority for capital investment in most African countries. Land, labour and other resources of the 
colonies were diverted away from the production of food into the production of industrial raw 
materials. The infrastructural development that took place during this period, and for decades after 
independence, was mainly aimed at servicing the production, transportation and marketing of 
industrial crops, such as cotton, tobacco, coffee and cocoa (Kalibwani, 2005). Agricultural policy 
must in future contribute to national economic growth objectives, reducing income inequalities and 
eliminating poverty through increased agricultural production, increased incomes for the poorest 
groups, creation of additional employment opportunities and improved household food security 
(SA, 1998, 2000 cited in Hendriks & Lyne, 2003). 
 
During the early 1960s, at a time when 17 African states gained their independence, SSA was a 
modest net exporter of food. However, during the late 1960s SSA became a net food importer, due 
to the Sahelian drought, crop failure and rapid population growth (Paulina, 1986, cited in Rukuni & 
Eicher, 1988). In 1985, SSA imported 12 million tonnes of grain, and three commodities accounted 
for 87% of grain imports: wheat (50%), rice (22%) and maize (15%) (Rukuni & Eicher, 1988). The 
main features of food production at that time were that such production was growing at half the 
population growth rate and the increasing importance of food aid. Even in recent years, SSA has 
been the only region in the world facing widespread chronic food insecurity, as well as persistent 
threats of famine (Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC),1 which superseded the Southern African 
Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), was formed in 1992 and currently consists of 14 
member countries (see Appendix 3), representing a total population of approximately 200 million 
people and covering an area of 9,1 million km2 (World Bank, 2001, cited in SARPN, 2003). Across 
eastern and southern Africa three countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South 
Africa and Tanzania) account for roughly two-thirds of the total population (64,4%) (see Figure 10), 
while the six smallest members (the Seychelles, Swaziland, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and 
Lesotho) comprise only 4% of the total population (World Bank, 2001, cited in SARPN, 2003). 
 
Agriculture is the main economic sector in the region and lies at the heart of the issue of food 
security. Furthermore, the agricultural potential of the region is immense, far exceeding present and 
future needs (SADC, 2003). Unfortunately, over the past 20 years, agricultural growth in the SADC 
                                                 
1 For further details about SADC, see section 6.4. 
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region has been slow, with an estimated annual growth of 1,5% (SADC, 2003). Agricultural growth 
is lagging behind demographic growth, leading to increased poverty and hunger in the region 
(SADC, 2003). The major reasons for this are the increasing frequency of natural disasters, the 
inadequate political support granted the sector, a lack of investment in the sector, the instability of 
the world market and an increasingly unfair trade environment (SADC, 2003). Furthermore, civil 
strife and wars have for a long time prevented SADC member states from reaching their full 
potential as regards agricultural output (SADC, 2003). 
 
Although there have been improvements in some of the member countries, the average per capita 
dietary energy and protein supplies have decreased over the past 15 years in the region as a whole, 
with the supplies currently standing at 2 160 kcal (an average intake of 2 700 kcal per capita per day 
is roughly estimated to be the level necessary to satisfy the food needs of the region) and 49 g per 
day respectively (SADC/FAO, 2002). Food imports have almost doubled over the past 15 years, a 
burden compounded by the weight of servicing debt2 in the SADC countries (SADC/FAO, 2002). 
The FAO estimates that the cereal demand in the SADC will reach about 58,4 million tonnes in 
2015, which is more than double the current requirement of 28,4 million tonnes (SADC/FAO, 
2002). 
 
Agriculture can potentially contribute to growth as: food; a provider of livelihoods; a market for 
producers of other goods and services; a source of raw materials to downstream industries; an 
earner of foreign exchange, and a producer of savings surplus (Johnston & Mellor, 1961; Nicholls, 
1964, cited in Maxwell, 2001).  
 
The agricultural sector in Africa provides by far the greatest part of the food that Africans eat, as the 
dependency ratio (imports/total consumption) was around 15%. In 1995, for example, cereal 
imports into SSA amounted to 12 million tonnes, though production was close to 80 million tonnes 
(Maxwell, 2001). However, for some years and in some countries, the dependency ratio was higher, 
and it needs to be noted that the degree of self-sufficiency achieved was at relatively low levels of 
consumption. According to Maxwell (2001), agriculture is also a major source of livelihood in that 
it generates employment opportunities. Some of these jobs are in food production, but many are not. 
The cash crop sectors, which earn some cash by way of exports, such as tea, coffee, cocoa and 
cotton, as well as non-traditional crops like cut flowers, are often more labour-intensive per unit 
                                                 
2 For the servicing of debt in the SADC countries, see Figure 11. 
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area than are food crops. All these cash crops are considered major employers and generators of 
livelihoods. Furthermore, agriculture provides a market, both directly, in the form of inputs, 
machinery and processing equipment requirements, and indirectly, through the expenditure of 
agricultural workers. Agriculture also provides raw materials for nascent industries, such as textiles. 
It also generates foreign exchange, which can be used to purchase capital equipment and 
intermediate goods for the agricultural sector (Maxwell, 2001). A leading contribution made by the 
agricultural sector is that it provides the most important, and sometimes the only real source of 
savings surplus, needed for growth, especially in the case of low-income countries where the sector 
is dominant. Farmers save and invest in their own communities (Maxwell, 2001). According to 
Hendriks and Lyne (2003), agriculture could drive widespread increases in rural household income, 
because most rural households have access to farmland. Income shocks that generate a broad-based 
benefit to rural communities generally come from the increased production of tradable 
commodities, such as sugar cane and timber. 
 
In assessing the status of food insecurity, it is clearly important to consider the issue at various 
levels, including individual and household (micro), country (national) and regional (macro) levels, 
because a country might be food secure at the national level, but food insecure at the household and 
individual levels. South Africa is a good example of such a disparity. The majority of South 
Africans, particularly those who live in the rural areas, are food insecure, in spite of the high levels 
of national food self-sufficiency. Currently, more than 40% of the population lives below the 
poverty datum line, and it is calculated that more than 2,5 million people in South Africa are 
nutritionally needy (Cooper & Van Zyl, 1994; Van Niewenhuizen, 1995; Van Rooyen et al., 1997, 
cited in Leroy et al., 2001). 
 
A region could also be food secure at its macro level, but food insecure at the individual country 
level. Such disparity between the macro and individual country level is the core focus of this 
research, as several countries in Southern Africa are presently facing acute food insecurity issues. 
On the macro-economic level, food security means that enough food has to be available to cater for 
all the population’s nutritional requirements. On the micro level namely, that of households and 
individuals; three conditions need to be respected: sufficient food at macro level, stability in supply, 
and regular access to the corresponding availabilities for all households and their members (Dubois, 
2003). Lofgren and Richard (2003) have stated that, for all the complexity of agricultural systems 
and policy issues, only three ways of obtaining food exist: own production, trade and grants. 
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Food insecurity in Southern Africa became pronounced when the region experienced two major 
food crises3 over a period of 10 years (1991–92 and 2001–2003). After the 1991–92 crisis, there 
was much expectation that new thinking on food security in the context of structural adjustment and 
market liberalisation aimed at generating economic growth would make the countries and 
populations of the region less vulnerable to food crises in the future, though the result was not as 
substantive as expected, as evidenced by the 2001–03 crisis (FFSSA, 2004, cited in Kalibwani, 
2005). There were two types of food insecurity in the region: chronic and transitory. According to 
Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995) and Valdes and Konandreas (1981, as cited in Nichola, 2006), 
chronic food insecurity refers to situations where, on average, food availability is below the 
required level, of which the root cause is poverty. The short-term decline in food supplies due to 
drought, fluctuations in income or unrealistic pricing is referred to as transitory food insecurity. 
 
In 1986, the World Bank issued a food security policy paper, Poverty and Hunger, in which food 
security was defined as “access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy 
life”: pp1. Two essential elements are “the availability of food and the ability to acquire it”. Food 
insecurity, in turn, is regarded as the lack of access to enough food (World Bank, 1986). The World 
Bank’s definition gained wide international acceptance due to its simplicity and comprehensiveness. 
 
The concept of food (in)security has evolved substantially since it was first introduced into the 
development discourse in the 1970s. Devereux and Maxwell (2001) have argued that the most 
significant aspect of this empirically and theoretically driven advancement is the awareness that: 
“Food security is no longer seen simply as a failure of agriculture to produce sufficient food at the 
national level, but instead a failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food at the 
household level: pp1−12” and this in line with Sen’s (1981) ‘entitlements approach’. 
 
Food security policies in developing countries can be broken down into three main categories: right 
pricing, optimal storage and supply enhancement. There are economic and political dimensions to 
all of these policies (Berck & Bigman, 1993). There were two interacting parts of the food security 
policy and research agendas in the SADCC region: (1) food availability through domestic 
production, storage and/or trade, and (2) access to food through domestic production, the market, or 
food transfers (Rukuni & Eicher, 1988). 
                                                 
3 The term ‘crises’ in this argument refers to any specified period during which the occurrence of certain events or 
shocks necessitates the granting of assistance to those worst affected by the crisis. 
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Rukuni and Eicher (1988) have also argued that the SADCC and donor agencies had given priority 
to food availability – in other words, the supply side of the food security equation, for example food 
production research (e.g. International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT)/SADCC research on sorghum and millet), food production campaigns, early warning 
systems (EWSs) and expanded grain storage capacity. On the demand side of the equation (food 
access), Botswana had taken the lead in the SADCC region, and probably in all of Africa, by 
implementing four innovative programmes to cope with droughts and household and national food 
insecurity. These programmes were the Pula for Work Programme; supplementary feeding for 
underweight children; school feeding programmes, and the development of irrigation projects to 
reduce the dependence on rainfall (Rukuni & Eicher, 1988). More recently, food security policies in 
the SADC have focused mainly on the implementation of subsidised agricultural input provision 
programmes. 
 
While there is usually consensus in favour of such programmes as recovery measures, there is 
debate about their scope and long-term role. Other options (cash payments and seed fairs) have been 
explored and successfully piloted. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, a tight input pricing 
policy regime was introduced, which threatened the viability of the private agro-industry and 
contributed to the development of a parallel market for agricultural inputs (Mano et al., 2003). 
Mano et al. (2003) have also argued that most SADC governments have liberalised markets for 
cash crops; that food markets are still restricted to varying degrees; that inappropriate and 
constraining policies may, in some cases, be the reason behind market failures, and that countries 
with minimal government interference in domestic food markets are amongst the more food secure 
in the region. Accordingly, the liberalisation of domestic markets should be extended to cover all 
food crops. 
 
There is considerable agreement among both scholars and policy-makers about long-range 
strategies to cope with the food problem. According to Berck and Bigman (1993), such strategies 
can be grouped into three main categories: (1) population control, which is required for economic 
assistance aimed at improving the social and economic conditions of the poor and reducing their 
motivation to have large families; (2) economic growth, the counterpart of population control as far 
as the relationship between food and mouths to feed goes; with a higher rate of economic 
development, poverty and undernutrition will steadily be pushed back, whereas, if present trends 
continue, poverty will affect an ever larger number of people; and (3) income distribution, which 
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focuses on the reallocation of existing wealth, and which is more difficult to implement. The most 
difficult measure is that of agrarian reform, because of the patterns of land ownership occurring in 
many developing countries. 
 
In conclusion, despite some efforts and achievements toward poverty reduction and maintaining 
food security at micro, national and macro levels, challenges remain, as millions of people, 
particularly those living in developing countries, are still chronically undernourished. The reason is 
that the food problem has deeper historical roots in developing countries than is usually appreciated. 
Colonial agricultural policies were such that food production was not given priority at central 
government level. Though agriculture is not the only sector responsible for maintaining food 
security at all levels, it is the main economic sector, lying at the heart of food security in the SADC 
region, of which the agricultural potential is immense, far exceeding present and future needs. 
Unfortunately, agricultural growth is lagging behind demographic growth in the region, resulting in 
increased poverty and hunger. 
 
When formulating food security policies for the region, it is crucial to consider the two essential 
elements of food security: the availability of food and the ability to acquire it. The balancing of both 
the supply and demand sides of the food security equation is important in overcoming food 
insecurity in Southern Africa. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE 
This research study proposes to assess causes of food insecurity problems in Southern Africa. 
Regional food security is considered one of the major challenges for the SADC countries. SADC is 
one of the regions in the world currently facing widespread transitory and chronic food insecurity 
(malnutrition), as well as persistent threats of acute food insecurity (famine). Due consideration 
needs to be given to the question of what the root cause of such a problem is, as well as to what 
should be done about it. The current study seeks to address the problem of food insecurity by 
answering these questions (see Chapter 7) by means of analysing the causes and planning 
appropriate policy interventions. 
 
In the light of the vulnerability of the population to food insecurity in Southern Africa, natural 
disasters and unfavourable policies, limited economic opportunities, Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and rising poverty, it is worthy that 
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causes of food insecurity in the region be assessed. This study investigates whether the SADC 
region has the potential to ensure food security to all people in the region at all times. Food security 
in this study is defined as access by all Southern African people at all times to sufficient nutritious 
food to enable the pursuit of a healthy and productive life. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
The research was conducted using the qualitative method of literature study. A broad literature 
review was undertaken, enabling the author to assess causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa. 
Documentary data were employed in investigating the problem. The study is mainly descriptive and 
analytical in nature, as relevant publications (books, academic journals and documents) were 
consulted in order to investigate the problem more closely. 
 
The study focused mainly on the availability of food, as well as the ability to acquire it, and how a 
balance between the supply and demand sides of the food security equation can be achieved. Such a 
study was undertaken in the form of an exploratory food insecurity analysis conducted at individual 
and household, as well as at national and regional levels, using secondary data. Further 
investigations were undertaken to determine the problems that food security programmes in the 
region face. 
 
1.4 LAYOUT OF DOCUMENT 
Chapter 1, the Introduction, investigates food insecurity at the micro, national, macro and global 
levels, showing how such insecurity changes over time, due to factors such as rapid population 
growth and natural disasters. The historical roots of the food problem in developing countries are 
also identified.  
 
This chapter highlights the fact that, though agriculture is not the only sector responsible for 
maintaining food security at all levels, it is the main economic sector, lying at the heart of food 
security in the SADC region, of which the agricultural potential is immense, far exceeding present 
and future needs. The reasons for agricultural growth lagging behind population growth, which has 
resulted in increased poverty and hunger in the region, are also explored. 
 
Chapter 1 also identifies the problem of food insecurity in Southern Africa, as regional food 
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security is considered one of the major challenges for the SADC countries. The purpose of this 
study is also explored in this chapter. In the light of the vulnerability of the population of Southern 
Africa to food insecurity, natural disasters, unfavourable policies, limited economic opportunities, 
HIV/AIDS and rising poverty, food insecurity analysis in the region should be investigated. Thus, 
the importance of the study is highlighted. 
 
Finally, Chapter 1 explains the research method that was used, according to which the study was 
conducted in terms of the qualitative method of literature study, employing documentary data in 
resolving the problem of food insecurity in the Southern Africa region. The study is, therefore, 
mainly descriptive and analytical in nature. 
 
Chapter 2, Food security: a literature review, articulates and clarifies the concept of food 
security, discusses the historical perspective on food security, and explores the evolution of thinking 
about the food security concept through its fundamental shifts since the 1970s: at the level of 
analysis – from global and national to households and individuals; in the scope of analysis – from a 
narrow ‘food first’ perspective to a broader ‘livelihoods’ perspective, and in the assessment of food 
(in)security – from objective (measured) indicators to subjective (self-reported) perceptions. 
 
This chapter also discusses causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa, specifically adverse 
climatic conditions, such as a lack of rainfall (intense droughts) and massive floods, as the major 
causes of serious damage to human lives, widespread damage to property and significant decline to 
livestock and food crop production in the region. The role of economic problems, such as macro-
economic performance; inconsistent food policies; successive years of conflict; chronic 
malnutrition; inflation; increased vulnerability of the region, and decreased purchasing power of 
households in the region, is also investigated. The chapter also discusses mismanagement and poor 
governance, focusing on the numerous inappropriate food security strategies adopted in the past at 
national level. The chapter argues that SADC countries should maintain permanent budgets for 
purposes of helping to alleviate the effects of unexpected disasters, such as droughts and floods. 
 
Chapter 2 also highlights the prevailing HIV/AIDS rate in Southern African countries and its 
linkage to all dimensions of food security, including the availability, stability of supply, access to 
and use of food. Particular attention is given to the impact of HIV/AIDS on household agricultural 
production in the region. 
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Also identified in this chapter is a lack of food entitlement (in other words, poverty), of which the 
major causes are identified as transitory shocks to the production systems; weak economic growth 
performance, resulting from the implementation of unsuccessful macro-economic policies; the poor 
balance of payments situations, and the highly skewed patterns of income and wealth distribution 
resulting from past colonial policies, and its effect on food security in the region. 
 
Southern African population growth is also discussed in this chapter in relation to the exploration of 
pessimists’ and optimists’ views about the relationship between population growth and food 
security, and in order to identify whether rapid population growth poses serious problems for the 
supply and demand of food in the region. 
 
Chapter 3, Domestic food production in Southern Africa, examines food production in the 
region, focusing on the main reasons for food self-insufficiency that have made SADC countries 
vulnerable to reliance on food imports. Recognition is given to the fact that domestic production is 
extremely risky and severely limited by the constraints of nature. 
 
In regional field crop production, the focus is on the current regional cereal situation and the main 
causes for crop failures. The chapter provides an overview of regional livestock production, the 
regional situation and the performance of the livestock sector in the SADC region. The chronic 
problems faced by livestock production and their effect on food security in the region are also 
identified. 
 
The section on regional marine fisheries production explores the current status of marine fisheries in 
the SADC region, of which there are seven coastal member countries, namely Angola and Namibia 
on the west coast of Southern Africa, and Mozambique, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Tanzania on 
the east coast, as well as the vast marine waters of South Africa, whose maritime region is divided 
between the east and west coasts. The role played by the marine fisheries as a leading socio-
economic sector of SADC, in terms of national and regional food supply, employment and a source 
of foreign currency income, is also identified. 
 
The section on regional horticultural production highlights the problems faced by regional 
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horticulture production. Southern African countries are revealed as having a large market for their 
horticultural produce (consisting of vegetables, fruit and flowers) in the EU, despite the attempts 
that the European Union (EU) makes to exclude African horticultural produce from its markets by 
subsidising the production of such produce by its own farmers. 
 
Chapter 3 also explores food production per capita in the region, and analyses food security, based 
on the food production per capita indicator, which acts as a measure of the ability of a country to 
feed itself. 
 
Chapter 4, Trade in Southern Africa, briefly discusses trade in Southern Africa by addressing the 
comparative advantage of the SADC countries in regards to regional and international trade: These 
countries gain from trade due to a difference in the relative cost of producing different commodities. 
Supply differences between countries due to technological differences and resource availabilities 
are also explained. 
 
In Chapter 4, the focus is on regional trade. The chapter examines the regional specialisation 
undergone in producing ‘cash crops’ and other goods for export, and in the use of its export 
earnings to import food. Commercial food imports in the region are also discussed in an attempt to 
determine the ability of SADC countries to maintain national food security through commercial 
food purchases. The terms of trade in the Southern Africa region are considered to show the 
countries’ ability to finance food imports. 
 
However, this chapter also highlights that the aim of international trade is not only to achieve the 
availability of food, but also food security through ensuring access of the poor to adequate and 
sufficient food on an on-going basis. It also discusses whether the current international trade system 
ensures fair and efficient trade (in regards to both exports and imports), based on considerations of 
equity and, in particular, fair access to markets for developing Southern Africa countries. 
 
Chapter 5, An assessment of food security programmes in Southern Africa, assesses the existing 
food security programmes in Southern Africa, generalising as to whether such policies are, indeed, 
successful.  
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This chapter highlights the role played by EWSs at a national level in a food monitoring system, 
using details related both to food self-reliance and to the implementation of household food access. 
EWSs are shown to have focused on food information, rather than serving only as a warning device 
of threats associated with climate variability, such as droughts and floods. 
 
A regional grain-stocking programme was able to reduce the national supply variability more than 
was food aid, by offering substantial advantages, such as security, time and shipping cost savings, 
as well as price cushioning, and that it might therefore provide a policy option for both the donors 
and countries so affected. In contrast, a number of negative factors are considered, such as storage 
and opportunity costs. However, it is argued that the food commodity exchanges examined in this 
chapter and hedging through futures and options strategies by means of private commodity 
exchanges aimed either at contracting for the forward supply of grains at a fixed price at a future 
date, or at purchasing grain at a given price at some future time, might be seen as an alternative to 
public stocks. 
 
Chapter 5 also discusses food subsidies and food price stabilisation in order to gain greater clarity 
on the existing regional governments’ interventions aimed at subsidising and stabilising food prices. 
The effects of such interventions on food security in the region are also recognised. 
 
The section on social protection programmes focuses on whether Southern African governments 
have made special attempts to address the food security needs of the poor in the region. The 
problems that these governments face in delivering social protection services are identified. 
 
The existing two forms of international food assistance in the region, food aid and food-related 
international finance, as well as the delivery or distribution problems faced by the recipient 
governments or NGOs, are also considered. 
 
Chapter 6, The contribution of regional trade integration to food security, clarifies the purpose 
behind regional trade integration in Southern Africa and the fact that African countries are too small 
to negotiate with powerful trading blocs. 
 
Economic structures and growth performance in the countries of the SADC region are explained in 
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this chapter. An overview of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is also presented here. 
Whether Southern African economies have interventionist or protectionist trade regimes on both 
export and import sides is discussed, and existing economic blocs and regional trade agreements in 
Southern Africa, as well as the contribution of these groupings to the issue of regional food security 
are explored. The historical role played by SADC is highlighted. Whether SADC as an economic 
community will foster economic growth and development through increased intra-regional trade 
and cross-border investment is also considered. South Africa’s trade position among the rest of the 
member states of the SADC region is identified, and the role played by the existing regional trading 
partners is recognised. 
 
The last chapter, Chapter 7, Findings and recommendations, summarises the key findings that 
have emerged from the addressing of different issues in regards to the problem of food insecurity in 
Southern Africa. This chapter, after highlighting the planning of policy interventions, makes 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Food security: a literature review 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to familiarise readers with the theoretical a literature review of food 
(in)security. This will be done by articulating and clarifying definitions of food (in)security, as well 
as by discussing the historical perspective on food security. Of particular importance are the causes 
of food insecurity in Southern Africa, including the adverse weather conditions, such as droughts 
and floods, experienced in this region. Economic problems, mismanagement and poor governance, 
HIV/AIDS, a lack of food entitlement (poverty), and population growth in Southern Africa will also 
be addressed. 
 
2.1.2 Definitions of food (in)security 
The concept of food security has been used for more than two decades as an indicator of the status 
of development of a region (ECI, 2002). The purpose of this section is to articulate and clarify the 
concept of food (in)security. 
 
Relevant literature offers various definitions of food (in)security (see Appendix 1), with the most 
widely accepted definition being that presented by the World Bank in 1986 in its food security 
policy paper, Poverty and Hunger. In this paper, food security is defined as “access by all people at 
all times to enough food for an active and healthy life”. The two essential elements are the 
availability of food, and the ability to acquire it. Food insecurity, in turn, is defined as the lack of 
access to enough food to sustain life (World Bank, 1986). These definitions have been 
internationally accepted, due to their simplicity and comprehensiveness. This study focuses mainly 
on the availability of food and the ability to acquire it, as well as on the achievability of balance 
between the demand and supply sides of the food security equation. 
 
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life (FAO, 1996). Such a definition is also in line with the following statements: “Food security, 
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whereby every person has the physical and economic right to sufficient food to lead a healthy, 
productive life”, is determined by access to and availability of food. Access to food is closely 
related to poverty and economic growth: the poor usually do not have adequate means to gain 
access to food in the required quantities (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1997, cited in Lado, 2001). 
 
Food security is conventionally defined as consisting of an income, an access and a utilisation 
component (McCalla, 1999). According to Ebony Consulting International (ECI) (2002), people 
cannot be food secure if they lack sufficient income to buy food. Similarly, people cannot be food 
secure if they do not have access to food (i.e. if the food is not physically available or if there is 
some physical, social or legal barrier to their access to food). The notion of access encompasses the 
notion of entitlement to food, such as entitlement to the financial means to purchase food (whether 
such entitlement refers to the receipt of a government pension, or lies in having one’s income 
protected from theft). Finally, people cannot be food secure if they do not correctly use the food to 
which they have access (i.e. if they do not follow a diet that ensures that they enjoy nutritional 
security). Effective food utilisation depends on the knowledge held by each and every household of 
food storage and processing techniques, the basic nutritional principles, and proper childcare and 
illness management techniques (ECI, 2002). 
 
Food security should not be defined as synonymous with either food self-sufficiency or agricultural 
development. Food self-sufficiency, which is a narrower concept than food security, can be 
narrowly defined as the ability of a nation to supply 100% of its staple food needs from domestic 
production and/or storage under all weather probabilities. Agricultural development entails the 
process of increasing agricultural output per capita (Rukuni & Eicher, 1988). Food security should 
neither be confused with agricultural development, nor be viewed in terms of the narrow definition 
of food self-sufficiency or national food availability. Most household food security definitions and 
conceptual models agree that the key defining characteristic of household food security as a 
phenomenon is the security of access at all times to sufficient food (Maxwell & Frankenberger, 
1995). 
 
Although many food insecurity cases have been referred to as food crises in the past, no satisfactory 
definition of the term ‘food crisis’ exists in the literature. An implicit definition of ‘food crisis’ is 
that of a process in which African governments, and ultimately international donor agencies, have 
become involved in extraordinary responses to what is perceived to be famine-induced conditions 
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and their associated risks, as experienced in many parts of the continent (e.g. Cape Verde, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia, Chad, Mali, Angola, Botswana and Lesotho). Indeed, the drought-
induced or drought-intensified ‘food crisis’ of 1982–1985 appears to have been the worst in several 
decades, affecting not only the Sahelian zone countries, but also Eastern and Southern Africa 
(Christensen & Stack, 1991; Christensen & Witucki, 1986, cited in Lado, 2001). 
 
From the literature it is clear that food (in)security may be defined both at individual and household 
levels, as well as at national and regional levels. As all such levels are inter-related, the issue of 
regional food insecurity status cannot be properly analysed without due consideration being given 
to individual and household, as well as national, levels. All these levels are therefore to be regarded 
as important in a study such as this. 
 
2.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON FOOD SECURITY 
The roots of concern with food security can be traced back to the world food crisis of 1972–1974, 
and even beyond that, at least to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which 
recognised the right to food as constituting a core element of what can be defined as an adequate 
standard of living (UN 1948, cited in Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1995). The concept of food 
security has evolved, developed, expanded and diversified in recent years, as a result of the diverse 
nature of the problem (ODI, 1997, cited in Drimie & Mini, 2003). The purpose of this section is to 
explore the evolution of thinking on the food security concept through the fundamental shifts that it 
has made since the 1970s: at the levels of analysis, the scope of the analysis, and the assessment of 
the issue of food (in)security. 
 
The history of thinking on food security since the World Food Conference in 1974 may be 
conceptualised as consisting of three important and overlapping paradigm shifts (Maxwell, 1996). 
These three shifts are: (1) from global and national, to households and individuals; (2) from a ‘food 
first’ perspective to a livelihood perspective; and (3) from the consideration of objective indicators 
to the consideration of subjective perception. 
 
During the 1970s, understanding of the concept of food security was based mainly on the idea that 
food insecurity was a food supply problem. The result was that much attention was focused on the 
self-sufficiency strategies adopted at a national level, such as strategies of ensuring the production 
of adequate food supplies and of maximising the stable flow of such supplies. In realising these 
 19
strategies, the focus was laid on the implementation of measures aimed at reducing price variability 
and financing the additional costs of exceptional imports at the international level (Maxwell, 2001). 
 
In 1981, Amartya Sen initiated the paradigm shift that moved the issue of access to food to the 
centre stage. Since the early 1980s, it has been impossible to speak credibly of food security as 
being a problem of food supply without referring to the importance of issues of access and 
entitlement (Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Sen (1981) stated, in terms of his ‘entitlement approach’, 
that ownership of food is one of the most primitive property rights, which is governed by rules in 
every society. The entitlement approach concentrates on each person’s entitlement to commodity 
bundles, including food, and views starvation as resulting from the failure to entitlement to a bundle 
including enough food. Sen’s view is a very clear shift from that of seeing food security as a food 
supply problem, which is concerned with issues of national self-sufficiency and proposals for world 
food stock or import stabilisation schemes, to that of seeing such security as encompassing the 
access to food allowed to individuals in a household, a view that entitles people to order that they 
have food, so that they can avoid having to suffer from the effects of starvation and famine. 
 
In the 1980s, the concept of food security shifted from a ‘food first’ perspective to a livelihood 
perspective, particularly after the African famine experienced during 1984/85. The conventional 
view of food security saw food as a primary need. Such a view was well expressed by Hopkins, 
who argued that “food security stands as a fundamental need, basic to all human needs and the 
organisation of social life. Access to necessary nutrients is fundamental, not only to life per se, but 
also to stable and enduring social order” (Hopkins, 1986, cited in Maxwell, 2001). 
 
Later, the view of food security came to recognise that the consumption of food, especially in the 
form of short-term nutritional intake, is only one of the objectives that people pursue. De Waal 
found that, during the 1984/85 famine in the Darfur region of the Sudan, people chose rather to go 
hungry in the short term in an effort to preserve their assets and future livelihoods. “People are quite 
prepared to put up with considerable degrees of hunger, in order to preserve seed for planting, 
cultivate their own fields or avoid having to sell an animal” (De Waal, 1991, cited in Maxwell, 
2001). In such a predicament, the long-term demands of livelihood outweighed the short-term 
demands of nutritional adequacy. 
 
Recently, perceptions of food security have shifted from a concentration on objective indicators to 
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consideration of more subjective issues. Poverty literature has long distinguished between ‘the 
conditions of deprivation’, referring to objective analysis, and ‘feelings of deprivation’, related to 
the subjective (Townsend, 1974, cited in Maxwell, 2001). Varying objective measurements form 
the basis of such food security approaches as the following: the ‘target’ levels of consumption (as 
identified by Siamwalla & Valdes, 1980, cited in Maxwell, 2001), the consumption of less than 
80% of the amount required for adequate energy (as expounded by the World Health Organisation), 
and the average required daily calorie intake approach (adopted by Reardon & Matlon, 1989, cited 
in Maxwell, 2001). 
 
One of the major problems with the above-mentioned quantitative measures is that qualitative 
aspects of food security, in terms of which nutritional adequacy is a necessary, though insufficient, 
condition for food security, are ignored. In terms of qualitative assessment, not only is quantity a 
key factor for consideration in food entitlement, but also quality. Some observers have consequently 
shifted their thinking to the consideration of the subjective dimension of food security. Such a shift 
can be seen in Maxwell’s description of “a country and people are food secure when their food 
systems operate in such a way as to remove the fear that there will not be enough to eat. In 
particular, food security will be achieved when the poor and vulnerable, particularly women and 
children and those living in marginal areas, have secure access to the food they want.” (Maxwell, 
1988 cited in Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1995) 
 
2.3 CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Achieving long-term food security is inextricably linked to overcoming other global crises, such as 
those of excessive population growth, unemployment, debilitating debt levels, undue energy 
consumption, environmental pollution and political insecurity – all of which have significant 
national and local components that impact negatively on one another (ODI, 1997, cited in Drimie & 
Mini, 2003). However, the direct causes of food insecurity include poverty, ill health, regional and 
national conflict and natural disasters. According to Mbaya (2003), food insecurity has so far 
affected over 15 million people in Southern Africa in forms ranging from the lack of access to food 
to malnutrition and famine. 
 
In Southern Africa, large populations, who are concentrated mainly in the rural areas, face on-going 
food insecurity and poverty. Food insecurity in the region is intensified by adverse weather 
conditions, such as droughts, which impact negatively on farm-level food production (Van Rooyen, 
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2000). Many causes of food insecurity exist in Southern Africa (Drimie & Mini, 2003), including 
macro and micro issues, which are basically either directly or indirectly, caused by the relationships 
maintained with other countries. Examples of such issues are political instability, poor economic 
governance, poverty and a lack of sustainable household income. The issue of HIV/AIDS has added 
another critical dimension to the search for food security. This section aims to identify the main 
causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa. 
 
2.3.1 Adverse climatic conditions (droughts and floods) 
Droughts and floods pose extraordinary threats to the social and economic advancement of the 
SADC region. As the region witnessed in the years preceding the current study, floods have 
undermined SADC efforts in the region to reduce poverty, to promote social and economic 
development, and to accelerate regional integration (SADC, 2001). Rapid-onset floods frequently 
were found to threaten thousands of lives, to displace populations, to damage property and to 
disrupt the provision of basic necessities that households were accustomed to acquire through the 
existing economic and social infrastructure. Slow-onset droughts were found to be equally 
destructive, even, in some ways, potentially more so than floods (SADC, 2001). This section of the 
study describes how an almost complete lack of rainfall (intense droughts) and massive floods cause 
extensive harm to people living in the region, as well as wide-ranging destruction to their property, 
livestock and food crops. 
 
The worst drought of the century in Southern Africa, which occurred in 1991/92, placed millions of 
households in the region under severe stress, increasing their vulnerability to malnutrition and 
disease, resulting in raised mortality rates. Subsistence agricultural production dropped sharply, 
increasing the number of households that depended on food supplies that they could obtain from the 
market, at the same time as prices were increasing and employment opportunities shrinking 
(Thompson, 1993). Thompson (1993) also states that in a number of Southern African countries, the 
rural economies, which were based on agricultural production and employment and small-scale 
commerce, deteriorated to such an extent that millions became dependent on outside assistance 
from relatives, governments and international agencies. 
 
The annual rainfall over the African continent varies from near zero in the heart of the Sahara to 
over 1 600 mm in the equatorial rain forest (Rasmusson, 1987). Drought, which is a recurring 
phenomenon in the semi-arid regions of Africa, has been defined in a number of ways, but no single 
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parameter (whether it be precipitation, run-off, evapotranspiration, temperature, soil moisture or 
crop yields) can serve as an adequate or comprehensive index of drought. Drought implies an 
extended and significant absence of rainfall, relative to that present at the time of the stabilisation of 
a society (Rasmusson, 1987). If the total amount of rainfall is inadequate, or if the rainy season ends 
early, the crops in the region may not mature, with a resulting low yield. Thus, it is often the 
distribution, rather than the total amount of precipitation experienced during the rainy season, that is 
the more relevant factor in regards to food production (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985, cited in Rasmusson, 
1987). Agricultural drought occurs when there is insufficient moisture available at the right time to 
allow for the growth and development of crops, resulting in a decline in yield and/or absolute 
production decline (Glantz, 1987). Rasmusson (1987) suggests a two-time scale conceptual 
framework for viewing African drought. Simply stated, in terms of this framework, the major 
African drought events are seen to occur on two time scales: (a) relatively short, intense drought 
‘episodes’, which usually last no longer than one to three years; and (b) long, dry ‘regimes’ of 
predominantly sub-normal rainfall, spanning a decade or more, which may include several intense 
drought ‘episodes’. 
 
According to Wiggins (2003), the immediate causes of the food insecurity experienced in Southern 
Africa include the drought suffered throughout much of the region during the 2001/02 crop season, 
as well as the flooding that occurred in Mozambique and Malawi, and the frosts and hailstorms 
endured in Lesotho. The weather during the aforesaid season was, in many parts of Southern Africa, 
the worst that had been experienced by farming since the severe drought of 1991/92. Consequently, 
farm output fell and food prices rose, often well above the levels of inflation. In Lesotho, for 
example, maize prices rose by 45% in 2002, against an overall inflation rate of just 14%. Some 
families in the region survived by managing to sell off their assets, most significantly their 
livestock, but, when there is a shortage of food, or when such food is costly, the livestock prices fell 
relative to the increase in the price of cereals, as is often the case. In Zimbabwe, for example, a cow 
could be bartered for less than 300 kg of cereals by December 2002, compared to the best part of a 
tonne that it would have reached under normal conditions (Wiggins, 2003). Although over 20 
million people were seriously affected by the drought of 1991/92, no widespread famine was 
experienced in Southern Africa. Significant levels of starvation only occurred in war-torn areas 
within Mozambique and Angola, more as a result of externally-backed destabilisation efforts than 
of the drought itself (Thompson, 1993). 
 
During the 1992/93 season, the total regional requirement for cereals was 14,8 million metric tonne 
 23
(MT), with import requirements of 7,7 million MT. By the end of December 1992, four months 
before the next harvest, 3,8 million MT of imported cereals had been delivered – 49% of the total 
required. In addition to the grain yet to arrive, 1,5 million MT had to be obtained from additional 
sources to meet the basic needs of the populace (Thompson, 1993). Thompson (1993) also found 
that the SADC/UN appeal of June 1992 estimated the non-food requirements (for health, water, 
agriculture, etc.) at US$197 million. By December of that year, only about 36% of these essential 
needs had been met. The region’s capacity to control the outbreak of epidemic diseases (e.g. 
cholera) and childhood diseases was constrained as a result, as was its ability to promote post-
drought recovery. 
 
With regard to the impact of floods on Southern Africa, the 1999/2000 crop season was 
characterised by the delayed onset of rain, followed by exceptional rainfall during December and 
January, which started flooding parts of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. The 
arrival of Cyclone Elaine compounded the situation, leading to extensive flooding not seen in 
previous years, as well as to extensive losses of life and crops, mainly in the above-mentioned four 
countries. Close on 700 people living in Mozambique, over 70 in Zimbabwe, and 13 in Botswana 
lost their lives. Crop output was also drastically reduced in the affected countries (SADC, 2001). 
 
In general, a lack of rainfall (seen as intense droughts) and massive floods are major threats to the 
social and economic advancement of the SADC region, and can cause significant harm to people, as 
well as damage to their property, livestock and food crops. 
 
2.3.2 Economic problems 
Over the past two or more decades, the countries of Southern Africa have struggled a great deal to 
develop their economies and to create job opportunities and sufficient income to allow their citizens 
to build livelihoods that would boost their standard of living beyond the poverty line, thereby 
reducing their vulnerability to shocks. This section aims to identify economic problems, such as 
poor macro-economic performance, rising external debt, generally increasing inflation and food 
prices, as well as inconsistent food policies, successive years of conflict, high unemployment rates 
and the lack of purchasing power experienced by inhabitants of the region. 
 
African countries have been implementing macro-economic reform programmes since the early 
1980s in response to the generally experienced economic decline, rapid inflation, difficulties with 
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balance of payments, external debt burdens, and other problems plaguing their economies (see 
Johnson, 1994, cited in Kargbo, 2003; World Bank, 1986, 2000). Exchange rates and food prices 
have been seen to be more volatile in Africa since the implementation of numerous adjustment 
programmes. For example, real food prices increased from between 7% and 11% per year in several 
African countries from 1980 to 1998 (Kargbo, 2000, cited in Kargbo, 2003). 
 
Over the past 20 years, the economic growth performance in Southern Africa has been relatively 
poor compared to that experienced in other developing regions. As can be seen in Table 2.1, the 
average annual growth experienced in the SADC region during the 1980s was just 1,4%. 
Unfortunately, between 1991 and 1999, the average annual growth, in contrast, decreased by 0,2% 
in the region (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002), while growth in other emerging blocs, such as that of the 
Mercosur,4 significantly increased during the same period. 
 
Table 2.1. Real GDP (PPP) growth rate in developing countries, 1960–1999 
  1960–1980 1981–1990 1991–99 
SACU 3,1 0,9 1,9 
SADC 2,6 1,4 1,2 
SSA 2,2 1,9 2,2 
Mercosur 2,5 1,7 3,4 
South-East Asia* 3,1 5,4 4,2 
Source: Chauvin & Gaulier (2002).  
* South-East Asia encompasses Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Simple average. 
 
Positive outcomes of the regional neo-liberal economic stance adopted have been a general 
reduction in fiscal deficits throughout the region and a significant curbing of the inflation rate since 
1995 (see Table 2.2) in South Africa, the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland), Zambia, and, most spectacularly, in Mozambique. However, the inflation rate has 
remained high in Angola, the DRC and Malawi, while soaring in Zimbabwe (McCord, 2002). 
Unfortunately, McCord (2002) also found that the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth is 
still far below the target of 6%, as set by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
as a minimum requirement for sustained economic development, and in line with the reduction of 
poverty by half by 2015 envisaged in terms of the Millennium Development Goals. 
                                                 
4 Mercosur is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venzuela. It is also known as the 
Commonmarket of the South. 
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Table 2.2. Macro-economic trends experienced in Southern Africa 
Indicator 1990 1995 2000 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 0,6 3,2 2,6 
GDP per capita (US$) 1 640 1 801 1 464 
Inflation (%) 33,9 70,7 23 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) −4,4 5,7 −2,6 
Source: African Development Report (2001, quoted in Pillary, 2002, cited in McCord, 2002). 
 
Exchange rate policy reform, which has been the main focus of structural adjustment programmes 
adopted by many African countries, have aimed to improve the external competitiveness of their 
economies. However, according to Wiggins (2003), the development models and strategies 
followed have disappointed and failed across the main production sectors of Southern African 
economies, namely mining, industry and agriculture. Although most SADC countries have adopted 
structural adjustment programmes, which has led to improved growth and performance in the export 
sector, the adoption of such programmes has also led to higher rates of unemployment and poverty 
(Siphambe, 2004). The performance of the economy in terms of growth alone is, therefore, an 
inadequate measure of food security in the region. In order to be able to assess the entire picture, the 
issues of poverty, income distribution and general human development have to be examined. 
 
In 2002, the farm-gate prices of basic agricultural commodities in South Africa started to soar. 
Given the high rates of unemployment and poverty experienced in South Africa, any increase in 
food prices should be a cause for concern. Therefore, as a result of the soaring food prices, the 
National Treasury commissioned an investigation into the causes of food price inflation (Vink & 
Kirsten, 2002, cited in Vink et al., 2004). According to Vink et al. (2004), the investigation showed 
that the trigger for the increase in food prices was the sharp depreciation of the Rand towards the 
end of 2001. Such an unexpected slump in the currency over a short period, combined with other 
factors (historically high world prices; a regional shortage of basic staple foods during that time; the 
climate of uncertainty created by the circumstances surrounding the land reform programme and the 
elections in Zimbabwe, and a lack of competition in the supply chain beyond the farm gate), all 
these have contributed to food prices increase. 
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The data in Table 2.3 provides an indication of the prices charged in certain food retail stores (the 
Shoprite Group, Pick ’n Pay Group, Spar, and Woolworths Food Division) in South Africa, as well 
as elsewhere in Southern Africa in 2001. The basket of goods described here was about 50% more 
expensive in Mozambique and Zambia than it was in South Africa, while it was twice as expensive 
in Malawi. The highest prices were charged for processed products, such as cooking oil, flour, rice 
and cheese (Vink & Kirsten, 2002). Vink and Kirsten (2002) also argued that the South African 
consumer market, at that time, was still segmented, inequality was decreasing, and the purchasing 
power of the wealthiest part of the population was increasing. As a result, the largest impact of food 
prices was felt by the poor, most of whom lived, at that stage, in the rural and peri-urban areas of 
the country. In line with such a finding, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) 
found that the exceptional levels of food price inflation were causing considerable hardship among 
consumers, especially among low-income households and the unemployed (CCSA, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the observed price increases appeared to be related to certain prevailing micro- and 
macro-economic conditions, including the decline in the exchange rate, the monetary policy stance, 
the effects of administered price increases, and the shortage of maize in the region. 
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Table 2.3. A comparison of grocery retail prices in the SADC region 
Product Description/Notes South Africa 
Price1 (R) 
Zambia  
Price2 (R3) 
Malawi 
Price (R4) 
Mozambique 
Price (R5) 
Eggs  6 x large (packaged in cardboard tray) 3,19 5,20 7,10 4,71 
Cooking oil 750 ml (in plastic bottle) 5,69 8,60 12,35 8,56 
White 
sugar 
2 kg (packaged in paper bag)  8,636 10,50 12,35 14,127 
Flour 2,5 kg all-purpose (packaged in paper 
bag) 
7,99 18,96 30,87 10,598 
Chicken Whole fresh chicken per kg (packaged in= 
polystyrene tray covered with cellophane) 
14,999(a) 
 
20,50 21,61 17,11 
Tomatoes Grade 1 per kg (sold loose) 8,79 3,88 10,80 3,64 
Potatoes Grade 1 per kg (sold loose) 3,49 5,00 10,19 5,13 
Milk Litre (in plastic bag)  3,39 5,15 7,72 5,34 
Bread Standard brown loaf 2,79 3,50 4,63 1,28 
Cheese Per kg – cut from block (packaged in  
cellophane) 
33,90 87,53 73,64 58,61 
Tea 100 g loose tea (packaged in silver foil)  3,2010(b) 2,00 12,35 13,90 
White rice 1 kg (packaged in sealed plastic bag) 3,59 7,25 7,72 6,63 
Maize meal 12,5 kg breakfast roller meal (packaged in 
cloth bag) 
29,9911(c) 23,96 57,88 42,78 
Body soap 250 g (packaged in sealed plastic) 1,4912(d) 3,88 5,71 3,20 
Total  131,12 205,91 274,92 195,60 
1Prices collected from Shoprite Stellenbosch on 13/11/2001. 2 Prices collected from Shoprite Manda Hill on 9/11/2001. 
31 ZAR = 399,864 ZMK (13/11/2001). 41 ZAR = 6,47899 MK (13/11/2001). 51 ZAR = 2,337,31 MZM (13/11/2001). 
6SA sugar sold in 2,5 kg (converted to 2 kg) paper bags.  7Price per kg. 8No equivalent packaging; average price for 1 kg 
and 5 kg. 9Thick plastic without polystyrene tray. 10Tea bags; loose tea not available; 62,5 g converted to 100g. 
11Converted to 12,5 kg; SA product 10 kg in paper packaging. 12Paper packaging. Comments: (a) Packaged in plastic 
bag. (b) Tea bags in foil packaging. (c) Packaging = paper. (d) Packaging = paper wrapping. 
Source: Vink & Kirsten (2002). 
 
Twenty-five countries in Africa faced food emergencies in 2003, of which 10 were experiencing 
civil strife, and 4 were emerging from conflicts.5 Conflicts were deflecting scarce resources into 
military costs (related to the feeding of armies and the purchasing of weapons) and away from 
critical development needs, resulting in collapsed infrastructures (Clover, 2003). According to 
Thomson (1993), in a situation in which over 80% of the population were living in rural areas, any 
attempts to secure food security and the reduction of poverty required that the rural inhabitants live 
                                                 
5 The countries that were, during this time, experiencing civil strife were Burundi, the Central African Republic, the 
DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The countries emerging from conflict were 
Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Guinea. 
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on their own land, which would then enable them to plant their own crops. 
 
In the decade preceding the current study, South Africa has made such remarkable strides in its 
transition to democracy, freedom and unity that it has become a leader on the African continent. As 
such, South Africa is the only country in the region that is currently food secure at the national 
level. The country produces its own main staple foods, exports its surplus foods, and imports what it 
needs to meet its food requirements. National food security indicators reveal that South Africa has 
been meeting the majority of the food needs, except for those relating to rice and wheat, of its 
growing population from domestic sources during the past 20 years. As South Africa lacks a 
domestic resource base for the production of rice and wheat, both products are imported (DoA, 
2002). Unfortunately, however, at household level, South Africa faces food insecurity. Hendriks 
(2005, summarising Labadarios & Nel, 2003); Rose (2004); Rose & Charlton (2003), and Gerike et 
al. (2003), all cited in Hendriks & Msaki (2005), the available data suggests that between 58,5% 
and 73% of South African households may experience food insecurity, with 15,9% consuming less 
than the amount required for adequate energy. As a result, stunting affects about 22% of children 
under nine years of age, while wasting occurs in approximately 3,7% of children under nine years 
of age. Approximately 30% of households may, in effect, experience hunger. According to 
Statistics SA (1998), many South African households are unable to afford to purchase food. 
Underlying their lack of purchasing power is the limited scope of income opportunities, especially 
in the rural areas. Unemployment rates have remained high at 38%, despite other economic 
indicators have remained more stable. 
 
With regard to the failure of food policy in Southern Africa, a forum has been established in the 
region to examine the underlying political economy and governance issues, particularly in relation 
to agricultural development and food security, which have contributed to food insecurity in the 
SADC region. The forum focused on five case study countries: Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho (Bird et al., 2003). According to Bird et al. (2003), neo-patrimonialism6 in 
the aforesaid countries has influenced food policies and the outcomes thereof in the following ways:  
 Agricultural policies have been formulated as a means of guaranteeing political support, 
particularly in the run-up to elections. 
 State intervention in the supply of agricultural inputs, pricing and food distribution persists 
                                                 
6 Max Weber (1974, cited in Bird et al., 2003) has identified ‘patrimonialism’ as a type of traditional political authority 
in which the ‘chief’ uses his position for his own gain. 
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for political reasons, while a technical case can be made for instituting some measure of 
official intervention to help make markets accessible to the poor. 
 State resources are unofficially diverted for personal gain by way of corruption and 
nepotism, despite the life-threatening nature of such behaviour to the general population. 
Effective domestic accountability cannot account for such occurrences. 
 
2.3.3 Mismanagement and poor governance 
Mismanagement and poor governance are reflected in the inappropriate food security strategies 
adopted at national level. This section sets out to define the inappropriate food security strategies of 
some SADC countries, which entail waiting for natural disasters before requesting help from the 
international community; the failure of governance both through lack of accountability and 
resistance to democratisation; financial mismanagement, such as the selling off of a country’s 
strategic grain reserve (SGR); and widespread corruption.  
 
According to Drimie and Mini (2003), some SADC countries – of which Zimbabwe and Malawi are 
prime examples – wait for droughts before requesting help from the international community, which 
is often slow to respond, and which sometimes responds inappropriately. One reason for such slow 
response time is the view that drought is an event, rather than the result of a process (Glantz, Betsill 
& Crandall, 1997, cited in De Klerk et al., 2004). There is therefore a need to find ways in which to 
press governments to use their resources wisely and to combine efforts, so that an EWS is not seen 
as a reactive operation separate from the government itself, but rather as part of on-going data 
collection (e.g. nutrition data or clinical information) and monitoring – thus serving as a rationale 
for an expanded food information system. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the failure of governance – both in terms of lack of accountability and in opposition 
to the process of democratisation – and, in particular, the way in which the land reform programme 
has been instrumentalised and implemented, has resulted in the severe undermining of the 
previously robust agricultural economy (Clover, 2003). Clover (2003) has also explored the fact 
that the land reform programme in Zimbabwe offers both promise (in the longer term) and threat. 
There is currently concern over the underutilisation of newly settled land and the possibility of 
lower crop yields. At the end of 2002, an estimated 90% of the 300 000 Zimbabweans who were 
given land by the government as part of the land reform programme still lacked farm inputs, and 
some 94% did not yet have seed for the coming season. The situation was further aggravated by the 
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uncertainty of tenure, as it appeared that the government still owned the land, making it difficult for 
farmers to access credit at the banks. By the end of 2002, Zimbabwe’s average farming output was 
down by about 75% from that of the previous year (Clover, 2003). 
 
Malawian financial mismanagement in its sale of the country’s SGR has also played a major role in 
contributing to the food insecurity being experienced in Southern Africa. For example, the 
Malawian government sold its SGR of 110 000 tonnes in 2001 at the behest of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to balance its payments, despite the fact that there were already 
signs of food insecurity.7 As a result, Malawi needed US$21,6 million to cover its 600 000 tonne 
maize deficit barely a year later. Corruption charges were levelled at some of Malawi’s elite for 
buying this reserve and reselling it in the country at a 500% profit (Sunday Independent, 19 May 
2002, cited in Drimie & Mini, 2003). 
 
Bird et al. (2003), finding that there was an absence of formal accountability mechanisms in 
Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, said: “We show that one might expect a 
vigorous media to play a positive role. However, the regional media was strangely silent during the 
whole of the food insecurity crisis.” According to Bird et al. (2003), domestic media and political 
debates focused on specific instances of corruption and interpersonal wrangling, while, despite the 
hunger and hardship experienced by both the rural and urban populations, remaining mute on the 
question of the food crisis. In some countries, such silence may mostly be due to self-censorship 
and/or state control of large parts of the media. But, whatever the cause, it has meant that 
governments have had little trouble in blaming either the climate or outside actors, such as donors, 
for the on-going problem of food insecurity. 
 
Prior to the onset of the emergency, few countries in Southern Africa had disaster management 
contingency plans in place aimed at guiding an effective response. Most countries were not 
adequately prepared to provide a widespread humanitarian response, which led to significant 
response delays in some countries, such as Zambia (Mano et al., 2003). Mano et al. (2003) have 
also argued that SGRs were at low levels in most SADC countries at the onset of the emergency, as 
they had already largely been depleted due to production shortfalls that had occurred in the 
preceding year. In some cases, such shortfalls had increased the level of food aid required at the 
                                                 
7 A similar difficult choice that had to be made between economic pressures and food security objectives almost 
brought Zimbabwe to the brink of famine in 1990/91, when the Bretton Woods institutions instructed the government to 
sell its grain reserves immediately prior to the 1991 agricultural drought. 
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time of crisis.  
 
In terms of democracy and governance debates in Southern Africa, national governance challenges 
continue to provoke sporadic political unrest and national conflicts of varying degrees of intensity 
across the SADC region. Some argue that political instability is often a direct cause of food 
insecurity (Hugon & Alii, 2003, cited in Mano et al., 2003). In the sub-region, such instability also 
tends to force insecure governments to promulgate economic and food security policies in order to 
satisfy selfish short-term goals of political survival and rent-seeking, thus restricting the 
development of an enabling environment that might otherwise encourage farmers and their buyers 
to do business. In such a distrustful environment, economic players tend to withhold from making 
investment and economic decisions (Hugon & Alii, 2003, cited in Mano et al., 2003). 
 
What is needed is an understanding that goes beyond conventional orthodox wisdom to focus more 
strategically on developing and implementing effective international, national and regional policies. 
Availability, access and affordability are all elements of food security that give rise to complex 
issues encompassing a wide range of interrelated economic, social and political factors, both 
internal and external, which challenge Africa’s ability to address the problem (Clover, 2003). 
 
2.3.4 HIV/AIDS 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is the focus of increasing concern in the SSA region, not only because of 
the serious health and social implications that it holds, but also because of the negative effect of the 
prevalence of such illness on agricultural performance and food security (FAO, 2001). This section 
therefore aims to determine the rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence in Southern African countries and the 
linkage thereof to all dimensions of food security – the availability of food, the stability of supply, 
and the access to and use of food – and to explore the impact of HIV/AIDS on household 
agricultural production and the food security status in the region. 
 
FAO (2001) estimated that in 2000, of the 36,1 million people worldwide estimated to have 
contracted HIV/AIDS, 25,3 million, or 70%, were living in the SSA. According to Dubois (2003), 
the widespread nature of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa breaks the chain of knowledge and 
capability transfer stretching, in the past, from one generation to the next, as well as the possibility 
of dividing labour up among generations. 
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A consultative meeting organised by the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and 
the Regional Interagency Co-ordination Support Office in November 2002 discussed the issue of 
food insecurity in Southern Africa (Drimie & Mini, 2003). At the meeting, over 70 participants 
from various UN agencies and civil society organisations concluded that the devastating impact of 
HIV/AIDS, especially in the worst affected areas, such as Southern Africa, was complicating the 
task of fighting hunger and debilitating efforts to ensure the livelihoods of the poor. The pandemic 
had created large new vulnerable groups and was rapidly eroding food and livelihood security at the 
time. At that stage, Southern Africa had the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world, namely 
Lesotho 31%; Malawi 16%; Mozambique 13%; Swaziland 33%; Zambia 22%, and Zimbabwe 34%, 
with infection levels at around 25% of the population (UNAIDS, 2002, cited in De Klerk et al., 
2004). The result was that all the dimensions of food security to which reference has already been 
made had already been affected. In 2006, UNAIDS determined the percentage of the adult 
population in Southern African countries infected with HIV/AIDS as standing at the following (see 
Figure 3): Mauritius 0,6%; Angola 3,78%; Malawi 14,1%; Mozambique 16,1%; Zambia 17%; 
South Africa 18,8%; Namibia 19,6%; Zimbabwe 20,1%; Lesotho 23,2%; Botswana 24,1%, and 
Swaziland 33,4% (UNAIDS, 2006).  
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Source: Adapted from UNAIDS (2006). 
Figure 3. Percentage of adult population infected by HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, 2006 
 
The age group most infected with HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa was that of the 15 to 49 year olds, 
of which the highest number was to be found in South Africa (see Figure 4), where 5 500 000 adults 
were reported as already infected (UNAIDS, 2006). 
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Source: Adapted from UNAIDS (2006). 
Figure 4: Prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, 2006 
 
Several studies have been undertaken in order to measure the effects of HIV/AIDS morbidity 
(illness) and mortality (death) on household income. In Botswana, the per capita household income 
for the poorest quarter of households was predicted to fall by 13% in the coming years, while 
income earners in this category were expected to provide for an additional four dependents as a 
result of HIV/AIDS (Botswana Institute for Development and Policy Analysis, 2000, cited in Naidu 
& Harris, 2005). In the rural Kafue District of Zambia, households affected by chronic illness, 
including HIV/AIDS, as in 1999 reported annual income levels 46% lower than those of non-
affected households (Mutangadura and Webb, 1999, quoted in Topouzis, 2000, cited in Naidu & 
Harris, 2005). In the rural Limpopo Province of South Africa, Oni et al. (2002) found that the 
average annual income was approximately 35% lower in households affected by HIV/AIDS than in 
non-affected households (Oni et al., 2002, cited in Naidu & Harris, 2005). These income changes, 
combined with the high associated morbidity and mortality costs, had resulted in changes to 
expenditure on foodstuffs, which threatened household food security in the region. 
 
According to the FAO (2001), the impact of HIV/AIDS on agricultural production and food 
availability is felt in terms of the quantity and quality of food available. In Zimbabwe, for example, 
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the communal agricultural output has decreased by 50% over the past five years, largely due to the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, combined with other factors. The production of maize, cotton, sunflowers 
and groundnuts had been particularly affected at the time of compilation of the current study. In 
most of the highly affected countries, agriculture continues to provide a living for the large majority 
of the population. Agriculture, particularly food production, had been affected in several ways by 
the number of those with HIV/AIDS. The toll exacted on the agricultural labour force responsible 
for food production was severe, as full-blown AIDS leads to sickness and death (FAO, 2001). The 
FAO Conference on HIV/AIDS and agriculture estimated that in the 27 most affected countries in 
Africa, 7 million agricultural workers had died from AIDS since 1985, and 16 million more deaths 
were likely in the next two decades. In the 10 most affected African countries, labour force 
decreases ranging from 10% to 26% were anticipated (see Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4. The impact of HIV/AIDS on agricultural labour in the most affected countries 
in the SSA 
   
Country Estimated % lost in 2000 Projected % loss in 2020 
Namibia  3,0 26,0 
Botswana  6,6 23,2 
Zimbabwe  9,6 22,7 
Mozambique  2,3 20,0 
South Africa  3,9 19,9 
Kenya  3,9 16,8 
Malawi  5,8 13,8 
Uganda  12,8 13,7 
Tanzania  5,8 12,7 
Central African Republic  6,3 12,6 
Ivory Coast  5,6 11,4 
Cameroon  2,9 10,7 
Source: FAO (2001).   
 
HIV/AIDS-affected households generally have been known to experience a decline in agricultural 
production of both cash and food crops, as compared to non-affected households. The major 
impacts of such ill health on agriculture include the depletion of human resources, the diversion of 
capital from agriculture, the loss of farm and non-farm income and other psychosocial impacts that 
affect productivity negatively (Mutangadura, Jackson & Mukurazita, 1999, cited in De Klerk et al., 
2004). For example, the UN estimated that, while 9,6% of Zimbabwe’s agricultural labour force 
was lost in 2000, 5,8% was lost in Malawi, where 70% of the households suffered a decrease in 
their labour force due to the disease. In Zimbabwe, smallholder production of cattle decreased by 
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29%, production of vegetables by 49%, and production of maize by 61% in households where 
somebody died of AIDS (Dubois, 2003). 
 
De Klerk et al. (2004) summarised the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on household agricultural 
production as follows: 
 a decrease in the area of land under cultivation at household level, due to a lack of labour 
stemming from the severe illness and death of infected household members; 
 a decline in crop yields, due to delays in carrying out certain agricultural interventions, such 
as weeding and other intercultivation measures, as well as cropping patterns; 
 a decline in yield resulting from a lack of sufficient input, such as fertiliser and seeds; 
 a reduction in the range of crops produced at household level; 
 a loss of agricultural knowledge and farm management skills, due to the loss of key 
household members due to AIDS; and 
 a decline in the livestock production of affected households, as the need for cash and the 
loss of knowledge and skills forced some of the worst affected families to sell their animals. 
 
Thus, such losses of adult agricultural labour potential may affect food security through decreases 
in both the number of areas planted and in the extent of yield. Furthermore, food security can be 
adversely affected through loss of labour quality by reducing the income earned at household level, 
and by the amount of time diverted from production to care-giving and the attendance of funerals. 
 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) suggested that the HIV epidemic 
disproportionately affects agriculture, relative to other sectors (IFAD, 2001, cited in De Klerk et al., 
2004). De Waal and Tumushabe (2003) argues that such devastating effects are not due to HIV 
rates being higher among workers in the agricultural sector than elsewhere, but because the 
structure of the agricultural sector is such that it is much less able than other sectors of the economy 
to absorb the impacts of the human resource losses associated with the epidemic. 
 
With regard to HIV/AIDS-related costs, direct costs to households represent out-of-pocket costs or 
actual expenditure on goods and services (UNAIDS, 2000). In HIV/AIDS studies, direct costs 
represent the actual expenditures on treatment (Booysen et al., 2002; Danziger, 1994; Bowie, 1996, 
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cited in Naidu & Harris, 2005) and funerals (Pitayanon et al., 1995; Booysen et al., 2002, cited in 
Naidu & Harris, 2005). A study in rural Thailand found that a household spent, on average, US$1 
000 per patient during the last year of an AIDS patient’s life, which is equivalent to the average 
annual household income (UNAIDS, 2000). In rural Tanzania, households spent more on funerals 
(60% of the total cost of medical and funeral expenses) than on medical care (Kagera study, World 
Bank, 1999, cited in Naidu & Harris, 2005). In South Africa, the high cost of a funeral can threaten 
the economic security of a bereaved family (Ayieko, 1997, cited in Naidu & Harris, 2005). These 
studies all emphasise the large proportion of total household income consumed by health care and 
funeral expenditure. 
 
2.3.5 Lack of food entitlement (poverty) 
Sen called poverty the lack of food entitlement (in reference to the lack of access to land, credit, 
income and family support systems), which was found to be the major cause of famine and hunger 
(Sen, 1977, cited in Rukuni & Eicher, 1988). Sen challenged the prevailing view of the time that 
famine was caused primarily by a food production shortfall, later expanding his entitlement thesis in 
his widely read book, Poverty and Famine. Sen came to realise that people starve because of a food 
entitlement failure, not because of a food availability failure. This section identifies a lack of food 
entitlement (poverty) as a phenomenon, describes it’s the major causes, and reveals the effect that it 
has so far had on food security in the region. 
 
Starvation is the phenomenon of some people not having enough food to eat – it is not the 
characteristic of there not being enough food to eat (Sen, 1981). Starvation statements can be 
translated into statements of ownership of food by persons. Therefore, a relationship of ownership is 
one kind of entitlement relation. According to Sen (1981), entitlement relations accepted in a private 
ownership market economy typically include the following: 
• trade-based entitlement, in terms of which one is entitled to own what one obtains by means 
of trading something one owns with a willing party (or, multilaterally, with a willing set of 
parties); 
• production-based entitlement, in terms of which one is entitled to own what one obtains by 
way of arranging production using one’s own resources, or by way of the resources hired 
from willing parties meeting the agreed conditions of trade; 
• own-labour entitlement, in terms of which one is entitled to one’s own labour power, and 
thus to the trade-based and production-based entitlements related to one’s labour power; and 
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• inheritance and transfer entitlement, in terms of which one is entitled to own what is 
willingly given to one by the legitimate owner thereof, which can take effect after the latter’s 
death (if so specified by him/her). 
 
Sen’s ‘entitlements approach’ provides a framework for analysing the relationship between rights, 
interpersonal obligations and individual entitlement to things (ODI, 2001, cited in Drimie & Mini, 
2003). 
 
Income levels, which vary significantly in Southern Africa, are linked to per capita food 
consumption. During the late 1990s, Mozambique, which was recovering from civil war, had one of 
the world’s lowest per capita income levels – US$140, while Mauritius had the region’s highest per 
capita income – US$3,870 (World Bank, 1998, cited in Trueblood et al., 2001). Nine of the 12 
SADC countries recorded positive per capita growth rates over the 1988 to 1997 period (see Table 
2.5). The fastest growing economies on an annual per capita basis were Mauritius and Botswana – 
both with over 4% annual growth rate. Only Angola, which had continued to experience political 
instability, showed a deeply negative growth rate (−8%). Inhabitants of the SADC region 
consumed, on average, 2 231 calories per person per day, which is quite substantially below the 
world average of 2 760. Average daily per capita calorie consumption was highest in Mauritius (2 
923) and South Africa (2 956), where incomes were highest, while consumption was below the 
nutritional requirement of 2 100 calories (as recommended by the FAO) in the poorer countries, 
such as Angola (1 900), Mozambique (1 782), and Zambia (1 958) (Trueblood et al., 2001). 
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Table 2.5. Per capita incomes and calorie consumption levels 
    Annual real per Average per capita Average share of 
 Per capita capita GNP growth calorie supplies grain in calorie 
Country GNP, 1997 rate, 1988–1997 per day, 1995–1997 supplies, 1995–1997 
 US$ Per cent Number Per cent 
Angola 260,0 −8,5 1 900,0 31,4 
Botswana 3 310,0 4,0 2 228,0 49,4 
Lesotho 680,0 1,4 2 236,0 75,3 
Malawi 210,0 1,3 2 068,0 68,4 
Mauritius 3 870,0 4,1 2 923,0 44,3 
Mozambique 140,0 2,7 1 782,0 41,5 
Namibia 2 110,0 2,1 2 141,0 48,9 
South Africa 3 210,0 −0,7 2 956,0 52,9 
Swaziland 1 520,0 1,6 2 479,0 50,5 
Tanzania 210,0 0,7 2 000,0 48,7 
Zambia 370,0 −0,9 1 958,0 66,2 
Zimbabwe 720,0 0,0 2 095,0 61,5 
SADC 1 420,0 −0,6 2 231,0 53,2 
Source: World Bank (1998), UNFAO (1999, both cited in Truebloodl et al., 2001). 
 
International studies have shown that income changes (usually calculated in terms of national 
change) are linked to concomitant changes in health and nutrition (Gillespie, 1997, cited in 
Hendriks, 2003). In South Africa, for example, various expenditure studies have served to confirm 
that increased household incomes are likely to increase the local demand for meat, poultry, 
vegetables and fruit, which would significantly positively influence food intake (Hendriks, 2003). 
 
Recent data has revealed that Southern Africa experiences a high percentage of income inequality. 
The World Bank (2006) Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. Figure 5 shows that 50% or more of the population living in 70% of the 
countries in the region had suffered from the adverse effects of an unequal distribution of income. 
Of these, the Namibian population (74,3%) had suffered most, followed by those of Lesotho 
(63,2%); Botswana (63%); Swaziland (60,9%); South Africa (57,8%); Malawi (50,3%), and 
Zimbabwe (50,1%) (World Bank, 2006). 
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Source: Adapted from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006). 
Figure 5. Distribution of income or consumption in Southern Africa, 2006 
 
A lack of food is one of the most acute forms of absolute poverty, when poverty is defined in terms 
of the lack of, and the non-accessibility to, basic goods (Dubois, 2003). Access to an adequate 
supply of food is the most basic of human needs. Ensuring that their people have enough to eat is 
not only the moral duty of governments but also in their own economic and political best interest. 
 
Since Southern African economies are highly dependent on land-based agricultural production and 
access to land is a critical component of ‘food entitlements’ – especially for those without income 
and employment, addressing land access issues in the region is of great importance. Unfortunately, 
the inequitable distribution of land and uncertain land tenure security tend to be hindered, rather 
than helped, by the land policies currently in place in Southern African countries. According to 
Hendriks and Lyne (2003), the supply of tradable and non-tradable agricultural commodities in 
rural areas is constrained by issues of insecure tenure and inadequate physical and legal 
infrastructures. The disadvantages of managing land as communal areas raise the related transaction 
costs in all markets, denying prospective farmers access to land, credit, inputs and buyers. In 
addition, the region made less arable land available throughout the past four decades than in the 
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past. According to Moyo (2006), the per capita arable land area available in all SADC countries 
shrank from 1965 to 2000. Consequently, the amount of arable land in the region decreased from 0, 
47/ha in 1965 to 0, 22/ha in 2000 (see Table 2.6). 
 
Table 2.6. Per capita arable land in the SADC region 
Country                      Per capita arable land area (ha)   
  1965 1980 1987 1990 2000 
Angola  0,53 0,41 0,34 0,31 0,25 
Botswana 0,73 0,44 0,35 0,33 0,22 
DRC 0,36 0,25 0,20 0,18 0,14 
Lesotho 0,37 0,22 0,20 0,18 0,16 
Malawi  0,28 0,20 0,20 0,18 0,18 
Mauritius  0,12 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,08 
Mozambique  0,30 0,24 0,21 0,20 0,17 
Namibia 0,92 0,64 0,53 0,49 0,47 
Seychelles  0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 
South Africa 0,62 0,45 0,38 0,38 0,28 
Swaziland 0,38 0,33 0,23 0,23 0,18 
Tanzania  0,17 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 
Zambia  1,34 0,89 0,73 0,67 0,55 
Zimbabwe  0,46 0,35 0,30 0,28 0,24 
SADC 0,47 0,33 0,28 0,26 0,22 
Source: Moyo (2006).     
 
Land tenure is the system of rights and institutions that govern access to and use of land (Adams, 
2001 cited in UN, 2003). It can be further defined as the terms and conditions under which land is 
held, used and transacted and is one of the principal factors determining the way in which resources 
are managed and used and the manner in which benefits are distributed. 
 
SAIIA (2004), in a recent publication of the South African Human Sciences Research Council, 
comments that land reform policies in the Southern African region have been applied inconsistently. 
Neither colonial nor contemporary practices have ever been uniform. Another major concern in 
Southern Africa is the failure to integrate land reform with tenure issues, resettlement programmes 
and meaningful land-use policies that cover all land, whether rural or urban. Land reform policies 
should also apply to non-agricultural land, because fertile soil is too scarce a resource in many 
countries to be made available to everybody. Only 7% of all land in Africa is arable, while, in 
Southern Africa, this percentage is only 6%, with Malawi having the highest amount at 18%, and 
Botswana the lowest, at 0.5%,. Two other SADC countries where the land reform debate is 
particularly public fall into the middle range, with Zimbabwe having 8% and Namibia 1% of land 
fertile enough for the growing of crops. Regional organisations, such as SADC, have still to express 
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an opinion on land reform. 
 
According to the United Nations, the main forms of land tenure insecurity include the insecurity of 
minority groups (as in Botswana and Malawi); unclear or overlapping land rights (as in South 
Africa); overcrowding (as in Lesotho, Malawi and South Africa); land alienation in the form of 
leasehold (as in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia); the insecurity of farm workers and farm labour 
tenants (as in South Africa); corrupt and exploitative administrative practices, and limited women’s 
land rights ( which affect all countries in the region) (UN, 2003). 
 
Land rights in freehold include the ability to sell the land, to rent it to others and to use it as 
collateral for a mortgage. Before colonisation, the dominant form of land tenure system was 
customary. Today, virtually all countries in the region have a dual land tenure system, wherein 
customary or communal system co-exists with statutory private, freehold and leasehold land rights. 
According to the UN (2003), Mauritius (77%) had the highest percentage of land ownership under 
the statutory tenure system, followed by South Africa (72%); Namibia (44%); Zimbabwe (41%) and 
Swaziland (40%) (see Figure 6). SAIIA (2004) found that state ownership varied from 100% in 
some SADC countries (Mozambique and Zambia) to 1% (Zimbabwe) to 0% (Namibia). Twenty-
five percent of land in South Africa, at the time of this study, was state owned. 
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Source: Adapted from UN, 2003 & Moyo (2006). 
Figure 6. Land ownership under private/freehold and leasehold, as % of national territory in 
Southern Africa, 1999–2006 
 
Unemployment also constitutes a major cause of lack of food entitlement in Southern Africa, as the 
unemployment rate is very high in the region. Though unemployment can be seen to be a universal 
problem, political leaders, nevertheless, have to wrestle to keep the level of unemployment as low 
as possible. Both the World Bank (2006) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) define 
unemployment in terms of the number of the economically active population that is without work, 
though available for and seeking work, including people who have lost their jobs and those who 
have voluntarily resigned from their jobs. 
 
According to the World Bank (2006), the unemployment rate is extremely high in Southern Africa, 
with the rate being the highest in Namibia (31,1%), followed by South Africa (28,4%), Zambia 
(18,9%), Botswana (18,6%), Mauritius (10,2%), Zimbabwe (8,2%) and Tanzania (5,1%) (see 
Figure 7). The socio-economic impact of such unemployment is that it tends to lead to participation 
in criminal activities as being regarded as the only means of survival by certain groups of the 
unemployed. 
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Source: Adapted from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006). 
Figure 7. Unemployment rate in selected countries in Southern Africa, 2000–2004 
 
Given the complexity of food security and the range of factors and elements that affect food supply, 
access, adequacy, utilisation, safety and cultural acceptability, measurements of food security are 
appreciably complex, extensive and expensive (Hendriks, 2005). Household vulnerability analyses 
are used by various international aid agencies (including the Food and EWS, the Food and Income 
Vulnerability Information Mapping System (FIVIMS), and the World Food Programme (WFP)) to 
facilitate the identification of long-term mitigation activities, the targeting of food aid and 
emergency activities and the monitoring of interventions. Vulnerability approaches attempt to 
determine the change in consumption (in terms of the total food budget) and income sources 
undergone as the result of a crisis compared to those present during baseline ‘normal’ periods for 
each socio-economic group identified by way of key informant interviews (Riely, 2000, cited in 
Hendriks, 2005). Such a focus on vulnerability, which complements that on poverty, implies firstly 
identifying the threats and, more generally, the risks that affected people may encounter, and 
secondly, assessing the capacity of those affected in this way to cope with the consequences of the 
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related dramatic event (Dubois, 2003). 
 
Rolling national vulnerability assessments have been carried out in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe during the 2002/03 crisis in order to assess and monitor the 
vulnerability of households to food insecurity (Mdladla et al., 2003, cited in Hendriks, 2005). Two 
of the indicators that were used to assess food insecurity in each country were the number of people 
requiring emergency food aid, and the levels of malnutrition in children under the age of five. The 
performance of the countries in the region in relation to these indicators is compared in Table 2.7. 
As a result of the assessment of these and other indicators, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi have 
been recognised to be the worst affected in terms of food insecurity, though acute malnutrition rates 
were reported as being low in general, with wasting in under-5’s being below 10% (Mbaya, 2003). 
With regard to the macro-economic picture of vulnerability assessments in Southern Africa, 
Marsland (2003) found a domestic cereal gap at macro level: 1 600 500 MT for the six countries, of 
which the cereal gap for Zimbabwe alone was 897 000 MT. 
 
Table 2.7. Food insecurity in six Southern African countries, 2002/03 
 
Country People needing food aid     Malnutrition in children under the age of five 
  % of population       Wasting                              Stunting 
Lesotho 34%         7,5%                                  34,7% 
Malawi 31%            6%                                  49% 
Mozambique 3%          5,5%                                 43,8% 
Swaziland 28%          2,2%                                 40% 
Zambia 28%          4,4%                                39,9% 
Zimbabwe 52%          7,35%                              49,3% 
Source: SADC (2002).  
 
According to Mbaya (2003), the factors underlying the ongoing poverty and food insecurity were 
varied, but generally included transitory shocks to production systems; weak economic growth 
performance resulting from unsuccessful macro-economic policies; poor balance of payments 
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situations, and highly skewed patterns of income and wealth distribution resulting from past 
colonial policies. 
 
One of the most common coping strategies in times of food insecurity in Southern Africa lay in 
reducing food consumption. For example, in badly affected parts of Zimbabwe, households have 
sought to cope with the situation by initially eating smaller portions. As the scarcity of food 
supplies worsened, families intensified their efforts at coping by skipping a meal during the day. 
This graduated to skipping more than one meal per day. In extreme cases, families then resorted to 
skipping whole days without eating a proper meal (Mbaya, 2003). The adoption of such an extreme 
response has negative consequences on one’s daily routine. According to the SADC Monthly 
Report of November 2002, about 80% of the households surveyed in Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe indicated that they had already changed their 
consumption patterns in response to the ongoing food insecurity (SADC, 2002, cited in Mbaya, 
2003). 
 
A study based on subjective assessment has been conducted in South Africa in order to assess 
household food insecurity. The results (see Table 2.8) show that during 1994 and 1995, and from 
1996 to 1998, the number of households not having ‘enough money to feed children’ and that 
‘could not afford to feed children’ may indicate that household food security deteriorated over the 
survey rounds. The results should be interpreted with caution, as the questions across survey rounds 
were inconsistent (HSRC, 2004, cited in Hendriks, 2005). 
 
Table 2.8. Subjective assessment of food insecurity in South Africa by province 
and area of residence, 1994–1999 
       Did not have enough     Children under 7 went hungry 
    money to feed children Could not afford to feed     due to insufficient money 
             in household  children in household                        to buy food   
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998     1999 
National 41,0 31,7 27,0 25,5 31,1   23,4 
Rural 49,2 n/a 29,1 29,9 37,2   27,6 
Urban 34,1 n/a 25,5 22,3 26,4     19,1 
Source: Statistics SA, 1994–99 quoted by HSRC, 2004 (both cited in Hendriks, 2005). 
 
Bradshaw et al. (2000) and Statistics SA (2003) (both cited by HSRC, 2004, cited in Hendriks, 
2005) confirm that malnutrition (in terms of rates of underweight and stunted children) worsened in 
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South Africa during the late 1990s. Rose and Charlton argue that, while research may indicate the 
efficiency of using national-level household data in identifying food insecurity as an alternative to 
expensive anthropometric measurement, it does not enable an understanding of household responses 
to food insecurity to be gleaned (Rose & Charlton, 2002, cited in Hendriks, 2005). According to 
Statistics SA, about 35% of the total population, or 14,3 million South Africans, were vulnerable to 
food insecurity. Among these, women, children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable 
(Statistics SA: Measuring Poverty in SA, 2000).  
 
Based on the available data it can be concluded that poverty or lack of food entitlement existed in 
Southern Africa. Sen views the lack of food entitlement as a major cause of famine and hunger, 
though the availability of food is also crucial for balancing the food security equation. 
 
2.3.6. Southern African population growth 
The world food supply and population growth are considered important variables in today’s debate 
on economic and environmental development, and the interaction between population growth, 
economic growth and resource availability is still a key issue (Maskey, 2001). This part of the study 
aims to explore pessimists’ and optimists’ views on the relationship between population growth and 
food security in Southern Africa, and to identify whether rapid population growth poses serious 
problems for the supply of, and demand for, food in the region. 
 
Numerous studies have shown a positive relationship between population densities or growth and 
deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, declining soil fertility and other resource and environmental 
problems (Panayotou, 1993; Stern et al., 1996; Templeton & Scherr, 1997, cited in Pender, 1998). 
Two conflicting views exist in regard to the future prospects of food supply being sufficient to cope 
with population growth – the pessimists’ and the optimists’ views. In the pessimists’ view, the 
population is likely to grow at a geometric rate, while land and food supply can only expand 
arithmetically. The growth in food supplies, therefore, will not be able to keep pace with ever- 
growing populations and per capita incomes will fall, leading to a stable population existing at a 
subsistence level (Maskey, 2001). In the optimists’ view, increasingly more experts think that 
global food supplies will be able to match the population growth rate. Such a view was supported 
by studies presented in early 1994 by the FAO, the World Bank and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) (Maskey, 2001). 
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According to Rousseau et al. (2002), the combined population of the SADC member states in 2000 
totalled almost 200 million. The countries with the largest share in the total population were the 
DRC (25,8%), South Africa (21,5%) and Tanzania (16,9%), (see Figure 8). The Seychelles, 
Swaziland and Mauritius, in contrast, had the smallest populations, with relative shares of 0,04%, 
0,5% and 0,6%, respectively. The DRC had the highest population growth rate. Given that the 
country had the largest population of all SADC member countries, the share of the DRC in the 
region’s total population was set to increase significantly in the foreseeable future, if the existing 
trends persisted.  
 
Source : Adapted from Rousseau et al. (2003:3). 
Figure 8. Total population of Southern Africa in 2000 
 
In contrast, countries with the smallest populations had the lowest population growth rates. 
Rousseau et al. (2002) also argue that one reason for the above-average growth rates of 2,5% in the 
DRC and Angola was the age structure of the population in these countries. The mentioned 
populations were relatively young, which implies that they had a higher potential for natural growth 
than did the rest of the member countries. Countries with the lowest population growth rates, the 
Seychelles and Mauritius, had the smallest proportion of people younger than 15 years of age 
(Rousseau et al., 2002). 
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The trends in population growth offer a bleak prognosis for meeting the escalating demand for food 
and water. Crude birth rate (CBR) is the number of live births occurring during the year, per 1 000 
population. In SADC, the birth rate ranged from 16 in Mauritius to 50 in the DRC in 2004. The 
regional average was 32 (World Bank, 2006) (see Table 2.9).  
 
Table 2.9. Demographic profile of the SADC: 1990–2004 
Country/Region Population Population Population growth rate Crude death rate Crude birth rate 
  (millions)  (millions) (%)* per 1,000 people per 1,000 people 
 1990 2004 1990–2004 2004 2004 
Angola 10,5 15,5 2,8 22 28 
Botswana 1,4 1,8 1,5 26 26 
DRC 37,8 55,9 2,8 20 50 
Lesotho 1,6 1,8 0,9 25 28 
Malawi 9,5 12,6 2,1 21 43 
Mauritius 1,1 1,2 1,1 7 16 
Mozambique 13,4 19,4 2,6 20 39 
Namibia 1,4 2,0 2,6 6 23 
South Africa 35,2 45,5 1,8 22 24 
Swaziland 0,8 1,1 2,7 20 34 
Tanzania 26,2 37,6 2,6 17 37 
Zambia 8,4 11,5 2,3 22 41 
Zimbabwe 10,6 12,9 1,4 23 30 
SADC 157,9 218,8 2,092 19,308 32,231 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on World Bank data. World Development Indicators (2006). 
*Note: Subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate provides the rate of natural increase, which is equal to 
the population growth rate in the absence of migration. 
 
However, the average crude death rate (CDR), meaning the number of deaths per 1 000 of the 
population, was estimated at 19 for the same period. This combination of high fertility and low 
mortality has generated an average annual population growth rate of 2% (see also Table 2.9) in the 
region for the period 1990–2004. This growth rate suggests that the population should have 
increased from 158 million people in 1990 to 219 million people in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). 
According to Mpande and Tawanda (1998), one immediate consequence of rapid population growth 
is also an escalation in the demand for agricultural products. Vink et al. (2006) have also argued 
that the population of the region has increased even more rapidly than was anticipated, and it is 
evident that there are limits to the extent to which expansion is instrumental in meeting the needs of 
the growing number of people. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
The available data and the literature on the different issues addressed in this chapter have resulted in 
the following findings: 
 Food security can be defined at individual and household levels, at national level, and at 
regional level. These three levels are interrelated, as the regional food insecurity status 
cannot be assessed without considering the individual, household and national levels. 
 The chronological perspective on the food security concept has experienced three basic 
changes since the 1970s: 
o at the level of analysis, from the global and national level to the household and 
individual level; 
o in the scope of analysis, from a narrow ‘food first’ perspective to a broader 
‘livelihoods’ perspective; and 
o in the assessment of food (in)security, from measured indicators to self-reported 
perceptions. 
 Intense droughts and massive floods were the major causes of extensive harm to people, and 
damage to their property, livestock and food crops. Such environmental disasters posed 
unexpected threats to the social and economic development of the SADC region, ultimately 
resulting in food insecurity. 
 Weak macro-economic performance, such as rising external debt, increasing food price 
inflation, contradictory food policies, successive years of conflict, high rates of 
unemployment, inconsistent land reform policies and a lack of buying power, due to the 
narrow scope of income opportunities, mainly in the rural areas in the region, have been 
identified in Southern Africa as contributing to food insecurity in the region. 
 The unsuitable food security strategies adopted in some SADC countries; the disappointing 
performance of authorities in regards to both their lack of responsibility and opposition to 
democratisation; their financial misconduct, such as selling off their country’s SGR; and 
widespread fraud are all common features of mismanagement that have played a crucial role 
in contributing to the current situation of food insecurity in Southern Africa. 
 Southern African countries have been reported as having the highest HIV/AIDS incidence 
rate in the world, which has complicated the mission of combating hunger and supporting 
the livelihoods of the poor in the region. As an increasing number of people have fallen prey 
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to the virus, large new vulnerable groups have formed, which has led to the rapid erosion of 
food and livelihood security. The loss of adult agricultural labour potential has undoubtedly 
affected the food security of the region by way of decreases in both the number of areas 
planted and the yield obtainable from such areas.  
 The fundamental causes of ongoing poverty and food insecurity in Southern Africa, though 
varying between the different countries in the region, have included temporary shocks to 
production systems; weak economic growth performance resulting from failed macro-
economic policies; reduced balance of payments situations, and extremely skewed patterns 
of revenue and assets distribution resulting from past colonial policies; the wrongful 
integration of land reform issues with issues of tenure, and the very high unemployment rate 
experienced in the region. 
 The combination of a high fertility rate with a low death rate has resulted in an average 
yearly population growth rate of 2% in Southern Africa. One direct effect of fast population 
growth is an increase in the demand for agricultural products, namely foodstuffs in 
particular. Since the population has grown faster than has agriculture in the SADC region, 
much pressure has been caused on agricultural land. In addition, the current increase in food 
production, as a result of area expansion rather than yield increase, in terms of which 
expansion has been instrumental in meeting the needs of the growing number of people 
could prove to be problematic in the long term, by reducing the per capita availability of 
natural resources, such as land, in the region. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Domestic food production in Southern Africa 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Food security is no longer viewed as an ‘exclusive’ agricultural issue. The drive for food self-
sufficiency through domestic agricultural production in many countries in the region has failed to 
enable such countries to feed their own populations (SADC, 1997, cited in Van Rooyen, 2000). The 
reason for this has been the increasing frequency of natural disasters; the inadequate political 
support of the sector; a lack of investment in the sector; the instability of the world market, and an 
increasingly unfair trade environment. Furthermore, civil strife and wars have for a long time 
prevented SADC member states from reaching their full potential in agricultural output (SADC, 
2003). The purpose of this chapter is to familiarise readers with the main reasons for food self-
insufficiency in the domestic food production that have made SADC countries vulnerable to 
reliance on food imports, and to encourage them to realise that domestic food production is highly 
risky and severely limited by the constraints of nature. 
 
3.2 FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE REGION 
Southern Africa is a region of considerable diversity, rich in renewable natural resources – land, 
water, livestock, forestry, wildlife and fish – that have not yet been fully exploited. Agriculture 
dominates the economy, employing 70% to 80% of the total labour force and contributing about 
35% of the region’s gross national product, and about 30% of its foreign exchange earnings 
(Rwelamira & Kleynhans, 1998). SADC (2003) also found that up to 80% of the population and 
labour force in the SADC region was dependent on agriculture for subsistence, as well as for 
employment and income. Agriculture is, therefore, the major foreign exchange earner in all 
countries, except for those countries that are mineral-rich – Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South 
Africa. 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), the physical output of most agricultural commodities has at least 
doubled over the past four decades (1961–2004). The fact that most of the increase has come about 
as a result of area expansion rather than as a result of increase in yield has led to the dominance of 
South Africa in the production of virtually all commodities; however, physical output has grown 
more slowly in South Africa than it has in the rest of the region. 
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3.2.1 Regional field crop production 
Crop production accounts for approximately 60% of the agricultural output. A wide variety of crops 
can be grown in the region, with the principal food crop being maize, especially in the southern 
parts of the region. Tubers, mainly consisting of cassava and bananas, are grown mostly in the 
northern parts of the region (SADC, 2003). This section aims to explore the current regional cereal 
situation, the crop failures that are experienced in this region and the main causes thereof. 
 
A strong grain production performance in the region during 1999 and 2000 turned into a regional 
deficit of 4 million tonnes in 2002. Zimbabwe’s production was estimated to have fallen from 1,8 
million tonnes to that of only 0,48 million between 2000 and 2002, compounding the impact of a 
harvest that failed across the entire region for numerous climatic and political reasons, which was 
exacerbated by reductions in state subsidies for seeds and fertiliser in Zambia and Malawi (McCord, 
2002). The result of these events has been a series of grain shortages of varying degrees of severity 
in parts of Angola, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho, and Mozambique. McCord 
(2002) also argues that those countries with inadequate foreign exchange to purchase imports on the 
world market are faring worst, with the shortfall in funding contributing to the inflationary 
pressures exerted on the price of staple foods across the region, with serious effects for the poor. 
The large-scale fall in production in Zimbabwe is likely to be sustained throughout the next half 
decade, with production stagnating as long as current agricultural and land policies persist, resulting 
in an ongoing national grain deficit. If weather conditions are favourable, however, and agricultural 
reforms set to support fertiliser and seed distribution are implemented as planned in Zambia and 
Malawi, a return to normal regional production levels in the rest of the region can be anticipated, 
and the 2002 crisis need not translate into a second year of near famine or of regionally inflated 
food costs (McCord, 2002). 
 
SADC experienced a cereal deficit of over 3,22 million tonnes in the 2001/02 season, including a 
maize deficit (the staple crop) of 1,10 million tonnes (Drimie & Mini, 2003). This food crisis has 
partly resulted from the accumulation of poor harvests that have occurred over a long period of 
time, which has been further aggravated by a decrease in crop harvests of over 50%. However, 
according to the FAO/WFP, food output and availability in Southern Africa in 2002/03 has been 
affected by a number of factors, such as poor rainfall, mismanagement, corruption, macro-economic 
problems, poor governance and the impact of HIV/AIDS (Drimie & Mini, 2003). The 2004 cereal 
production (including rice in paddy) in Southern Africa has been estimated to be 21,9 million 
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tonnes, a slight decrease from the previous year’s output. Consequently, cereal import requirements 
for 2004/05 were estimated at about 7 million tonnes, 8% higher than the preceding year’s 
estimated imports. 
 
Although cereal surpluses in South Africa and Zambia and trade among the other countries in the 
Southern African region are expected to meet many of such requirements commercially, substantial 
amounts of emergency food aid (about 930 000 tonnes) are also expected to be required 
(FAO/GIEWS, 2004). In SADC countries, about 12 million people were in need of emergency food 
assistance in the marketing year 2005/06 (mostly during the months of April/March) in Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia, following a poor cereal harvest that 
occurred early in 2005. The resulting food shortages, rising staple food prices (especially in 
Zimbabwe and Malawi) and diminished income-earning opportunities and remittances have led to 
an upward revision of the number of people at risk of food insecurity in many of these countries 
(FAO/GIEWS, 2005). 
 
In Southern Africa, the five key food staples that have caused agriculture in the SADC countries to 
be viewed as a cornerstone in maintaining food security in the region are maize, wheat, rice, 
sorghum and millet. Each of these staples will now be considered in turn. 
 
3.2.1.1 Maize 
Maize is the cereal that is produced and consumed in the largest quantities in the Southern African 
region. Despite its popularity, most of the SADC countries (except Zimbabwe, South Africa and, to 
a large extent, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi) supplement their maize supplies with commercial 
imports (Van Rooyen, 2000). Maize is the most consumed cereal on a per capita basis and is also 
the largest source of calories, protein and fat. The trend of high maize consumption will continue 
for many years unless fundamental per capita income changes take place, accompanied by a 
preference for other commodities, such as some wheat products and vegetables (e.g. potatoes), 
which have a higher income elasticity. Such trends are also expected to occur in South Africa in the 
near future (Van Rooyen et al., 1996, cited in Van Rooyen, 2000). 
 
Throughout the 2001/02 period, maize harvests totalled US$16,34 million, presenting a 3% increase 
in production. Such an increase, combined with 803 000 tonnes of opening stock, positioned maize 
availability estimated at US$17,15 million (Zondi, 2004). However, Zondi (2004) states that such 
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production was insufficient to meet the sub-region’s required 3,03 million tonnes, worsening the 
year’s maize deficit to 3,20 million tonnes in contrast to the previous year’s 1,15 million tonnes. 
Due to the accumulation of such a deficit, hardly any maize stock could be set aside for export. 
Only South Africa had surpluses above 800 000 tonnes for export. 
 
On a brighter note, the South African maize harvest was estimated to produce a record level of 12,4 
million tonnes in the marketing year 2005/06, which was about 28% higher than that of the low 
price-affected harvests of the previous two years. The resulting closing stocks of about 5 million 
tonnes of maize were more than enough to cover the region’s total import requirements of 2,8 
million tonnes, of which 1,8 million tonnes consisted of commercial imports (FAO/GIEWS, 2005). 
 
Despite a better regional harvest being experienced in 2003/04 than was originally expected, maize 
production levels were still below the levels achieved in 2002/03. Table 3.1 shows the trend in 
maize production in the SADC region over the past 10 years. In general, most countries have had 
better maize crops in the five years (1999/2000–2002/03) than they did in the earlier part of the last 
decade, when multiple droughts were experienced, following the severe regional drought of 
1991/92. Notable exceptions are Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland, which experienced better 
crops during the mid-nineties than they have done post 1999/2000 (FEWS NET, 2004). 
 
Table 3.1. Maize production trends 2003/04 compared to 2002/03 and previous 5-year 
averages (’000 MT) 
Country Average Average Trend 2002/03 2003/04 
  1994/95–1998/99 1999/2000–2002/03      
Angola 341 469 + 619 531 
Botswana 10 4 − 2 6 
Lesotho 126 98 − 75 38 
Malawi 1,558 2,026 + 1,983 1,773 
Mozambique 875 1,169 + 1,250 1,375 
Namibia 28 32 + 33 43 
South Africa 8,642 8,958 + 9,714 8,140 
Swaziland 103 80 − 69 78 
Tanzania 2,360 2,544 + 2,526 2,652 
Zambia 955 957 + 1,207 1,328 
Zimbabwe* 1,881 1,298 − 945 1,400 
SADC 15,322 17,634   18,426 17,364 
Source: SADC Food Security Early Warning System, National Early Warning Unit  
and FEWS NET (2004).     
* Zimbabwe estimate, derived using WRSI model.    
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Average maize production in Zimbabwe fell from 1,88 million MT in the years 1994/95–1998/99 to 
an average of 1,30 million MT in the years 1999/2000–2002/03. Apart from the poor crop-growing 
conditions experienced during some of these years (notably during 2001/02 and 2002/03), the 
downward trend has been exacerbated by the land resettlement programme embarked on by the 
government, which has seen a drastic decline in the commercial farming sector. For the past four 
rainy seasons (2000–2003), Lesotho and Swaziland have endured consecutive years of drought 
conditions, which have adversely affected agricultural production (food and cash crops) and hence 
the livelihoods of the affected communities. Extended periods of food insecurity and the impact of 
HIV/AIDS have also weakened the resiliency of households, as well as setting back agricultural 
recovery (FEWS NET, 2004). 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), maize production in the SADC region doubled in the 43 years from 
1961 to 2004.8 South Africa accounts for only some 49% of total maize production in the SADC 
region, compared to between 54 and 63% two decades ago. Of the roughly 10m tonnes in increased 
maize production since 1961, South Africa has contributed 43.85%, while the countries on the 
eastern seaboard of the SADC region (Mozambique and Tanzania) have contributed 30.47% and the 
landlocked countries in the centre (the DRC, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have contributed just 
over 20%. The rest of the contribution came from Angola and the BLNS countries. 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), the reason for such an increase in growth could originate in the 
expansion of the extent of area planted to maize, an increase in yield, or a combination of the two. 
Land planted to maize has increased throughout the region over the past four decades (see Figure 
9), excepting in South Africa, which has seen almost 1m ha of land taken out of maize. The largest 
proportional increase has been in the countries of the eastern seaboard, namely Mozambique and 
Tanzania. Together, they have added some 1.665m ha, about 900 000 ha of which is to be found in 
Mozambique. 
                                                 
8 Mauritius has been excluded from the calculation of maize trends, due to its miniscule production. 
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Source: Adapted from Vink et al. (2006). 
Figure 9. Total area planted to maize in SADC (Ha), 1961–2004 
 
Vink et al. (2006) also found that the countries of the SADC region have followed widely divergent 
paths in terms of the adoption of yield-increasing technologies. Producers in Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe have, on average, been unable to maintain the yield levels that they reached 
in 1961 (see Table 3.2). Producers in Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia have not fared much 
better: their yield levels are not much higher that those achieved 43 years ago. Such figures, in 
effect, reveal that only farmers in South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia have produced 
significant yield increases. In the case of South Africa, such an increase in yield should be seen in 
the context of the decline by roughly 1m ha of the extent of area planted to wheat, enabling it to 
improve production by increasing yields, while using less land. 
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Table 3.2. Growth in average maize yields in SADC, 1961–2004 
Country/Year 1961 1962 1963 2002 2003 2004 
Angola 0,81 0,81 0,77 0,52 0,55 0,52 
Botswana 0,45 0,68 0,75 0,29 0,21 0,12 
DRC 0,69 0,69 0,62 0,80 0,80 0,80 
Lesotho 0,81 0,81 0,81 0,81 0,64 0,83 
Malawi 1,02 1,06 0,90 1,05 1,28 1,12 
Mozambique 0,87 0,83 0,89 0,97 0,96 0,96 
Namibia 1,18 1,17 1,17 1,32 1,43 1,43 
South Africa 1,29 1,39 1,41 2,85 2,66 3,04 
Swaziland 0,40 0,43 0,44 1,02 1,02 1,17 
Tanzania 0,75 0,75 0,89 1,70 1,61 1,77 
Zambia 0,88 0,85 0,74 1,40 1,55 1,55 
Zimbabwe 1,19 1,12 0,96 0,38 0,67 0,71 
Source: Vink et al. (2006). 
 
3.2.1.2  Wheat 
Practically all the SADC member states import this commodity, as wheat is basically a temperate 
climate product. During the period under consideration, however, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
produced most of their wheat domestically, although at a substantial cost (Van Rooyen, 2000). Van 
Rooyen (2000) has also found that, despite there being very few localised areas that are suitable for 
wheat production in these countries, farmers received subsidies and attained producer prices well 
above the world producer prices. Furthermore, highly subsidised irrigation was used to produce the 
wheat. The SADC region as a whole (except for those members who have recently joined the 
organisation, like the DRC) faces serious shortages of water for human consumption and other 
important sectors. 
 
SADC was not self-sufficient in wheat production in 2002, with flour production essentially an 
import substitution industry in the region, entering into little cross-border trade. Outside South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, only modest volumes of wheat were produced in Lesotho, Tanzania and 
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Zambia (see Table 3.3). Almost 50% of the region’s wheat consumption was imported. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, the two largest producers, must import wheat to meet the requirements of 
flour millers. South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe produce 60% of their domestic wheat 
requirements, while Tanzania produces 36%. The remaining SADC countries all produce less than 
10% of their requirements, with Mauritius, Mozambique and Swaziland producing less than 1% 
(TSG, 2004). 
 
Table 3.3. Wheat production, consumption, imports and exports in SADC, 2002 (’000 tonnes) 
Country Production Consumption Imports Exports 
Botswana 1 78 81 3 
Lesotho 5 70 74 9 
Malawi 2 60 58 0 
Mauritius 0 103 133 30 
Mozambique 0 108 180 0 
Namibia 6 60 57 3 
South Africa 1,800 2,500 830 130 
Swaziland 0 40 40 0 
Tanzania 90 250 190 30 
Zambia 70 115 45 0 
Zimbabwe 300 420 190 70 
Total 2,274 3,876 1,878 275 
Source: Flatters (2002a, cited in TSG, 2004).   
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), wheat production in the SADC region also increased twofold (to 2 
million tonnes) between 1961 and 2004. Production has increased in all regions, except Angola. 
These trends are the result of changes in South African wheat production patterns – South Africa, 
which is also a net importer of wheat, still produces more than 80% of the region’s crop, albeit that 
percentage is down from its production of 90% four decades ago. However, even though the growth 
rates are high, they are invariably from a small base. The reduction in the extent of area planted in 
South Africa dominates the trend for the region, which must be seen against the general increase in 
production: hence, yield increases in South Africa have also dominated land productivity increases 
for the region. As South Africa is a net importer of wheat, it is expected that the region, as a whole, 
will also remain a net importer. 
 
In Southern Africa, the estimated 3,81 million tonnes of wheat produced in the marketing year 
2001/02 falls short of the required 4,84 million tonnes the region had to import as food aid, as well 
as the bought commodities of 1,03 million tonnes required to cover the projected shortfall (Zondi, 
2004). The 2002 wheat crop in the region yielded an aggregate output of around 2,6 million MT, 
 60
9% lower than the good crop of the previous year, but above the average of the preceding five 
years. Such figures reflect a production decline of 9% in South Africa, the largest producer of wheat 
in the region, where production was down to 2,3 million tonnes, mainly as a result of lower yields, 
following adversely high temperatures experienced in the northern growing areas during October. 
In Zimbabwe, production was 213 000 tonnes, one of the lowest production rates that it has had in 
the past decade, as a result of the lower yields following on land reform activities (FAO/GIEWS, 
2002). Its 2003 wheat crop was close to 1,7 million tonnes, which was still 28% lower than that of 
the previous year, and below average. In South Africa, the crop yield was steadily improving, but in 
Zimbabwe, the wheat crop was below both the reduced level of the previous year, as well as the 
average, reflecting a decline in the extent of area planted following on the implementation of land 
reform policies (FAO/GIEWS, 2003). An early estimate of the 2004 wheat crop in Southern Africa 
was about 2,2 million tonnes, an increase by nearly 20% over that of the drought-affected 2003 
season (see Table 3.4). In South Africa, which accounts for about 85% of the region’s aggregate 
production, favourable weather and improved international wheat prices at planting time resulted in 
a significant increase in the extent of area cultivated. Production was increased by almost 30% from 
the previous year, but remained slightly below the average level of 2 million tonnes (FAO/GIEWS, 
2004). The 2005 wheat crop was 2,1 million tonnes for the region, less than produced earlier, but 
still an improvement over the drought-reduced crops of the two previous seasons. The downward 
revision was primarily due to the effect of dry weather on yields in parts of South Africa, where 
output was estimated to be 9% higher than in the previous year, but still below the average level 
(FAO/GIEWS, 2005). 
 
Table 3.4. Wheat production in Southern Africa, 2001–2005 (in million/tonne) 
Marketing years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Wheat production in 
Southern Africa 
3,81 2,6 1,7 2,2 2,1 
Source: Adapted from FAO/GIEWS (2001–2005). 
 
3.2.1.3  Other cereals 
For the supply of other cereals, such as sorghum and millet, most SADC countries depend largely 
on their domestic production. There is little trade among the SADC member states in these small 
grains, though the production of such crops is suited to dry areas. Sorghum is the third most 
important source of nutrients in the SADC region. For countries such as Botswana, Tanzania and 
Mozambique, sorghum is the second most consumed cereal after maize. Millet is also consumed in 
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significant quantities in Namibia, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Malawi and, to some extent, 
Tanzania, cassava provides the largest source of calories after maize. The largest import of most 
SADC countries is rice, a crop which is produced through irrigation. Most of these countries, 
however, lack sufficient water resources to venture into the viable irrigation of such a crop (Van 
Rooyen, 2000). 
 
The 1,95 million tonnes of sorghum/millet production in the 2001/02 season, which was actually a 
2% increase from the preceding year’s harvest of 1,91 million tonnes, fell short of the demand. The 
sorghum/millet shortfall was actually 475 000 tonnes, compared to the previous year’s 380 000 
tonne deficit. Tanzania and Mozambique have significantly increased their sorghum/millet output 
consistently over the previous two years. Although such output was insufficient for export, these 
countries should not run short of these commodities for internal supply in the near future (Zondi, 
2004). 
 
With regard to the rice crop situation in the region, Zondi (2004) has argued that the decline in rice 
production experienced in Zambia and Tanzania accounts for the increase in the rice deficit from 
about 362 000 tonnes in 2000/01 to 517 000 tonnes in 2001/02. According to FAO/GIEWS (2000), 
the 2000 rice season has been one of the poorest experienced by the region during the current 
decade, as the major producer, Mozambique, was severely stricken by drought, tropical storms and 
cyclones in the first half of that year. 
 
A deficit in key food staples has made the supply situation critical in Southern Africa. Table 3.5 
illustrates cereal availability in Southern Africa, which imports more than is available from 
domestic production. SADC’s Monitoring Weather and Climate for Disaster Management report for 
2001/02 stated that the decline in food production in the region was a fundamental part of the 
agrarian crisis. There are various reasons for current production shortfalls, among them being the 
adverse climatic conditions experienced, as in the 1999–2001 period. Massive floods and intense 
droughts caused extensive harm to people, as well as damage to their property, livestock and crops 
during this period (SADC/WFP/FAO, 2002, cited in Zondi, 2004). 
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Table 3.5. Cereal availability for six Southern African countries, 2000 
(in ’000 MT) 
Item Lesotho Malawi Swaziland Mozambique Zambia Zimbabwe Total 
Domestic availability 74 1747 72 1811 762 955 5420 
Total utilisation 412 2242 204 2256 1 462 3283 9859 
Import required 338 495 132 445 701 2328 4439 
 Commercial imports 191 277 96 592 352 312 1820 
Food aid pledges 147 208 15 50 175 645 1240 
Food import gap 0 10 21 −197 174 1371 1379 
Source: SADC/WFP/FAO (2002 cited in Zondi, 2004).   
 
3.2.2. Regional livestock production 
The livestock sector has, by far, been the fastest growing sub-sector in agriculture over the past 
several decades. Due to the growing population, rising incomes and urbanisation, the demand for 
meat and milk products is expected to double over the next two decades in the developing world. 
Delgado et al. (2001) estimates the annual demand for meat in this area will grow from that for 111 
million tonne in 1997 to 213 million tonne in 2020. Over the same period, milk consumption 
should, by all estimates, grow from 194 million tonne to 324 million tonne per year in the same 
area. Under the current economic and regulatory conditions prevailing in the region, projections 
show that by far the largest share of this increased demand will come from intensive, largely 
industrial pig and poultry production units located in the developing world. According to the FAO 
(2005), while per capita consumption of livestock products in developed countries grew by only 1% 
per year, in developing countries growth rose to 5,4% (a total increase of 88% over a period of 12 
years). Increases, at this rate, are mainly being met through an increase in intensive systems of 
production, which has raised concerns about their potential impact on the environment, their 
potential negative effects on the poor, and the increased risk of animal diseases (which in some 
cases affect humans as well) associated with such systems of production. The livestock sector plays 
a vital role in the economies of many developing countries, as it does in Southern Africa, too. The 
sector provides food for people in the form of animal protein, income, employment and, possibly, 
foreign exchange. For low-income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides 
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draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production, and serves as a means of transport (FAO, 
2002). SADC (2006) livestock provides a steady stream of food and income, helps to raise the level 
of farm productivity and, for many inhabitants of the SADC region, offers a livelihood option that 
opens up common resources for exploitation for purposes of private gain. An estimated 70% of the 
rural poor consists of vulnerable groups, including women and children, for whom livestock plays 
an important role, not only by providing a source of income, but also by conferring status on those 
who own it. Livestock also creates opportunities for employment beyond the immediate household 
environs. 
 
SSA has the world’s fastest growing human population, coupled with the lowest average annual per 
capita consumption of livestock products (FAOSTAT, 2002). Growth in livestock production in the 
SSA has barely kept pace with the growth in demand for food of animal origin, with the annual per 
capita consumption of meat and milk being estimated to remain low at 9,6 kg and 28,3 kg 
respectively (FAO, 2002), if the current trends noted for production growth and population increase 
persist. This section aims to review the performance of the livestock sector in the SADC region, to 
identify the chronic problems facing livestock production and to assess the consequences thereof on 
food security in the region. 
 
The role played by livestock in relation to the levels of food security experienced in a remote rural 
area may be critical – due to the dependence of certain incomes on livestock, due to the relatively 
drought-resistant nature of livestock and due to the fact that acquiring livestock is often the main 
means by which poorer people can escape being subject to food insecurity (Hubbard, 1995). A large 
number of inhabitants of the SADC region depend on the livestock industry for employment, capital 
and agricultural inputs. Given the common poor status of grazing land, the sector faces many 
challenges, including overstocking, poor breeding stock and inadequate support services for the 
control of diseases that tend to spread across national boundaries (SADC, 2003). 
 
In 2005, the estimated livestock population in the SADC region comprised 53 million cattle, 33 
million sheep, 32 million goats, 5 million pigs, and over 276 million poultry (see Table 3.6) 
(FAOSTAT, 2005). Game farming, especially ostrich and deer farming, is also becoming an 
important livestock enterprise in the region. 
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Table 3.6. Livestock population in SADC countries, 2005 
Country Cattle Sheep Goats Pigs Poultry 
            
Angola 4,150,000 340,000 2,050,000 780,000 6,800,000 
Botswana 3,100,000 300,000 1,950,000 8,000 4,000,000 
*Lesotho n/a n/a n/a 65,000 1,800,000 
Malawi 750,000 115,000 1,900,000 456,300 15,200,000 
Mauritius 28,000 11,500 93,000 12,925 9,800,000 
Mozambique 1,320,000 125,000 392,000 180,000 28,000,000 
Namibia 3,133,000 2,663,795 2,043,479 28,000 3,500,000 
South Africa 13,764,000 6,407,000 6,407,000 1,648,000 121,000,000 
Swaziland 580,000 274,000 274,000 30,000 3,200,000 
Tanzania 17,719,091 12,550,000 12,550,000 455,000 30,000,000 
Zambia 2,600,000 1,270,000 1,270,000 340,000 30,000,000 
Zimbabwe 5,400,000 2,970,000 2,970,000 610,000 23,000,000 
Total 52,544,091 33,179,724 31,899,479 4,613,225 276,300,000 
Source: FAOSTAT (2005). 
*Note: 2005 data for cattle, sheep and goat production in Lesotho was not available at the time of the study. 
 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation Statistics (FAOSTAT) (2005), South Africa 
had the largest number of livestock units in 2005, followed by Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Namibia and Botswana. Many countries gave a single figure for all poultry, including both 
commercial and traditional village chicken. South Africa also produced the largest number of 
poultry, followed by Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mauritius and Angola. 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), beef production in the SADC region increased by almost twofold 
from 1961 to 2004. South Africa, at the time of this study, was by far the dominant producer of beef 
in the region. The production of poultry meat in the SADC region also increased dramatically (more 
than tenfold) between 1961 and 2004. Although the production figures exhibit steady overall 
growth, the increase experienced from 1990 to 2001 was more pronounced. Much of the increase in 
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poultry production in the region can be attributed to the increased production of South Africa. 
 
Considerable diversity across SADC countries prevailed with regard to the importance of 
smallholder livestock-keeping for the maintenance of rural livelihoods. In Zimbabwe, there was 
broad consensus that investment in livestock was central both as a means of escaping poverty for 
many smallholder households (Jackson & Collier, 1991, cited in Poulton & Dorward, 2003) and as 
a strategy for ensuring food security.9 However, whilst most households were found to keep some 
small stock and a proportion (25%–50%) were found to keep some cattle, the importance of 
livestock-keeping lies not so much in its contribution to income generation as in: 
9  its contribution to direct household nutrition (as a milk and meat supply) and crop 
production activities (especially as regards the contribution made by cattle in the form of 
draught power and manure); and 
9  the reliance on livestock as a savings mechanism, and as an insurance policy to be cashed in 
during a drought.10 
 
According to Poulton and Dorward (2003), the importance of livestock (especially cattle) to rural 
livelihoods in Malawi has declined over time, as a result of the increasing population pressure that 
has led to the shrinkage of grazing land, as well as to increased insecurity. The dire effects of 
increasing population pressure in the absence of wider economic growth and increased agricultural 
productivity are seen in growing competition, rather than in the development of a synergy between 
livestock and crops. The prevalence of livestock diseases has restricted member countries’ access to 
lucrative external markets, both regionally and beyond the borders of the Community itself. The 
most diseases with the most devastating impacts in the region are transboundary animal diseases, 
specifically foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), African 
swine fever (ASF) and Rift Valley fever (RVF). Transboundary animal diseases negatively affect 
the livelihoods of millions of farmers in the region, hampering their possibilities of benefiting from 
the rapid increase in animal production and trade expected in the coming 20 years, which might 
otherwise offer them an opportunity to escape hunger and poverty. Other less well known animal 
diseases that equally affect food security and trade are tuberculosis, salmonellosis and Newcastle 
disease (ND) (SADC/FAO, 2002). SADC/FAO (2002) also argue that currently, these diseases are 
                                                 
9 This argument held valid at least for the period before the onset of the current situation of political and economical 
instability in Zimbabwe. 
10 The fact that livestock prices can fall precipitously when many households try to sell at once notwithstanding. 
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not effectively controlled due to the lack of enforcement of existing control regulations and/or the 
failure to impose or develop appropriate control mechanisms. For instance, no country fighting 
FMD in isolation can obtain lasting success. 
 
3.2.3. Regional marine fisheries production 
Fisheries production is central to food security worldwide, with the production from capture 
fisheries and aquaculture supplying about 101 million tonnes of food fish in 2002, providing a 
calculated per capita supply of 16,2 kg, with aquaculture accounting for a growth from 15,9 kg in 
2000 (FAO, 2005). The world population has been increasing faster than the total food fish supply 
has; as a result, the average per capita fish supply outside China declined from 14,6 kg in 1987 to 
13,2 kg in 1992, and has since remained stable. Overall, fish provided more than 2,6 billion people 
with at least 20% of their average per capita animal protein intake in 2002. The share of fish protein 
in total world animal protein supplies was about 16% in 2001 (FAO, 2005). 
 
Marine and fresh waters, as well as the amount of land appropriate for the development of 
aquaculture, make fisheries one of the most important socio-economic sectors for SADC in terms of 
national and regional food supply, employment and source of foreign currency income. Within the 
SADC region, considerable potential exists for aquaculture. This section aims to determine the 
status of marine fisheries in the SADC region and to explore marine fisheries as a viable socio-
economic sector for SADC in terms of national and regional food supply, employment and as a 
source of foreign currency income. 
 
In the SADC region, in particular, fisheries have great importance as a source of food, income, 
export earnings and as a means of poverty alleviation. As such, they have played a key role in the 
maintenance of food security. SADC regional fish consumption in 2001 was about 1 541 tonnes, 
with a wide variation in per capita fish consumption among member states. The average per capita 
fish consumption is estimated at 8 kg/year, against the 15 kg/year worldwide average. According to 
the data presented in Table 3.7, the lowest per capita fish consumption took place in Zimbabwe, 
estimated at only 2 kg/year, while the highest occurred in the Seychelles, estimated at 60 kg/year. 
Fish consumption was estimated at only 6,5 kg/year in Mozambique, while being notably lower in 
the DRC (SADC, 2002). 
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Table 3.7. Fish consumption in Southern Africa, 2002 
  Fish consumption 
Country Per capita (kg/yr) Total (tonnes) 
Angola 16,4 211,56 
Botswana 8,1 12,96 
DRC 5,7 281,01 
Lesotho 2,4 5,04 
Malawi 6,8 68 
Mauritius 23,34 27,54 
Mozambique 6,5 109,2 
Namibia 12 21,24 
Seychelles 60 4,8 
South Africa 9 387,9 
Swaziland 0,1 0,01 
Tanzania 9 288 
Zambia 9,1 94,64 
Zimbabwe 2,2 28,82 
Total 7,92 1 540,72 
Source: SADC (2002).   
 
The average annual fish catch for the previous five years (1997–2001) was around 2 028 million 
tonnes. About 75% of the landings associated with such catches were from marine waters, while 
25% was from inland waters. Namibia, South Africa and Angola were responsible for 79% of the 
total regional fish landings (see Figure 10). Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania were 
landing 17% (SADC, 2002). The remaining 4% of the total landings occurred in Zimbabwe (28 
tonnes), the Seychelles (22,8 tonnes), Mauritius (11,9 tonnes), Botswana (2 tonnes), the DRC (1,2 
tonnes) and Lesotho (0,02 tonnes) (SADC, 2002). No figure was indicated for fish landings 
occurring in Swaziland. 
 68
Source: Adapted from SADC (2002). 
Figure 10. Fish landings in Southern Africa, 2002 
 
According to the SADC Annual Report, the region realised an aggregate GDP growth rate of 3,4% 
in 2000, which was significantly below the growth target of 6% required for sustainable economic 
development in Africa. Nevertheless, fisheries are expected to contribute significantly to the future 
economic growth of the region. The fisheries sector employed approximately 0,8% of the 194,4 
million inhabitants of the SADC region, meaning that 1,5 million people were working in the 
fisheries sector, while 5,5 million were dependent on fisheries during this period. Of the 1,5 million 
employed in this sector, 70% were working in inland fisheries and 30% in marine fisheries (SADC, 
2002) (see Table 3.8). 
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Table 3.8. Population dependent on fisheries and employed in the sector in SADC, 2002 
  Total Population Population employed in fisheries 
Country population dependent Total MIF MAF IF 
  (million) (million)   (thousand)   
Angola 12,900 1,147 251,950 180,350 41,600 30,000 
Botswana 1,600 0,050 20,000 n.a. n.a. 20,000 
DRC 49,300 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lesotho 2,100 0,001 0,200 n.a. n.a. 0,200 
Malawi 10,000 0,010 245,000 n.a. n.a. 245,000 
Mauritius 1,180 0,018 5,653 0,982 4,341 0,330 
Mozambique 16,800 0,660 120,000 10,000 110,000 n.a. 
Namibia 1,770 1,800 114,500 14,500 n.a. 100,000 
Seychelles 0,080 0,005 1,625 0,175 1,450 n.a. 
South Africa 43,100 0,117 28,000 28,000 n.a. n.a. 
Swaziland 0,097 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tanzania 32,000 0,500 371,042 0,417 20,625 350,000 
Zambia 10,400 1,200 300,000 n.a. n.a. 300,000 
Zimbabwe 13,100 0,037 12,200 n.a. n.a. 12,200 
Total 194,427 5,534 1 470,170 234,424 178,016 1 057,730 
Note: N.a. = not available.      
Source: SADC (2002).      
 
The Republic of Tanzania was the SADC country that employed the most people in fisheries, 
accounting for 25% of the total, followed by Zambia with 20%, Angola and Malawi with 17% each 
and Namibia and Mozambique with 8% each. The other eight member states employed the balance. 
Namibia, Zambia and Angola were the SADC countries with most people dependent on the 
fisheries sector, with 32%, 22% and 21% respectively (SADC, 2002). According to the SADC/ECs’ 
Regional Strategy Paper, marine fisheries provided a large, though decreasing, proportion of foreign 
exchange earnings for two of the eight SADC coastal countries, namely Mozambique and Namibia. 
The European Community (EC) was the main market for the region’s exports and it has concluded a 
number of fisheries agreements with countries in the region. Unfortunately, weak monitoring, 
control and surveillance have led to commercial overfishing and unlicensed fishing has had a 
negative impact on artisanal fishing (SADC/EC, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative 
Programme, 2002–07 Draft; n.d.). 
 
3.2.4 Regional horticultural production 
Sub-Saharan African countries have a comparative advantage in regards to the production of export 
horticultural commodities, due to their favourable climatic conditions, their geographic proximity to 
European markets, their preferential trade agreements, absence of government controls and an 
abundance of cheap labour (Barrett et al., 1997, cited in Dolan et al., 1999). These supply-side 
factors have made Africa an attractive supplier of off-season vegetables to European markets. This 
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section identifies problems experienced with regional horticulture production and recognises that 
Southern African countries have a large market for their horticultural produce in the EU, though the 
EU has tried to exclude African horticultural produce from its markets by means of the subsidies 
that it grants its own farmers. 
 
The fact that fruits and vegetables are becoming increasingly valuable products, due to their 
availability, even during the off-season, calls for intervention strategies that will ensure the 
reduction of qualitative and quantitative losses experienced in this sector. Fruits and vegetables are 
the major sources of calories, minerals, proteins, vitamins and fibres (Kasimila et al., 2001), all of 
which elements are essential to the maintaining and improving of health in all humans, but 
especially in those living below subsistence levels, who often suffer from vitamin A deficiencies. 
 
Fruits and vegetables are horticultural products that deteriorate fast after being harvested, as they 
characteristically are high in moisture content and sensitive to bruising. The availability of technical 
storage facilities and careful handling, especially when they are being harvested and transported, is 
core to their ongoing supply (Kasimila et al., 2001). 
 
A quantitative and qualitative study was undertaken in Tanzania to identify the major causes of 
fruits and vegetables losses, with farmers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers being the 
respondents in the study. The results of the study (see Table 3.9) made clear that the major causes of 
such losses are the unavailability of technical storage facilities both in the production areas and at 
urban markets. Subsidiary causes are bad packing methods and poor transportation systems 
(Kasimila et al., 2001). In line with such findings, the FAO found that the post-harvest losses of 
cereals (an estimated 5%–10%) were far less than those experienced by fruits and vegetables (30%–
40%), and that loss of nutritional quality was a result of the physiological and biochemical 
processes undergone by such produce (FAO, 1975, cited in Kasimila et al., 2001). 
 71
 
Table 3.9. Respondents’ opinions (N=50) on the major causes of fruits and vegetable 
losses in Tanzania 
  Lack of storage Transportation Inadequate packing 
Respondents N % N % N % 
Farmers 50 86,5 4 6,7 4 6,7 
Wholesalers 10 62,5 2 12,5 4 25 
Retailers 4 50 1 12,5 3 37,5 
Consumers 10 71,4 2 14,3 2 14,3 
Source: Kasimila et al. (2001).     
 
Overall vegetable production for the SADC region increased from 1.7 million MT in 1961 to 2.5 
million MT in 2004 (see Table 3.10). A similar study, which was undertaken by Vink et al. (2006) 
for the same period, found that the total vegetable production for the SADC region from 1961 to 
2004 increased from around 1.8m to about 3.8m Mt, representing an increase of more than 100% 
over the 43-year period. The first two decades (1961–1981) experienced a high increase (from 1.8m 
to 3.2m Mt), while for the last two decades the rate of growth was somewhat subdued, only 
increasing from 3.2m in 1982 to around 3.8m in 2004. South Africa currently accounts for the 
largest proportion of vegetable production in the SADC region. 
 
Table 3.10. Vegetable production in SADC countries (Mt), 1961–2004 
Country/Year 1961 1962 1963 2002 2003 2004 
Angola  164,000 166,000 169,000 245,000 245,000 245,000 
Botswana  8,300 8,600 8,800 1,6000 16,000 16,000 
DRC 235,000 240,000 245,000 320,000 340,000 280,000 
Lesotho  12,000 12,400 12,800 18,000 18,000 18,000 
Malawi  91,000 92,000 93,000 174,000 17,4000 174,000 
Mauritius  5,700 5,700 5,800 18,364 18,500 18,500 
Mozambique  142,000 144,000 145,000 105,000 105,000 105,000 
Namibia  4,000 4,000 4,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Seychelles  0,860 0,880 0,900 1,750 1,750 1,750 
South Africa  216,000 199,000 209,000 270,000 310,000 310,000 
Swaziland  3,800 4,000 4,200 7,300 7,300 7,300 
Tanzania  612,860 628,500 639,240 950,000 950,000 955,000 
Zambia  90,000 92,000 94,000 215,000 215,000 215,000 
Zimbabwe  73,000 75,000 76,000 135,000 135,000 135,000 
Total 1,658,520 1,672,080 1,706,740 2,487,414 2,547,550 2,492,550 
Source: Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT, 1961–2004. 
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According to Vink et al. (2006), potato production in the SADC region increased rapidly over the 
43 years in question, growing from about 478 000t in 1961 to over 5 million tonnes in 2001. The 
highest growth in production was experienced between 1992 (1.86 mmt) and 2001 (5.1 mmt), after 
which there was a decline to just over 3m tonnes in 2002. 
 
Fruit production in the SADC region cannot be analysed in the similar way as is the production of 
cereals or livestock, due to its wide diversity. Therefore, this study will focus on the production of 
citrus fruit. As defined by Vink et al. (2006), citrus production includes the production of oranges, 
lemons, limes, tangerines, mandarins, clementines, satsumas and a residual category. 
 
Table 3.11 shows that the total citrus fruit production for the SADC region from 1961 to 2004 
increased from about 583,900/mt to 2,257,006/mt (see Table 3.11), with South Africa being the 
largest producer in the region. 
 
Table 3.11. Citrus fruit production in SADC countries (Mt), 1961–2004 
Country/Year 1961 1962 1963 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Angola 70,000 70,000 70,000 78,000 78,000 78000 444,000 
Botswana 0,600 0,600 0,600 0,600 0,600 600 3,600 
DRC 2,000 2,000 2,000 196,302 196,640 196970 595,912 
Malawi 0,700 0,700 0,800 2,400 2,400 2400 9,400 
Mauritius n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,410 0,410 410 1,230 
Mozambique 20,000 20,000 25,000 30,500 30,500 30500 156,500 
Seychelles 0,028 0,028 0,029 0,060 0,060 60 0,265 
South Africa 436,572 497,796 513,856 1,841,894 1903159 1707936 6,901,213 
Swaziland 25,500 25,500 27,000 75,150 73,850 73850 300,850 
Tanzania 7,000 8,000 9,000 39,900 40,100 40100 144,100 
Zambia 1,000 3,000 2,000 3,500 3,500 3500 16,500 
Zimbabwe 20,500 23,500 24,600 122,680 122,680 122680 436,640 
SADC 583,900 651,124 674,885 2,391,396 2,451,899 2,257,006 9,010,210 
Source: Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT, 1961–2004. 
Note: 
1) n.a. = data not available 
2) At the time of this study, no data was available for Lesotho and Namibia. so the two countries were excluded from 
this analysis. 
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According to Vink et al. (2006), South Africa produced some two-thirds of the total citrus crop in 
the SADC region in 1961, which had increased in percentage to 80% by 2004. Hence, trends in 
output and in yields tend to follow the South African experience. Over the longer term, other than 
South Africa, only the DRC experienced any real increase in total output. Citrus products form an 
important South African export crop. 
 
In the past 20 years, the trade in high value foods (HVFs), such as dairy items, shrimp and fresh 
horticultural products, has become increasingly globalised. HVFs account for over 5% of global 
commodity trade, one-third of which comes from developing countries (Goodman & Watts, 1997, 
cited in Barrett et al., 2004). Three-quarters of the fresh vegetable imports into the EU market came 
from SSA countries, including South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 3.12), of which 
Zimbabwe accounted for 10% (Stevens & Kennan, 2000, cited in Barrett et al., 2004). 
 
Table 3.12. Southern African countries supplying fresh vegetable exports to the EU (1997) 
Exports worth more than €1 million Country 
Peas Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Beans Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Other vegetables South Africa 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Source: Adapted from Stevens and Kennan (2000, cited in Barrett et al., 2004). 
 
There are several reasons for the rapid growth in the production of fresh horticultural products for 
export in the region. First, technological improvements in storage and transportation have meant 
that produce can be on the shelves of UK supermarkets within 48 hours of harvesting (Barrett et al., 
2004). Second, changes in the international trading environment, such as the EU trade preferences 
in terms of the Lomé Convention, have given SSA countries a competitive advantage over non-
preferred exporters (Stevens & Kennan, 2000, cited in Barrett et al., 2004). Third, export-led 
growth and agricultural diversification into HVFs was facilitated in SSA in the 1990s by the 
implementation of liberal economic restructuring policies, which were supported by the Bretton 
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Woods Institutions in response to the problems of escalating debt and rising poverty in the region 
(Barrett & Browne, 1996, cited in Barrett et al., 2004). 
 
Exporters who wish to source part of their output from smallholders face a number of well-known 
problems that exist, irrespective of the market being supplied. Such problems include the need to 
provide credit at interest rates affordable to small farmers, loan defaults and side-selling (e.g. selling 
produce to buyers other than the provider of credit and inputs). Moreover, smallholders suffer from 
logistical constraints, such as transport and haulage problems due to poor roads and unreliable 
transport in rural areas (Dolan et al., 1999). 
 
In contrast, the support given to farmers in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, including those in the EU, has taken many forms, with the 
intention of achieving a number of different goals. The choice of policy instruments has ranged 
widely, from income support by means of price support to border measures, aimed either at limiting 
the amount of legitimate imports or at removing surplus production via subsidised exports. Many 
countries have used a combination of these instruments as part of their agricultural policy, resulting 
in the development of a great deal of interdependence between them (Milner & Morgan, 2004). The 
OECD spent $318 billion on agricultural support measures during 2002, which comprised nearly 
1,3% of the GDP (OECD, 2004, cited in Milner & Morgan, 2004). The implementation of such 
policies led to OECD farm prices being 31% higher than world prices, as the EU alone accounts for 
90% of the OECD export subsidies (WTO, 2003, cited in Milner & Morgan, 2004). Table 3.13 
shows that, for the selected products, the majority of developing countries currently have a trade 
deficit. Although the proportion with a deficit could be expected to decline with the reform of EU 
export policies, a significant proportion is likely to remain (Milner & Morgan, 2004). 
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Table 3.13. Net trade balance of developing countries in EU subsidised exports, 
2002 (US$ ’000) 
Products Balance Surplus (%) Deficit (%) 
Fresh and processed fruit and vegetables +11,156,684 38 62 
Bananas +1,968,270 40 60 
Citrus fruits −174,406 37 63 
Processed tomatoes −123,812 16 84 
Source: Milner & Morgan (2004). 
 
3.3 FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA IN THE REGION 
The low food production in Southern Africa has led to a rapidly increasing gap between production 
and requirements/consumption. Merely maintaining the current low per capita consumption levels 
requires either a significant change in production trends or a continued increase in the amount of 
imports (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1997, cited in Lado, 2001). This section analyses issues of food 
insecurity, based on the food production per capita indicator as a measure of the ability of a country 
or region to feed itself. 
 
The 1980s and early 1990s were a difficult period for Southern Africa’s food economy, as recurring 
and increasingly severe droughts threatened the state of food security in the region, which, in the 
absence of imports and food aid, would have been severely compromised (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 
1997, cited in Lado, 2001). Cereal production caused an overall decrease in the food/self-
sufficiency ratio in the early 1990s, and the rising value of food imports and scarcity of foreign 
exchange to pay for such imports made it more difficult for many African countries to meet their 
consumption requirements (Tekolla, 1990; Uneca, 1990; Pottier, 1993, cited in Lado, 2001). The 
consequence of such difficulties was the gradual and inexorable increase in the number of people 
suffering from absolute poverty, social stress and malnutrition. Effective food security and 
nutrition-monitoring systems are, consequently, seen as essential for mitigating the adverse effects 
of drought on food security in Southern Africa. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, population growth remained high in Southern Africa, while the countries of 
the region struggled with cereal production. On a per capita basis, cereal production in South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia actually declined by between 20% and 32% between the calendar 
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years 1991 and 2001, both of which were pre-drought years of normal rains (WCFIA, 2003). 
Therefore, even the relatively minor drought experienced in 2001–02 (see Table 3.14) was enough 
to push regional supplies below a safe threshold. 
 
Table 3.14. Per capita food production index as a % of 1999–2001 
food production average per capita 
Marketing years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Southern Africa 101,0 99,4 99,7 98,0 97,9 
Angola 90,9 100,5 108,5 105,5 104,1 
Botswana 94,8 98,7 106,6 105,1 100,4 
DRC 101,4 100,2 98,3 99,5 97,6 
Lesotho 96,2 99,6 104,2 96,6 104,2 
Malawi 91,1 102,6 106,2 74,9 79,5 
Mauritius 82,4 101,5 116,1 100,1 102,8 
Mozambique 107,7 94,5 97,8 97,5 98,1 
Namibia 104,7 108,1 87,2 90,4 90,7 
Seychelles 102,3 100,4 97,2 97,7 96,5 
South Africa 96,6 106,3 97,0 103,4 100,1 
Swaziland 107,1 98,2 94,8 98,7 97,8 
Tanzania 99,7 100,5 99,8 101,1 97,3 
Zambia 105,1 100,3 94,6 93,7 102,7 
Zimbabwe 95,4 105,3 99,4 81,2 85,1 
Source: Adapted from FAOSTAT (2004).    
 
Farm productivity, in fact, lagged so badly in the 1990s that cereal output actually declined per 
hectare, as well as per capita. Zimbabwean farmers produced 9% less on the same area of land in 
2001 as compared to that which they had produced in 1991, while Zambian farmers produced 11% 
less (WCFIA, 2003). The conventional causes of the sharp decline in farm productivity included the 
inadequate government investments made in rural infrastructure and agricultural research, plus, in 
some cases, the reduction in fertiliser subsidies, resulting from budget deficits and structural 
adjustment. However, some unconventional factors were also at work, including disruptive land 
redistribution programmes and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS (WCFIA, 2003). 
 
In the long term (1979–2004) as well, food production per capita was negative in every country in 
the SADC region, except for Angolan and Malawian output, which showed a slightly positive trend 
(see Table 3.15). As a result of the overall trend, the average per capita food production decreased 
from 131/kg for the period 1979 to 1981 to 100, 7/kg in 2004 (FAOSTAT, 2006). 
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Table 3.15. Long-term per capita food production indicator in SADC, 1979–2004 
(1999–2001=100) 
Country 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003 2004 
Angola 99 83 100 116 118 112 
Botswana 169 142 100 105 98 100 
DRC 151 154 100 92 90 87 
Lesotho 123 104 100 97 96 105 
Malawi 89 64 100 76 84 93 
Mauritius 109 110 100 100 103 101 
Mozambique 113 99 100 97 98 101 
Namibia 214 145 100 109 123 122 
Seychelles 120 82 100 97 86 97 
South Africa 121 106 100 105 103 105 
Swaziland 152 132 100 102 102 102 
Tanzania 129 120 100 101 98 99 
Zambia 117 117 100 94 104 103 
Zimbabwe 128 107 100 81 88 83 
SADC 131 111,8 100 98 99,4 100,7 
Source: FAOSTAT (2006).      
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Domestic food production will continue to remain one of the most significant parts of the food 
security equation in the region, in spite of other pressing problems. Since the production of the main 
staple crop (maize) in the region, the production of fruit, vegetables and livestock have grown over 
the long term, at the cost of land exploitation, rather than due to the adoption of up-to-date 
agricultural technology practices. This chapter revealed the main challenges facing domestic food 
production in the SADC region, consisting of the following: 
 Domestic food production is very uncertain and is severely limited by the restrictions 
imposed by nature, such as the occurrence of natural disasters (droughts and floods), 
insufficient political support of, and a lack of investment in, the sector, volatility of the 
world market and an increasingly inequitable trade environment. Civil strife and wars have 
also for a long time prevented SADC member states from attaining their full potential in 
regards to agricultural output. 
 Dominant grain production performance in the region during the late 1990s has turned into a 
regional shortage in recent years. Zimbabwean production has declined by more than half, 
though it used to be the second most prolific producer in the region, compounding the shock 
of a harvest which failed across the region for a combination of climatic and political 
reasons, and was worsened by reductions in state subsidies for seeds and fertiliser in certain 
SADC countries, such as Zambia and Malawi. 
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 Due to an increase in land planted to maize, the tendency in maize production in the SADC 
region over the past 10 years has shown that most countries have had improved maize crops 
over the past five years in contrast to those produced during the earlier part of the past 
decade, when several droughts were experienced. The average maize production in 
Zimbabwe declined towards the end of the previous decade, as the poor crop-growing 
conditions experienced at the time were exacerbated by the deleterious effects of the land 
resettlement programme. For the past four rainy seasons (2000–2003), Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland have suffered successive years of drought circumstances that have badly 
affected agricultural production and, consequently, the livelihoods of the affected 
communities. The impact of HIV/AIDS has destabilised the resiliency of households, as 
well as impacting negatively on any efforts made towards agricultural improvement. 
 The SADC region was not self-sufficient in wheat production, with roughly half of the 
region’s wheat consumption being imported. Even South Africa and Zimbabwe, the two 
major wheat producers, must import the crop in order to meet the needs of flour millers. 
 For the supply of other cereals, such as sorghum and millet, most SADC countries depend 
largely on their domestic production, with a relatively insignificant amount of small grain 
trade being conducted between the SADC member states. In countries such as Malawi and 
Tanzania, cassava provided the largest source of calories after maize. Rice production has 
dramatically decreased in the region in 2000, as the most important producer, Mozambique, 
has been harshly affected by drought, tropical storms and cyclones. 
 Despite the increase in livestock production in the SADC region over the past four decades, 
transboundary animal diseases have affected the livelihoods of millions of farmers in the 
region and hindered their ability to benefit from what otherwise might have been a rapid 
increase in animal production and trade. Other inconveniences were overstocking, poor 
breeding stock, and too few support services to enable the effective control of diseases 
which have spread across national borders. In a country such as Malawi, the importance of 
livestock, especially cattle, to rural livelihoods has declined over time, due to the inexorable 
rising population demands, which have led to the depletion of grazing land, as well as to 
increased insecurity. 
 Over 2 million tonnes of fish per year have been harvested during the preceding five years 
(1997–2001), of which about two-thirds of the landings have been from marine waters. 
Namibia, South Africa and Angola have accounted for more than three-quarters of the total 
regional fish landings. The total GDP growth rate in 2000 was significantly lower than that 
necessary for sustainable economic development in Africa. Tanzania was the SADC country 
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that employed the most people in its fisheries. However, Namibia, Zambia and Angola were 
the SADC countries with the most people reliant for their livelihood on the fisheries sector. 
Thus, marine fisheries offer a significant, though declining, share of foreign exchange 
earnings of some SADC coastal countries, such decline being due to weak monitoring, 
control and inspection, which have led to commercial overfishing, as well as to the practice 
of unlicensed fishing, which has had a harmful impact on artisanal fishing. In spite of such 
difficulties, the fisheries are still likely to contribute much to the future economic expansion 
of the region. 
 Southern African vegetable and fruit production has grown over the preceding four decades. 
The countries in this region have enjoyed the benefits of having a large market for their 
horticultural produce, as well as fruits and vegetables, in the EU, and in the UK in particular. 
Nevertheless, the region faces major causes of fruit and vegetable loss. Despite inadequate 
processing and transport systems, the production of fresh horticultural products for export 
has developed in a number of Southern African countries over the past decade. This is 
despite EU efforts to exclude African horticultural produce from its markets by subsidising 
the production of its own farmers. 
 Per capita food production trends in Southern Africa have been directed at bridging the ever-
widening gap between production and demand/consumption throughout the past 25 years, as 
the region has become increasingly incapable of feeding itself. The average annual growth 
rate of food production per capita has been seen to be in decline in all SADC countries. 
Farm productivity has been badly affected since the second half of the past decade, with a 
steadily declining cereal harvest in terms of hectare as well as capita. The conventional 
causes of such a decline in agricultural productivity include inadequate government 
investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural research, in addition, in some cases, to a 
drop in fertiliser funding, due to budget deficits and structural adjustments. Disruptive land 
relocation programmes and the rapid spreading of the HIV/AIDS pandemic also played a 
role in the decline of food production in the region, though, generally, such decline was 
primarily due to agrarian factors. The different reasons for production shortfalls, including 
difficult climatic conditions, such as widespread floods and intense droughts, caused 
extensive harm to the inhabitants of the region, as well as much damage to their assets, 
domestic animals and crops. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Trade in Southern Africa 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries were traditionally considered to be exporters of primary goods and importers 
of manufactured products. Southern Africa, in particular, apart from South Africa and Mauritius, 
lagged behind in regards to economic diversification. The manufacturing and processing capacity of 
South Africa and Mauritius remained modest, however. The slow progress made in economic 
diversification and technological upgrading has been associated with weak private sector 
development and lagging incomes, which have resulted in the marginalisation of Africa in regard to 
international trade. 
 
Over the past quarter of a century, an increasing number of SADC countries have come to rely on 
imports for a growing share of their food supply. Yet most have substantial agricultural resources, 
with many being key exporters of agricultural goods, such as coffee and cocoa (Stevens & Kennan, 
2001). This chapter provides a brief overview of Southern African trade by way of addressing the 
comparative advantages of the different SADC countries, their export earnings, their commercial 
food imports, their terms of trade and their international trade with non-SADC countries. 
 
4.2 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF SADC COUNTRIES 
Comparative advantage refers to the specialisation of countries in those goods which they can 
produce relatively cheaply, as well as to the exporting of these goods by these same countries in 
order to enable them to import other goods that would be relatively more costly to produce locally 
(Stevens & Kennan, 2001). Stevens and Kennan (2001) argue that the term ‘relative’ has a double 
meaning in this context, referring both to one good, as compared to other goods, and to one country, 
as compared to other countries. This section explores the theory of comparative advantage that 
states that countries gain from trade due to the difference in the relative costs of producing different 
commodities, and that supply varies between countries due to technological differences and 
resource availabilities. 
 
Much confusion exists between the use of the terms ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘competitiveness’ 
in economics. Though these concepts are related, they are often mistakenly used as synonyms. 
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However, comparative advantage and competitiveness could only be synonymous in a world of 
perfect competition, in which there are homogeneous products, information equally available to, 
and accessible by, all and an absence of any possibility of market failure (Cordon, 1974, cited in 
Bahta & Jooste, 2005). From a trade point of view, Worley provides more clarity on the difference 
between the two concepts. He states that comparative advantage elucidates how trade benefits 
nations through more efficient use of their resource base in the presence of totally unrestricted trade, 
while competitive advantage explains trading patterns as they exist in the real world, including all 
the barriers to free trade being ignored in terms of comparative advantages (Worley, 1996, cited in 
Bahta & Jooste, 2005). 
 
According to Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, ‘a nation, like a person, gains from trade 
by exporting the goods or services in which it has its greatest comparative advantage in productivity 
and importing those in which it has the least comparative advantage’ (Lindert & Pugel, 1996). The 
key word here is comparative, meaning relative and not necessarily absolute. Even if one nation is 
the most productive at producing everything and another is the least, they both gain by trading with 
each other and with third countries, as long as their (dis)advantages in making different goods are 
distinct from each other (Lindert & Pugel, 1996). According to the Heckscher–Ohlin theory, 
countries export the products that use their abundant factors intensively, and import products that 
use their scarce factors intensively. In other words, a country is relatively labour-abundant if it has a 
higher ratio of labour to other factors than do other countries. However, a product is relatively 
labour-intensive “if labour costs are a greater share of its value than they are of the value of other 
products” (Lindert & Pugel, 1996: 52). These theories claim that the production-side differences 
that exist between countries are due to the differences between product prices in relation to trade. 
 
In terms of measuring comparative advantage, net social profitability, domestic resource cost, 
resource cost ratio and revealed comparative advantage (RCA) are all measurements of economic 
efficiency (Mucavele, 2000, cited in Bahta & Jooste, 2005). An alternative measure of changes in 
comparative advantage is the RCA, which provides a measurement of comparative advantage based 
on national trade patterns. The clear definition of the use and interpretation of the RCA is necessary, 
however, to prevent incorrect interpretations of the meaning of such a term in an analytical context 
(Bahta & Jooste, 2005). Therefore, an appropriate way of evaluating present intra-SADC trade 
flows and the potential complementarity of its member countries is to look at indices of RCAs. In 
the context of regional arrangements, the presumption is that country groupings that have a 
narrower range of RCA indices in similar products are less likely to find grounds for sustained 
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exporting as a result of a regional trade arrangement (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). In line with such 
thinking, Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS) (2007) revealed that comparative advantage, 
as measured by the Balassa index, is a helpful indicator of the direction of a country’s trade focus. 
The index measures relative export performance by country and industry, defined as a country’s 
share of world exports of a good, divided by its share of total world exports. 
 
The method used to assess RCA here is based on the indicator of contributions to trade balance 
(CTB), as developed by Lafay (1990, cited in Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Compared to the Balassa 
index the CTB takes into account both exports and imports, comparing the contributions of various 
products to the trade balance of a country. Expressed in thousandths of GDP, this indicator is 
assessed by referring to a theoretical equilibrated trade balance and by eliminating the impact of the 
variations of the products’ relative weights. CTB compares the observed trade balance for a product 
with a theoretical trade balance corresponding to the absence of specialisation (Chauvin & Gaulier, 
2002). 
 
In order to remove business cycle effects, global trade imbalances are spread over the different 
products, according to their respective weights in the country’s total trade. 
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with i the country, k the product, Y the GDP, X the exports and M the imports.  
 
The range of CTB facilitates understanding of the differences between countries in terms of their 
degree of specialisation. The results of CTB for SADC countries are shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 
and 4.4. 
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Table 4.1. RCAs of South Africa and Zimbabwe in 1999 
 South 
Africa 
 Zimbabwe 
Petroleum and petroleum products −10.9 Road vehicles (incl. air-cushioned vehicles) −37,7 
Telecommunications and sound-recording 
apparatus 
−10.5 Machinery specialised for particular industries −27,0 
Office and automatic data processing machines −8.1 General industrial machinery and equipment −20,1 
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances −6.9 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances −16,9 
General industrial machinery and equipment −6.8 Special transactions and commodities, 
unclassified 
−12,5 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles −4.5 Chemical materials and products −12,1 
Power-generating machinery and equipment −4.3 Telecommunications and sound recording 
apparels 
−11,8 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products −4.3 Artificial resins and plastics −11,4 
Pulp and waste paper 2.5 Crude animal and vegetable materials 7,8 
Chemicals 3.2 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and products thereof 8,5 
Vegetables and fruits 6.7 Non-ferrous metals 12,3 
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 7.8 Iron and steel 13,3 
Non-metallic mineral products 8.9 Crude fertilisers and crude materials 13,4 
Coal, coke and briquettes 9,8 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 18,5 
Iron and steel 15,2 Textile fibres (excluding wool tops) 20,2 
Non-ferrous metals 23,5 Tobacco and tobacco products 117,6 
Source: Chauvin & Gaulier (2002). 
 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), results in the range of comparative advantages were less 
concentrated for South Africa compared to other SADC countries (see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The 
main comparative advantages of South Africa spread from minerals (coal, coke) and crude 
minerals, chemicals (inorganic chemicals) and basic manufactures (non-ferrous metals, iron and 
steel) to fresh food (vegetables and fruits). According to TIPS (2007), the comparative advantage of 
South Africa is, however, still vested in primary goods and commodities. In the long run, one would 
expect the terms of trade to move against commodities and primary goods, hence the general desire 
to trade in more advanced manufactured goods. Unfortunately, Chauvin and Gaulier (2002) have 
found that in the majority of SADC countries, the main disadvantages lie in general industrial 
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machinery and equipment, telecommunication and electrical equipment, and, to a lesser extent, in 
road vehicles. The main comparative advantages of Zimbabwe lie in basic manufactures (iron and 
steel, cork and wood manufactures), tobacco, textile fibres and clothing. The main disadvantages of 
Zimbabwe were close to those of South Africa. 
 
Table 4.2. RCAs of Mauritius and Seychelles in 1999 
 Mauritius  Seychelles 
Textile yarn, fabrics and related products −70,2 Fish, crustaceans and preparations thereof 304,841 
Road vehicles (incl. air-cushioned vehicles) −31,7 Professional scientific and control instruments 7,906 
Other transport equipment −26,5 Feeding stuff for animals 1,081 
Petroleum and petroleum products −24,2 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0,869 
Machinery specialised for particular industries −21,5 Cork and wood manufactures (excl. furniture) 0,483 
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances −14,2 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and products thereof 0,083 
Telecommunications and sound-recording 
apparatus 
−13,4 Animals, including zoo animals 0,066 
General industrial machinery and equipment −12,5 Textiles fibres (excluding wool tops) 0,03 
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0,6 Specialised machinery for particular industries −9,773 
Fertiliser products 0,6 Road vehicles (incl. air-cushioned vehicles) −12,255 
Crude animal and vegetable materials 1,0 Telecommunications and sound-recording 
apparatus 
−12,413 
Animals, including zoo animals 2,4 General industrial machinery and equipment −16,316 
Photographic apparatus, optical goods and 
watches 
2,6 Miscellaneous manufactured articles −16,429 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and preparations 
thereof 
5,2 Textile yarn, fabric and related products −27,417 
Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 90,4 Manufactures of metal −32,58 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 264,5 Power-generating machinery and equipment −59,254 
Source: Chauvin & Gaulier (2002). 
 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), a country like Mauritius, due to the small size of its 
economy, was among those countries with less diversified comparative advantages (like Angola). 
Globally, Mauritius had two main comparative advantages in sugar and sugar preparation, and 
articles of apparel and clothing accessories. Mauritius and Malawi were the two SADC countries 
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that had a comparative advantage in clothing. The main disadvantages were in textile yarn and road 
vehicles. Notably, while these countries had comparative advantages in clothing, they had 
disadvantages in textile yarn or fibres. At the same time, countries like Zimbabwe or Mozambique 
had comparative advantages in textile fibres. Such a finding suggests that some complementarity 
might be developed in this field.  
 
Table 4.3. RCAs of Angola and Malawi in 1999 
 Angola  Malawi 
Petroleum and petroleum products 268,36 Tobacco and tobacco products 180,658 
Non-metallic mineral products 34,214 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and products thereof 27,058 
Non-identified products 22,788 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 21,242 
Gas, natural and manufactured 1,043 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 12,278 
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0,069 Vegetables and fruits 3,823 
Pulp and waste paper 0,006 Crude animal and vegetable materials 0,515 
Hides, skins and untanned fur and skins  0,003 Coal, coke and briquettes 0,478 
Gold, non-monetary 0,001 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 0,472 
Beverages −10,664 General industrial machinery and equipment −9,844 
General industrial machinery and equipment −15,377 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances −11,371 
Cereals and cereal preparations −17,366 Miscellaneous manufactured articles −11,708 
Road vehicles (incl. air-cushioned vehicles) −19,112 Fertiliser products −12,813 
Special transactions and commodities, 
unclassified 
−23,412 Telecommunications & sound recording apparels −13,315 
Other transport equipment −27,352 Machinery specialised for particular industries −13,636 
Specialised machinery for particular industries −31,248 Cereals and cereals preparation −21,758 
Metal products −48,838 Road vehicles (incl. air cushion vehicles) −42,534 
Source: Chauvin & Gaulier (2002). 
 
On a more global level, SADC countries had comparative advantages in quite similar products with 
which they are well endowed. Moreover, they suffered from the same disadvantages in regards to 
machines and road vehicles. Such a finding suggests that complementarity as a way of stimulating 
trade might be difficult among SADC countries (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). 
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Table 4.4. RCAs of Tanzania and Zambia in 1999 
 Tanzania  Zambia 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, manufactures thereof 24,608 Non ferrous metals 95,139 
Vegetables and fruits 21,61 Non identified products 90,185 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, preparations thereof 12,176 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 15,985 
Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 9,331 Special transactions and unclassified commodities  5,166 
Textiles fibres (except wool tops) 7,381 Crude animal and vegetable materials 4,889 
Crude animal and vegetable materials 3,272 Textile yarn, fabrics 2,577 
Non metallic mineral manufactures 2,855 Textiles fibres (except wool tops) 2,367 
Hides, skins and untanned fur skins 1,048 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 2,225 
Fixed vegetable oils and fats −3,366 Cereals and cereals preparation −8,196 
General industrial machinery & equipment −3,525 Telecommunications & sound recording apparels −8,327 
Iron and Steel −3,562 Miscellaneous manufactured articles −10,816 
Manufactures of metal −4,153 Fertiliser products −11,398 
Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliance −4,663 Petroleum and petroleum products  −14,354 
Machinery specialised for particular industries −5,789 General industrial machinery and equipment −14,473 
Petroleum, petroleum products and related −8,599 Specialised machinery for particular industries −19,32 
Road vehicles (incl. air cushion vehicles) −15,217 Road vehicles (incl. air-cushioned vehicles) −37,407 
Source: Chauvin & Gaulier (2002). 
 
Table 4.5 indicates that Botswana has a high RCA index (37.9) in precious stones, which is not 
surprising, given that Botswana is the world’s leading diamond producer. It is expected that 
Botswana’s world share of diamonds exports would far exceed its share of world exports, due to the 
country’s relatively small economy and dependence on diamonds (TIPS, 2007). According to IDS 
(2005, as cited in TIPS, 2007), Botswana also has a high index for copper, though Botswana’s 
copper and nickel mine at Selibe–Phikwe is expected to reach the end of its life in the next few 
years. As one of the largest beef exporters to the UK, Botswana has a comparative advantage in 
meat. However, the country’s beef industry is facing challenges relating to stiff price competition 
and supply bottlenecks. 
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Table 4.5. RCAs of Botswana and Mozambique in 2002 
 Botswana  Mozambique 
Natural pearls, precious stones, precious metals 
and coins 
37,9 Aluminium and articles thereof 50,1 
Copper and articles thereof 18,8 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and others 17,6 
Meat and edible meat offal 2,8 Residues and waste from the food industry 6,0 
Sugars and sugar confectionery 1,3 Sugars and sugar confectionery 5,1 
Explosives; pyrotechnics; matches; pyro alloys, 
etc. 
0,9 Cotton 4,8 
Apparel articles and accessories, knitted or 
crocheted 
0,7 Tobacco and tobacco products 4,1 
Prepared cereal, flour, starch or milk; bakers’ 
wares 
0,7 Edible fruit and nuts; citrus peel 3,2 
Carpets and other textile floor coverings 0,5 Animal/vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage 
products 
2,8 
Textile articles NESO; needlecraft 0,5 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 2,7 
Milling products; malt; starch; inulin; wheat gluten 0,4 Other vegetable textile fibres 2,3 
Vehicles, except railway or tramway and related 
parts, etc. 
0,4 Wood and articles of wood; wood chips 1,5 
Articles of iron or steel 0,3 Processed mill. industrial; malt; starches 1,0 
Printed books, newspapers, etc.; manuscripts, etc. 0,3 Mineral fuel, oils and product of these 1,0 
Raw hides and skins (excluding fur skins) and 
leather 
0,3 Ships, boats and other floating structures 0,9 
Apparel articles and accessories, excluding 
knitted, etc. 
0,2 Salt; sulphur; earth and stone; plaster 0,8 
Knitted or crocheted fabrics 0,2 Oil seed, oleagic fruits; miscellaneous grains 0,7 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0,1 Rubber and articles thereof 0,7 
Paper and paper board and articles 0,1 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0,7 
Cereals 0,1 Cereals 0,6 
Specific woven fabrics; tufted fabrics; lace; 
tapestries, etc. 
0,1 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0,5 
Source: Adapted from TIPS (2007). 
 
The formula for the index for country i, good j is RCAij = 100(Xij /Xwj)/(Xit /Xwt), where Xab is 
exports by country a (w=world) of good b (t=total for all goods) (TIPS, 2007). 
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According to TIPS (2007), Mozambique’s comparative advantage lies in aluminium production (see 
Table 4.5), which is somewhat of an anomaly for such a poor country under normal circumstances. 
As shown in the table, this comparative advantage is far greater than the RCA index of the second 
product on the list – fish and crustaceans – although such a finding might be considered more in line 
with traditional Mozambican exports. Beyond these two categories, the low index of all other 
products indicates the very narrow range of sectors in which Mozambique has a RCA. Mozambique 
has the least comparative advantage in manufactured goods, but also some primary commodities, of 
which Mozambique is not a major producer, such as tin and nickel, as might be expected. 
 
4.3 REGIONAL TRADE 
Southern Africa is still heavily trade dependent, with exports accounting for over 60% of its GDP, 
compared to a range of 8% to 28% in the rest of the world, and a high dependency on commodity 
exports (McCord, 2002). Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) is a very small player in the 
global economy, accounting for only 0,3% of world exports. Its highest export shares are in primary 
products (1,7% of total world exports) and energy and mining (1,5%), while South Africa accounts 
for 0,8% of total exports, with its highest export shares in energy and mining (2,7%) and primary 
products (1,3%) (McCord, 2002). In general, South Africa has a larger share of total exports than 
does the rest of Southern Africa. Manufacturing in the region is still largely dependent on the 
performance of the mining and agricultural sectors, as well as the size of investment inflows into 
the region, which have remained low. According to Vink & Kirsten (2002), manufactures make up 
more than 70% of total imports, but only 10% of exports. Total imports from the rest of the world 
into SADC amounted to US$32 052,4 in the late 1990s, of which South Africa accounted for two-
thirds. Non-SACU intra-SADC trade amounts to only 0,9% of total imports. Levels of 
manufacturing differed from one country to another. 
 
SADC member countries had relatively open economies, with exports and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP ranging from 42,2% in Mozambique to 174,4% in Swaziland. 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola and the Seychelles being heavily dependent on imports. Imports, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP in the latter countries, exceed 80% (Rousseau et al., 2002). Only 
three countries, Botswana, the DRC and South Africa, experienced positive net exports.  
 
According to SARPN (2003), many differences among SADC member states determine and 
indicate potentiality for trade in agriculture and food products in the region. As of late, trade 
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between SADC member countries is rising. However, the levels of imports and exports differ from 
country to country. For example, Tanzania imports more than what it exports to SADC countries. 
While imports from SADC countries accounted for 13% of the total market share in 2000 and 2001, 
exports accounted for only 4%. SARPN (2003) for a country such as Malawi, SADC represents a 
very important market for both imports and exports. However, regional trade with other SADC 
members remains relatively minor. For Namibia, its main trading partner, South Africa, (under the 
auspices of SACU) dominates trade, accounting for 99,84% of the imports and 99,38% of Namibian 
exports. Zambia’s agricultural exports have varied from year to year. In 1997 and 1998, agricultural 
exports to SADC countries grew by 21% and 33% respectively. These gains were reversed by 
declines in agricultural exports of 23% and 26% in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Zambia imports 
various agricultural products from SADC member countries. 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), SADC global agricultural exports grew by 3.6% over the period 
1961 to 2004, more than did overall exports, by 3.0%. Within the agriculture sector, processed food 
exports grew at a rate of 4.8% over the period and the largest single product (sugar) only growing at 
0.7 per cent. The overall SADC global agricultural imports grew only a little, by 0.6%. Processed 
foods actually declined by 1.3%, while vegetable-related products with little or no further 
processing increased by 5.1%. As a source, intra-SADC agricultural imports grew by 18.3%, with 
the imports of South Africa dominating. 
 
4.3.1 Export earnings in the region 
SSA countries’ exports tend to be highly concentrated in a few products, many of which are not 
important in other African countries’ imports. Such limitation restricts the potential importance of 
any regional trade agreement among them (Yeats, 1998, cited in Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). This 
section identifies regional specialisation in producing cash crops and other goods and services for 
export, as well as the potential for using its export earnings to import food stuffs. 
 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), the more industrialised countries of the region (South 
Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe and Mauritius) have met a large portion of SADC’s import 
needs. South Africa dominated trade by supplying around 77% of intra-SADC exports in 1999. 
Zimbabwe was the next most important exporter to the region, contributing 15% of total intra-
SADC exports in 1999. Malawi and Tanzania, which were also relatively important exporters to 
SADC in the 1980s, have seen their contribution to intra-SADC exports decrease, dropping, 
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respectively, from 11,1% and 9,6% in 1980 to 2,3% and 1,3% in 1999. At the same time, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa increased their exports to the region. 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), sugar is the main SADC export, followed by edible fruit and nuts 
and beverages. During 2002 these sugar exports constituted some 14% of the region’s agricultural 
exports, with 34% from South Africa (see Table 4.6). Both of these percentages are less than their 
1997 levels. While South Africa has a very high percentage share in many of these products, such 
share is by no means universal, as other SADC sources dominate in regard to tobacco, cotton, 
processed fruit and vegetables, and coffee/tea. Note must also be taken that the South African share 
has, in almost all cases, declined, thus signifying that the other SADC countries are doing relatively 
better. 
 
Table 4.6. SADC agricultural exports, US$ million, 1997 & 2002 
  US$M  US$M 
% SADC Agri. 
Exports 
% SADC Agri. 
Exports  % from SA % from SA  
  1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 
Sugar $680m $704m 17% 14% 43% 34% 
Fruit 649 667 16 14 89 88 
Beverages 357 518 9 11 99.5 88 
Fish 268 484 7 10 77 60 
Tobacco 177 399 4 8 46 22 
Cotton 259 312 6 6 17 13 
Processed veg. 300 268 7 6 82 32 
Hides 247 214 6 4 96 81 
Cereals 292 206 7 4 97 79 
Coffee 173 175 4 4 18 19 
Wool 224 174 6 4 96 99 
Others 625 965 16 20 86 60 
Source: Adapted from Vink et al. (2006). 
 
The vulnerability of the economies of a number of SADC member countries was measured in terms 
of the top commodity export of each country as a percentage of its total exports. In the case of 
Angola (oil, 78%), Malawi (tobacco, 71%), Lesotho (manufacturing, 55%) and Botswana 
(diamonds, 49%), a single commodity represents more than 40% of their total exports (Rousseau et 
al., 2002). Such a finding clearly means the almost complete dependence of these countries on the 
production of a single commodity. According to the World Bank (2004, as cited in TIPS, 2007), 
copper exports account for more than 50% of the total value of Zambian exports. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the significant ongoing dependence of the Southern African region on 
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commodity exports. When combined, energy, minerals and primary products account for 47% of 
total regional exports (excluding those of South Africa), highlighting the continued non-
diversification and low value-add of most regional economic activity, as well as the ongoing 
vulnerability of the region to global commodity price fluctuations (McCord, 2002). 
Source: Derived and adapted from Lewis (2001, cited in McCord, 2002). 
Figure 11. Percentage of total exports from Southern Africa, excluding those from South 
Africa, 2001 
 
In terms of growth in the value of commercial service exports in the SADC region, almost every 
country showed positive growth in 2004 from its 1990 base (see Table 4.7), except for Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, whose trends were unknown, due to the unavailability of the necessary data in 2004. In 
addition, South Africa has led the region in the value of commercial service exports by increasing 
from 3,291US$ million in 1990 to US$8,066 million in 2004, followed by Mauritian exports in the 
same sector (World Bank, 2006). 
Primary products, 17%
Services, 16%
Textiles and apparel, 11%
Energy and minerals, 30%
Capital goods, 3%
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Table 4.7. Growth in the value of commercial service exports in SADC, US$ millions, 
1990–2004 
Country Commercial service exports Commercial service exports 
  1990, US$ millions 2004, US$ millions 
Angola 65 323 
Botswana 183 647 
Lesotho 34 56 
Malawi 37 49 
Mauritius 478 1,449 
Mozambique 103 246 
Namibia 106 463 
South Africa 3,291 8,066 
Swaziland 102 485 
Tanzania 131 845 
Zambia 94 n.a. 
Zimbabwe 253 n.a. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database (2006). 
Note: n.a. = data not available, and no data for the DRC and the Seychelles. 
 
Even with the combined exports of goods and service, the SADC countries, however, showed 
considerable increase as regards exports of goods and service measured as a percentage of the GDP, 
which amounted to an average increase to 52,5% in 2005 from only 41,5% in 2000 in the SADC 
region (see Table 4.8) (World Bank, 2005). 
 
Table 4.8. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) in SADC, 2000–2005 
Country/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Angola 90 77 78 70 70 77 
Botswana 61 55 46 42 40 40 
DRC 22 19 21 26 30 34 
Lesotho 30 42 56 49 56 56 
Malawi 26 28 24 27 27 27 
Mauritius 63 66 61 59 56 53 
Mozambique 20 27 29 28 31 31 
Namibia 46 45 50 51 46 46 
South Africa 28 30 33 28 27 27 
Swaziland 82 92 95 86 94 88 
Tanzania 14 16 17 18 18 17 
Zambia 21 27 24 21 20 16 
Zimbabwe 36 18 7 23 36 170 
SADC 41,5 41,7 41,6 40,6 42,4 52,5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (2005). 
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4.3.2 Commercial food imports in the region 
This section determines the ability of SADC countries to maintain national food security by way of 
commercial food purchases. 
 
In 1980, 1,6% of total SADC imports were supplied by SADC members; by 1999, this share 
amounted to around 10,2%. South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles were the least 
dependent on SADC imports (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). For Mauritius and Tanzania, such a 
finding might be explained by the closer and older historical relationship established with members 
of the East African Community. On the other hand, Malawi, Mozambique (since 1995), Zambia and 
Zimbabwe rely heavily on SADC imports, with more than 50% of their imports originating from 
SADC (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Agricultural diversification was central to the agricultural 
strategies of Mozambique and Zambia, which have made a small shift in the composition of 
agricultural exports from the region, although the size of this shift was such that it may not have had 
a major impact on regional economic performance or export composition (McCord, 2002). 
According to Vink et al. (2006), cereals are the main imports, with about half coming from South 
Africa and featuring an increased share of agricultural imports. The next largest food imports are 
animal/vegetable fats and beverages. The relative dominance of South Africa in this field seems to 
have declined over the period in question (see Table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9. SADC agricultural food imports, US$ million, 1997 & 2002 
  US$M  US$M 
% SADC 
Agri Exp 
% SADC 
Agri Exp  % from SA % from SA  
  1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 
Cereals $447 $659 15% 21% 72% 53% 
Animal/veg. fats 353 385 12 12 73 52 
Beverages 187 164 6 5 86 59 
Residues 224 160 7 5 92 84 
Fish 77 155 3 5 53 17 
Miscellaneous 83 121 3 4 64 49 
Dairy 119 108 4 3 52 30 
Milling 85 97 3 3 49 33 
Meat 183 96 6 3 85 66 
Other 654 450 29 26 72 55 
Source: Adapted from Vink et al. (2006).    
 
According to De Klerk et al. (2004), there was a net shortfall in 2002/3, calling for imports of 
nearly 4 million tonnes, a large proportion of which was channelled through the transport 
infrastructure of South Africa. Of the countries worst affected during the preceding year, Zambia 
and Malawi have made the best recoveries, with maize production up by as much as 22% in 2002/3 
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in Malawi and with neither country having to import a significant part of its domestic needs in that 
year. Even so, in both countries there were several areas that experienced crop failure, and it was 
estimated that, by January 2004, about 400 000 people in Malawi would need food aid. 
 
Figure 12 shows maize imports trends in the SADC countries from 1974 to 2004. In 2002, SADC 
reached its highest level of maize imports, due to the adverse climatic conditions that had largely 
affected agricultural production in the region. In the 2003/4 marketing year alone, South Africa 
produced enough maize to meet its own needs, as its surplus was more than sufficient to cover the 
combined deficit of all other SADC countries in the same year. Generally, maize imports had 
declined by more than half by 2004 (1, 379, 412/tonnes) from the 2002 (3, 058, 758/tonnes) level, 
meaning improved domestic production trends in the region, though the maize import level was still 
nearly threefold higher than it was in 1974 (482, 480/tonnes) (FAOSTAT, 2006). 
Source: Adapted from FAOSTAT (2006). 
Figure 12. Maize import trends in the SADC region (tonnes), 1974–2004 
 
With increased demand across the region and static production levels, imports of wheat in the 
SADC region exhibited a growing trend during the 1990s. There were, however, limited prospects 
0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000 3500000
1974
1975
1976
2002
2003
2004
Y
ea
r
Maize imports (tonnes)
 
 95
for growth of internationally competitive wheat production in the region, particularly given plans to 
lower/eliminate protection levels over the coming years amongst SADC member states. At present, 
except for Malawi and Mauritius (both currently standing at 0%), all SADC member states provide 
very high levels of effective protection to their local milling industries, with Tanzania at 25%, 
Zambia at 75% and the other SADC countries all above 98% (Flatters, 2002, cited in TSG, 2004). 
According to the service group of Anastasia Gerkis (TSG, 2004), a total of 50 wheat flour mills 
exists throughout the SADC region. The highest numbers of such mills were found in Mauritius and 
South Africa (see Figure 13), with Tanzania the next highest, with five mills. South Africa has six 
wheat flour mills, of which the latter are all privately owned. The mills in the other SADC countries 
are largely public–private partnerships, with some form of government ownership. Government 
control was evident only in Swaziland and Tanzania, with Tanzanian mills scheduled for 
privatisation (TSG, 2004). 
Source: DIT (1999, cited in TSG, 2004). 
Figure 13. Number of mills in SADC, 1999 
 
Most flour-milling industries in the region have developed behind protective barriers: tariffs 
(SACU, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), import licensing (Botswana, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe) and other controls (e.g. the Mauritius State Trading Corporation). Given 
Angola, 2 Malawi, 2
Mauritius, 16
Mozambique, 3
South Africa, 16
Swaziland, 3
Tanzania, 5
Zambia, 1 Zimbabwe, 2
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the high rates of tariffs and other import barriers, the bulk of flour in most member states was sold 
in their domestic markets, with scant intra-SADC trade occurring. Malawi generally accounts for 
the bulk of intra-SADC imports of flour and Mauritius for its exports. Zimbabwe was found to be 
both an importer and exporter of flour within SADC. Trade in flour also occurred between 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, while South Africa exported small amounts of the product to a number of 
SADC member states (TSG, 2004). 
 
National policies affecting trade in food grains vary among SADC countries. Table 4.10 shows that, 
with the exception of Zimbabwe, current policies tend to allow private trading in grains 
internationally, subject to some fairly modest tariffs and duties. Official policies permitting grain 
exports are less well maintained at times when domestic markets experience shortage of supply 
or/and price rises (Wiggins, 2003). 
 97
 
Table 4.10. Policies affecting trade in grains in SADC 
Country Policy affecting trade in food grains 
Lesotho Permits import and export of grain without restriction by private traders. 
Malawi No restriction on grain imports can be made by private or state traders.  
The former tend to deal with small cross-border movements from Mozambique and Tanzania, the 
latter with larger shipments from outside the region. 
Grain exports need a licence. 
Mozambique Imports of grain allowed: imposes duties of 17% on imported grain, but may waive such duties 
when there are food emergencies. 
Grain exports allowed, though local authorities may try to restrict these when local shortages arise. 
South Africa 
 
Liberal regime for international trade in grains, though current South African tariffs exist in the 
form of a formula tariff on maize and a 2% ad valorem value charged on wheat imports. 
Zambia Grain imports allowed by private and state agencies. (However, a temporary ban existed on some 
imports from Zimbabwe in 2002 on the grounds that such imports were being dumped.) 
Export regime:  
Duties of 5% apply to traded grains. Such duties may be waived on imports when supplies run 
short. 
Zimbabwe The government monopolises international trade in grains through the GMB. A 15% import tax 
applies. In addition, 30% duties on wheat imports and 15% on rice imports are charged. However, 
such duties may be waived when supplies run short. 
Source: Based on Mano et al. (2003). 
 
Besides the ongoing reform of trade policies in most SADC countries over the past decade and 
more, as well as the achievement of substantial progress in the area, restrictive tariff, non-tariff and 
technical barriers still remain. In Tanzania, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have been identified as 
including the issuance of export permits; import restrictions; cumbersome administrative 
procedures; local government taxation, and inefficient bureaucracies (the latter of which delay the 
obtaining of licences and utilities, among other hindrances). The degree of red tape and corruption 
experienced at border posts also prevents the smooth handling of intra-SADC trade. Border delays, 
as shown in the studies of some countries, were a major NTB to cross-border trade (ESRF, 2003). 
The complex and confusing tariff structure of SACU countries as opposed to that of other non-
SACU SADC countries also impeded intra-SADC trade. In South Africa, the demand for quality 
standards was regarded as constraining trade, with South African importers requiring quality and a 
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consistent flow of products. Phytosanitary and veterinary protocols need to be put in place to allow 
for an increase in intra-regional trade in meat and other animal products (ESRF, 2003). 
 
4.3.3 Terms of trade 
Economists use the words ‘terms of trade’ to describe the ratio between the prices of a country’s 
exports and imports. There are several types of terms of trade, which measure different ratios, of 
which the most commonly used is the net barter terms of trade. This is the ratio existing between 
one unit of a country’s exports and one unit of its imports (Stevens & Kennan, 2001). For example, 
the net barter terms of trade show how many tonnes of cotton a country must export in order to 
import one tonne of wheat. Stevens and Kennan (2001) argue that the terms of trade are normally 
used to describe changes in the ratio of export and import prices over time. In other words, as time 
passes, the country has to export more or less cotton to obtain that tonne of wheat. If the price of 
cotton rises relative to that of wheat, so that one tonne of cotton will now buy more wheat, there is 
said to be a favourable movement in the terms of trade. If the opposite occurs, there is an 
unfavourable movement in the terms of trade. This section analyses food security, based on the 
terms of trade involved that show a country’s ability to finance food imports. 
 
During the 1970s, Southern Africa lost the relative food self-sufficiency that it had enjoyed during 
the 1960s, when it shifted to become a net food importer, with imports totalling 1,3 million tonnes 
per year. The 1970s, therefore, signified a major shift in food availability and supply in the sub-
continent, with a move towards greater food dependency on the industrialised nations of the first 
world (Zondi, 2004). More recently, between 1995 and 2000, ten African countries suffered 
extreme losses in terms of trade, amounting to more than 20%; a further six saw their trade terms 
deteriorate by between 10% and 20% (compare these percentages with Table 4.11). Only oil-
exporting countries experienced an improvement in their terms of trade (FAO, 2001). McCord 
(2002) agrees that the terms of trade for all commodities, except oil, are expected to continue the 
decline that they displayed between 1995 and 2000, and that the region is likely to continue to lose 
its world share in most commodities. 
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Table 4.11. Terms of trade (% of GDP) in selected Southern African countries 
Country 1980 1990 2000 
Lesotho 0.5 −0.2 −0.8 
Malawi 15.7 14.3 4.1 
Mozambique 11.2 2.3 −6.0 
Zambia 11.2 3.5 −12.3 
Zimbabwe −1.3 0.0 −1.0 
Low-income average 9.6 −1.2 −10.0 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002). 
Notes: A decline in this variable indicates a decline in the terms of trade: i.e. a fall in the price of exports relative to 
imports (vice versa for an increase in the variable). More specifically, it is the price value of exports of goods and 
services, deflated by the import price index, less exports of goods and services in constant prices, divided by GDP. 
 
Table 4.12 shows the net barter terms of trade experienced in the SADC region from 1990 to 2004, 
as only four countries, Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe and the DRC, were shown a favourable 
movement in the terms of trade. During the same period, the rest of the region encountered an 
unfavourable movement in this respect, of which those worse affected were Zambia, Mozambique, 
Malawi and Tanzania. Accordingly, SADC as a group experienced an unfavourable movement in 
the terms of trade, shifting from 115,6 in 1990 to only 99,8 in 2004 (World Bank, 2005). 
 
Table 4.12. Net barter terms of trade in SADC, 1990–2004 (2000=100) 
Country/Year 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Angola 94 100 89 89 98 121 
Botswana 98 100 102 97 94 92 
DRC 86 100 99 94 92 94 
Lesotho 100 100 103 102 97 91 
Malawi 148 100 100 91 86 82 
Mauritius 93 100 95 98 97 89 
Mozambique 175 100 94 88 89 94 
Namibia 93 100 98 98 97 97 
South Africa 104 100 100 103 111 120 
Swaziland 100 100 100 96 93 94 
Tanzania 107 100 95 95 99 100 
Zambia 207 100 96 92 95 119 
Zimbabwe 98 100 99 96 100 104 
SADC 115,6 100 97,7 95,3 96 99,8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (2005). 
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4.4 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
International concern for food security should be translated into a concern for how the policies of 
developed countries limit international trading opportunities. Multilateral and bilateral actions to 
reduce trade restrictions on the exports of developing countries would help most, since the poor 
often work in the labour-intensive production of export goods (World Bank, 1986). Moreover, trade 
restrictions cause international markets to be more unstable than they might otherwise be, and thus 
contribute to transitory food insecurity. Actions that stabilise food prices and major exchange rates 
would help as well. The international community could also provide technical assistance to help 
developing countries use the same tools that developed countries use to manage trade risks (World 
Bank, 1986). Two key changes sought are improvements in access to markets through the reduction 
of import taxes and other domestic supports, and the removal of subsidies for exports, which are 
seen to depress world prices (Milner & Morgan, 2004). This section aims to determine whether 
current international trade systems are ensuring fair and efficient trade, based on considerations of 
equity and, in particular, fair access to markets for developing countries, such as those in Southern 
Africa. 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture of 1994 was premised on the assumption that domestic food security 
is best achieved through promoting liberalised trade, although food imports are contingent upon 
both foreign currency reserves and the reliability of the existing transportation network (Diaz-
Bonilla, Pineiro & Thomas, 1999, cited in Drimie & Mini, 2003). Similarly, some argue that if there 
is a crop failure, free trade will provide deficit nations with access to the global market for the 
financially well endowed. The Agreement on Agriculture has been subject to severe criticism for its 
imbalances, as it has enabled industrialised countries to secure exemptions from some of their 
policies, with their being allowed to continue to use large amounts of capital for domestic support 
and export subsidies (Diaz-Bonilla & Robinson, 2000, cited in Drimie & Mini, 2003). The main 
complaint of the developing countries has been that, when it comes to agricultural trade, the 
developed countries tend to preach liberalisation, while practising protectionism. Drimie and Mini 
(2003) also argue that rich countries have the capacity and the resources to implement the variety of 
policies allowed under in terms of the Agreement, while developing countries, although operating 
under the same Agreement, often lack the necessary financial resources to enable them to gain the 
most benefit from the situation. 
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If there was global agricultural trade liberalisation, the welfare benefits that would accrue to 
humanity, assuming duty-free market access and the removal of agricultural subsidies, were 
estimated at about US$ 160 billion per year at 1995 prices (World Bank, 2001, cited in Sigwele, 
2001). The welfare gains would increase substantially if other sectors of the economy, such as 
services (including insurance, transport, telecommunications, investments, etc.) were to be equally 
fully liberalised.  
 
The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the 
mandate for wide-ranging negotiations. Such negotiations include those on agriculture and services, 
which began early in 2000. According to Jensen and Sandrey (2006), an outcome from the Doha 
Development Round proxied by a 30 percent cut in applied tariff rates across all countries for all 
products, as well as a complete elimination of all export subsidies.  
 
Table 4.13 shows the global gains to be attained from an overall across-the-board 30 percent cut in 
global applied tariffs, as representing a possible Doha Development Round outcome, to be in the 
order of US$27,5 billion. The overall welfare gain for South Africa was nearly US$400 million 
from a modest Doha outcome. Interestingly, the rest of Africa is also shown as being a substantial 
beneficiary of this outcome, with gains of almost US$2 billion – a figure that is reduced by around 
US$1 billion from the efficiency gains of better domestic resource allocation when the terms of 
trade go against the continent. A similar pattern is also shown by the rest of SADC, as the gains in 
efficiency are almost negated by the terms of trade losses (Jensen & Sandrey, 2006). As expected, 
in this way, high-income countries would enjoy most of the welfare gains, though; overall, the 
entire world would still stand to gain therefrom (Sigwele, 2001). 
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Table 4.13. Welfare gains from the 30% Doha outcome, US$million 
 Efficiency Terms of trade Investment Total 
South Africa 230 116 48 394 
Botswana 11 −1 8 18 
Rest of SACU 22 24 −1 45 
China 2,015 850 −91 2,774 
Rest of SADC 264 −182 22 105 
Rest of Africa 2,997 −1,175 42 1,864 
India 3,107 −677 135 2,565 
EU 3,950 1,107 255 5,313 
USA 69 −933 −894 −1,758 
Brazil 666 295 5 966 
Rest of world 14,215 563 471 15,252 
Total 27,551 −12 0 27,538 
Source: Jensen & Sandrey (2006). 
 
Various regions, as well as the world as a whole, could gain from multilateral trade reforms over the 
next decade. Agriculture is the sector that, by far, requires the greatest cuts in bound tariffs and 
subsidies, due to the very high rates of assistance evident in that sector, relative to other sectors. 
Food and agricultural policies are responsible for the foregoing of more than three-fifths of the 
global gain so far, due to merchandise trade distortions, despite the fact that agriculture and food 
processing account for less than 10% of world trade and less than 4% of the global GDP (Anderson 
& Martin, 2005). From the point of view of the welfare of developing countries, agriculture is at 
least as important for such countries as it is for the world as a whole: their gains from global 
agricultural liberalisation represent almost two-thirds of their total potential gains, which compares 
with just one-quarter from textiles and clothing and one-ninth from other merchandise liberalisation 
(see Table 4.14). 
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Table 4.14. Effects on economic welfare of full trade liberalisation of different groups of 
countries and products, 2015 
  Agriculture Textiles and Other All  
  and food clothing manufactures goods 
Percentage due to: % % % % 
Developed countries’ policies 29 17 4 50 
Developing countries’ policies 33 10 7 50 
All countries’ policies 62 27 11 100 
Source: Adapted from Anderson & Martin (2005). 
 
Anderson et al. (2001) have estimated that if all the trade barriers were to be eliminated, about half 
of the total welfare gains would come from agricultural liberalisation in OECD countries. The bulk 
of the static welfare gains to be made from agricultural liberalisation in high-income countries 
accrue to the high-income countries themselves, in the form of consumer gains from lower domestic 
prices. Indeed, in terms of welfare effects, there are larger gains in store for low-income countries 
from the liberalisation of their own agricultural trade barriers (over US$31,4 billion) than from 
OECD agricultural liberalisation (over US$11,6 billion). 
 
Sigwele (2001) shows that, in 2000, the OECD countries spent about US$327 billion in total 
subsidies of agriculture. Such income transfer to agriculture by industrialised countries is about 
twice SADC’s GDP. Approximately US$1 billion is spent every day on agricultural subsidies in 
developed countries (Diaz-Bonilla & Reca, 2001 cited in Drimie & Mini, 2003), with eighty percent 
of these subsidies being paid to farmers in the EU, the USA and Japan (Drimie & Mini, 2003). 
Drimie and Mini (2003) also state that large shares of these subsidies are designed in such a way to 
cause expanding food production and, thus, distortions of trade. These countries exacerbate the 
trade-distorting subsidies by imposing tariffs and NTBs to imports, as well as subsidising exports. 
These subsidies create substantial negative effects on the poor in developing countries, making it 
virtually impossible to develop a properly functioning and fair global food system. 
 
Levels of national trade liberalisation vary significantly across the region, with Zambia 
Mozambique, Malawi and SACU representing significantly reformed trade regimes, while 
Zimbabwe and South Africa (despite the simplification of its tariff structures) still having barriers 
significantly higher than those of the ‘reformer’ group (McCord, 2002). McCord (2002) also argues 
that, despite these varying levels of liberalisation; South Africa maintains profound trade 
 104
dominance in the region. The dominance of South Africa within the regional economy is illustrated 
in Table 4.15, which indicates that the South African share in total world exports is 0,8%, and that 
that of the rest of the region totals only 0,3%. The combined Southern Africa share of world exports 
totals only 1,1%, with the strongest showing in the energy and mining sector, which represents a 
4,2% share of global markets (McCord, 2002). The following table confirms the relative 
insignificance of the region in the global economy, and underscores the limited negotiating power 
of the region as a bloc, even when acting in concert as SADC. 
 
Table 4.15. Disaggregated Southern African world trade shares 
  South Africa Rest of Southern Total Southern  
    Africa African Share 
Shares in World Exports % % % 
Primary Products 1.3 1.7 3 
Energy and Mining 2.7 1.5 4.2 
Food Processing 1 0.6 1.6 
Textiles and Apparel 0.3 0.5 0.8 
Other Manufacturing 0.7 0.1 0.8 
Services 0.8 0.3 1.1 
Total 0.8 0.3 1.1 
Shares in World Imports % % % 
Primary Products 0.6 0.3 0.9 
Energy and Mining 1.1 0.1 1.2 
Food Processing 0.9 0.6 1.5 
Textiles and Apparel 0.5 0.3 0.8 
Other Manufacturing 1 0.3 1.3 
Services 0.8 0.3 1.1 
Total 0.9 0.3 1.2 
Source: Lewis (2001, cited in McCord, 2002). 
 
Given the inability of Southern African markets as regards their extending of agricultural exports to 
Europe or the US, or their developing of diversified economies, due to the dual constraints imposed 
by OECD protectionism and World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade barrier restrictions, the need to 
secure at least the concessions proposed at the Doha round of the WTO trade negotiations is critical 
for the region (McCord, 2002). The recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, has once 
again emphasised increased market access to agricultural products from low-income countries, such 
as those in SSA. Both Africa as a whole and the SADC have great potential for exporting tropical 
and subtropical products (vegetables; fruits; sugar; spices; cocoa; tea; coffee; chillies; oilseeds; cut 
flowers; meat; cereals; etc.) in order to increase household incomes (Sigwele, 2001). 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
SADC (excluding South Africa) was found to be a minor competitor in the international market, 
accounting for less than one percent of world exports. Its highest export shares were found to be in 
the realm of primary products, and energy and mining. Manufacturing in the region is still mostly 
dependent on the performance of the mining and agricultural sectors, as well as on the volume of 
capital investment coming into the region, which has dwindled in recent years. Therefore, trade in 
SADC experiences many inconveniences, inter alia:  
9 Globally, SADC member countries have comparative advantages in primary products which 
are cosiderable. However, they have equal disadvantages in regard to machines and road 
vehicles (manufacturing), so that it appears that the adoption of complementarity as an 
approach to the motivating of trade may be problematic between SADC countries. 
9 The dependence of the SADC countries (excluding South Africa) on the production of a 
solitary commodity, such as oil, sugar, tobacco, manufacturing, diamonds and copper, as a 
sole product means that the product represents about half of all their exports. Such a 
situation has led to exports tending to be intense in a few products, many of which are not 
essential to other African states’ imports. Such over-specialisation has lessened the 
likelihood of any regional trade harmony existing among them. 
9 South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles were found to be the least in need of 
SADC food imports. South Africa was found to be the only SADC member that produced 
sufficient maize to meet its own needs, with its surplus maize being more than enough to fill 
the collective shortfall of all other SADC countries. For Mauritius and Tanzania, such a 
situation allowed for sound connections to develop with other members of the East African 
Community, while Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe relied deeply on SADC 
imports, with more than half of their imports being derived from SADC. Generally, maize 
imports in the region were found to have been roughly threefold higher than during the 
previous three decades. 
9 Wheat imports in the SADC region have demonstrated an escalating trend throughout the 
past decade. However, imperfect prospects exist for the enlargement of worldwide 
economical wheat production in the region. Currently, except for Malawi and Mauritius, all 
SADC member countries offer very high protection to their home-milling industries. Import 
tax, uneconomical bureaucracies and the imposition of quality standards, which impede 
intra-regional trade, still remain, and may impede the capacity of SADC countries to sustain 
nationwide food security through commercial food imports. 
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9 The terms of trade have been negative for the past 15 years in Southern Africa, except for 
Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe and DRC, which showed a favourable movement in this 
area. The terms of trade for all goods and services, excluding oil, are likely to continue to 
decline, and it is possible that the region will continue to lose world share in most 
commodities. 
9 The major criticism regarding the positioning of the third world in global trade has been 
that, in terms of agricultural trade, rich nations advocate the free market system, but tend to 
function in terms of protectionism, as wealthy countries have both the power and the capital 
to apply the range of policies authorised under the International Trade Agreement on 
Agriculture. Accordingly, agriculture is the area in which bound tariff cuts are most needed. 
In addition, welfare gains from global agricultural liberalisation tend to exceed gains in 
other liberalised sectors. 
9 Financial support of farmers in the OECD states, and in the EU in particular, has been so 
planned that they cause expansion in foodstuff production and, consequently, deform trade 
by enforcing trade barriers to imports, as well as funding exports. Such grants have had a 
significant negative effect on the vulnerable sector in developing countries, making it almost 
not viable to build up a relevant and reasonable universal food system. The existing global 
trade structure thus fails to guarantee fair, efficient and just conditions of trade, only 
allowing relatively insignificant access to markets for developing nations, such as those in 
Southern Africa. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
An assessment of food security programmes in Southern Africa 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Programme evaluation entails the use of scientific methods to measure the implementation and 
outcomes of programmes on which to base sound decision-making (Rutman, 1984, cited in Babbie 
& Mouton, 2001). Rutman also states that a ‘programme’ is taken to refer to any intervention or set 
of activities mounted to achieve external objectives, aimed at meeting some recognised social need 
or at solving an identified problem (Rutman, 1984, cited in Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In this regard, 
food security programme evaluation consists of an assessment, by means of objective measurement 
and systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which national food security programmes 
achieve intended objectives. This chapter provides an assessment of existing food security 
programmes in Southern Africa, supplemented by general views on whether or not they are 
successful. 
 
Food security interventions can be designed to address one or more of three broad objectives: risk 
reduction, risk mitigation, and risk coping (World Bank, 2000). In the aftermath of a food crisis, it 
is all too easy to focus on ‘coping’ interventions, primarily designed to assist affected households 
and communities to survive, and only secondly to rebuild their livelihoods. Such interventions, 
though important ameliorative measures, fail to reduce the vulnerability of such households and 
communities to future shocks, thus resulting in the need for more interventions when the immediate 
crisis is over. According to Devereux (2003), a strong case can be made for current consideration of 
strategies aimed at ‘weather-proofing’ rural communities in Southern Africa against the production 
shocks that triggered the recent crisis, as well as to reduce the structural vulnerability of individuals 
and households affected by other risks, such as those of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and market 
failure. Such strategising requires a more holistic view of social protection than is usually adopted, 
and implies making strong linkages with ‘developmental’ policies, such as those aimed at market 
deepening, without neglecting the immediate needs of the vulnerable poor living in the region. 
 
5.2 RISK-REDUCING FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES 
A risk-reducing food security programme is an application of appropriate techniques and 
management principles aimed at reducing food insecurity and/or the likelihood of its results. This 
section addresses Early Warning Systems and disaster preparedness programmes. 
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5.2.1 EWSs and disaster preparedness 
According to Wiggins (2003), regional co-operation in running EWS makes sense. There are 
economies of scale in collecting data through, for example, satellite images, as well as in analysing 
such data. Also, when assessing the responses to an early warning of a harvest failure in one area, it 
is helpful to know whether similar warnings apply to neighbouring parts of the region. This section 
identifies the role played by EWSs at a national level. A food-monitoring system can, in this way, 
be implemented that builds on information related to both food self-reliance and household food 
access. EWS then takes on a food information focus, rather than only acting as a warning device of 
threats associated with climate variability, such as droughts and floods. 
 
Among the various projects that have been implemented under the auspices of the SADC Food 
Security Programme, the Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) leads by virtue of it having had the 
greatest impact to date in efforts to reduce hunger and malnutrition within SADC. REWU is a 
SADC mechanism for the cost-effective assembling and analysing of food security information 
during periods of food deficits, which has allowed for an earlier co-ordinated response by SADC 
countries than would otherwise have been possible in the absence of such a mechanism 
(SADC/FAO, 2002). SADC has the experience of running such a regional EWS in tandem with the 
support that has so far been granted, apparently successfully, to national EWS for several years 
preceding the current study. 
 
The 2002 food and humanitarian crisis came as no surprise, as clear warnings had been given well 
in advance of its appearance (Mano et al., 2003). The EWS succeeded in registering the production 
and availability of cereals in the region, though, to date, the EWS has largely failed in tracking non-
climatic shocks, such as conflict and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The information gleaned on the 
developing situation has not yet been fully contextualised within the context of the livelihoods of 
the local populace. The ability of the EWS to analyse markets, trade and prices is, so far, limited, 
with its primarily tracking the production and availability of cereals, and not that of the other, non-
cereal staple foods, such as cassava. To date, the EWS has tended to report information to 
governments and donors, with much less attention being paid to potential clients in the form of 
private enterprises and civil society (McNabb, 2003). 
 
In addition, REWU has provided technical backstopping to SADC countries in the areas of agro-
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economics, statistics and agrometeorology. Considerable progress has been made in unifying and 
improving the methods used to assess the food security situation in member states, particularly by 
means of computer-based food balance sheets and the development of agrometeorological models 
that forecast crop yields and production. REWU has also taken part in the joint FAO/WFP Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment Missions that assessed food supplies and needs in Angola, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe from mid-April to early June 2002 
(SADC, 2002). The project was fully dependent on contributions made by member states for 
supporting its operations (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Actual payments to REWU budget in SADC, 1994–2002 (US$’000) 
Country 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 
Angola 0.00 0.00 0.00 103.88 99.43 39.33 37.45 45.41 
Botswana 20.72 31.38 31.38 46.39 53.09 39.28 37.47 45.43 
DRC n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00 39.28 
Lesotho 20.72 20.72 42.04 31.38 53.09 54.29 37.47 45.43 
Malawi 0.00 0.00 52.10 46.39 6.70 60.59 56.46 82.90 
Mauritius n.a. n.a. 0.00 77.77 53.09 39.28 37.47 45.41 
Mozambique 20.72 0.00 62.76 0.00 99.38 39.28 37.46 45.41 
Namibia 20.72 31.38 24.94 52.80 53.09 39.28 37.44 45.43 
Swaziland 0.00 72.50 31.38 46.39 53.09 39.28 37.47 45.43 
Seychelles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Africa n.a. 0.00 62.76 46.39 53.09 39.28 37.47 45.43 
Tanzania 0.00 0.00 30.57 34.42 85.28 27.13 102.71 45.43 
Zambia 20.72 19.06 43.70 46.39 0.00 39.96 39.28 66.99 
Zimbabwe 20.72 30.65 32.11 0.00 46.39 92.37 37.47 45.43 
Total 124.30 205.69 413.74 532.20 655.73 459.33 535.62 643.42 
Source: SADC (2002).        
 
However, the EWS focused on the food availability situation with the sole intention of triggering 
emergency responses in order to mitigate the effects of starvation or famine that would otherwise 
have been experienced during years of drought. Such a focus was in line with the SADC food 
security definition prominent during the 1980/90s. The definition of food security upheld by the 
SADC has since broadened, with the emphasis now being placed on sustained access to food and 
the promotion of policies and programmes that generate long-term employment opportunities, and 
general economic and agricultural growth, especially targeted at the rural and peri-urban vulnerable 
sections of the population. Such a refocusing of intent demonstrates the region’s realisation that 
long-term policy disaster management and preventative measures are what is required, as opposed 
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to emergency responses that tend to jeopardise long-term development efforts (SADC/FAO, 2002). 
Unfortunately, most national governments were not well prepared for the events of 2002, at which 
time the SADC also lacked appropriate contingency plans, with the Regional Disaster Management 
Technical Committee (RDMTC) that had been established under SADC auspices not yet being 
operational. However, the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee, formed as part of the 
food security programme of SADC Food and Natural Resources (FANR) in the early 2000s, 
performed better. The Committee was able to take the lead in supporting country emergency food 
assessments throughout the six emergency operation countries, in synthesising information, and in 
communicating with major donors, such as the WFP (Wiggins, 2003). However, the evidence 
suggests that many countries and regions that were vulnerable to natural hazards at the time lacked 
the capacity, or were poorly prepared, to respond to the crisis. The capacity to organise at country 
level a dedicated team who can identify the immediate problem, analyse the information at 
grassroots level and design solutions aimed at preventing famine, was either absent or insufficiently 
utilised. The appropriate policies, institutions and capacities have to be in place in order to enable 
effective and timely responses to be taken to food emergency situations in the SADC region. There 
were, nevertheless, many cases of successful famine prevention, including that carried out in 
Botswana in the mid-1980s, and those enacted in Zimbabwe and South Africa during the early 
1990s. However, the extremely limited nature of the recovery and rehabilitation efforts set to 
address the root causes of chronic food insecurity and vulnerability to drought were apparent 
(Clover, 2003). 
 
The cyclic and, in some areas, endemic nature of disasters (droughts, floods and conflicts) in SADC 
leads to additional difficulties in supply. However, although the regular occurrence of such disasters 
is fully recognised, little forward planning or consultation has been done in the past, resulting in 
SADC lacking the necessary capacity to respond to such disasters in an effective and sustainable 
manner. The overall food situation was only minimally impacted on by the various disaster-relief 
efforts made in the form of food aid, food imports by government, the development of strategic 
maize reserves, and the supply of seeds (SADC/FAO, 2002). 
 
5.3 RISK-MITIGATING FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES 
A risk-mitigating food security programme is a planning process in which attempts are made to 
eliminate the occurrence of food insecurity, while simultaneously devising a means of recovery, 
such as regional grain stocking and food commodity exchange, should food insecurity become a 
reality after all.  
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5.3.1 Regional grain-stocking programme 
According to NEPAD (2004), national buffer stocks in Southern Africa had provided adequate food 
security until the prolonged 1983–85 drought caused a food emergency with which the area could 
not cope. Thereafter, the marketing boards of some SADC countries were made responsible for 
maintaining food security reserves and for managing the distribution of food relief and food aid in 
emergencies. However, the reduced levels of donor involvement, and changes in policy came at a 
time when the overall economic conditions were leading to increased pressure for more 
fundamental reform. According to Trueblood et al. (2001), consumption variability proved, at that 
stage, to be a major concern for several countries in the region. For countries in which domestic 
production is the primary source of food supply, buffer stocks were previously often used to smooth 
over year-to-year food supply variability. If the SADC countries were to work together on a 
regional stocking programme, they may be able to reduce their own national supply variability. 
 
Due to recurring regional food emergencies and the prospect of hunger and starvation following on 
droughts and floods in 1992, 1995 and 2001/2, especially in the face of severe foreign currency 
shortages at country level, the project concept has been continuously revisited and refined. 
Accordingly, in 1996 a World Bank-funded consultant study was undertaken in some SADC 
countries. In September 2001, the SADC Ministers of Agriculture and Natural Resources reiterated 
the need to implement aspects of the Food Reserve Facility (SADC/FAO, 2002), thinking that a 
regional grain-stocking programme may prove to be an appropriate policy option for addressing the 
issue of food insecurity in Southern Africa. External assistance, particularly in the form of food aid, 
has been used historically, but has had limited success in preventing food supply shortages in lower 
income countries. This section identifies whether a regional grain-stocking programme would be 
able to reduce its own national supply variability more than food aid. If so, a grain-stocking 
programme may prove a suitable alternative for future investment in the region. 
 
Since food is consumed daily, while crops are harvested once or twice a year, any food system has 
to have sufficient stocks to enable the evening out of consumption and production within any given 
year. Similarly, given that human consumption of staples varies little between years, while wide 
variance may occur in harvests, which are negatively affected by adverse weather, pests and 
diseases, inter-annual storage is needed to reduce the risk of severe depletion of stock following a 
poor harvest (Wiggins, 2003). 
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WFP (2006), under the auspices of NEPAD, contributed to the study of food reserve systems, 
focusing on defining appropriate regional and national food reserve systems within the broader 
context of food security in eight African countries: Burkina Faso; Ethiopia; Malawi; Mali; Niger; 
Sudan; Tanzania, and Zambia. The study, which was completed in June 2004, was submitted 
through the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) to the 
July 2004 AU Summit. Several subsequent workshops have discussed the study findings and 
implementation modalities. 
 
According to Wiggins (2003), there is still much debate about the food stores in the region, 
including about the extent of grain stocks, which have to balance the exigencies of a fluctuating 
supply against a fairly steady demand. Responsibility for the stock should be shared among private 
actors, including traders and households or public agencies, and the levels that stocks hold, no 
matter whether they be village, district, nation, region, or world. The debate on the extent of grain 
stocks held is partly a technical matter, requiring the gleaning of data on the fluctuations typically 
seen in consumption and production, and partly a matter of the willingness to bear the risk and cost 
of stocks running out. However, such matters depend on the scale of market covered by the stocks, 
and the ability, as well as the amount of time taken, to buy in supplies from a wider market. Kirsten 
(2003, cited in De Klerk et al., 2004) argues that if there is indeed a case for carrying grain stocks, 
such an argument is likely to be strongest in the instance of white maize, which is most vulnerable 
to supply shocks. Clearly, having a physical stock on hand in times of shortage has substantial 
advantages in regards to security, time and shipping cost savings, and price-cushioning. However, 
against these, a number of negative factors must be weighed: storage costs; opportunity costs 
(which are difficult to estimate, due to the unpredictability of price movements subsequent to the 
purchase of the stock, but, at the minimum, including the interest payable annually – perhaps 
around R50 million at present for a stock of 500 000 tonnes) (Kirsten, 2003 cited in De Klerk et al., 
2004); the pressures of managing the stock efficiently and impartially in the face of powerful lobby 
groups, whose demands are likely to vary from month to month and year to year, depending on 
market conditions; the disincentivising of any private sector efforts to perform a task that almost 
every international study indicates it does more cost-effectively than does the public sector (Kirsten, 
2003, cited in De Klerk et al., 2004), and the inability, ultimately, to prevent severe price 
fluctuations in times of severe shortage. 
 
Debates on the responsibility for, and levels of, stock are divided into two broad camps (Wiggins, 
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2003): 
1) Market-based approaches, favouring free markets in grains and liberal international trade. 
The arguments in favour of liberalisation include the following: 
 The greater the territorial aggregation for which stocks are held, the smaller they have to be, 
relative to total grain transacted in the system to keep the risk of depleting stocks to an 
acceptably low level. Hence, drawing on regional or international stocks, exporting and 
importing grains between territories as and when needed or convenient, lowers the costs of 
inventories. 
 Private sector traders are more flexible and responsive to market conditions than are public 
sector agencies. 
 
2) Public regulation and intervention. The arguments for an active public role include two 
fears: 
  Private traders may try to rig markets to generate excess profits by, for example, holding 
stocks off the market to drive up prices. 
 Private traders may misjudge the risks, or accept risks that are unacceptably high for society 
as a whole11 of running out of stocks and supplies. 
 
Wiggins (2003) has also argued that there has to be some public holding of stocks to allow 
government to intervene in the market to reduce price spikes (by selling off public stocks when 
prices rise), and to insure against running out of stock. It is also usually argued that the stocks have 
to be held nationally (see Table 5.2), since doing so allows sovereign governments to respond 
speedily to local problems. Amongst those who argue for a public role, there were differences of 
opinion over whether to hold physical reserves or to secure access to a foreign exchange fund to 
finance public imports when needed. Holding physical reserves eliminates the risks of high 
international prices for grains or hold-ups in delivering food imports, but they tie up resources in 
inventories and are subject to waste and losses (Wiggins, 2003). 
 
                                                 
11 Traders who miscalculate suffer from missing a chance to trade profitably. However, for the rest of society the risks 
are those of seeing grain prices soar so high that they are unable to afford to buy food. 
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Table 5.2. Public stocks of food grains in Southern Africa 
Country Policy for public stocks of food grains 
Lesotho No public stocks held. 
Malawi Aims for 60 kt, 9 days supply. In effect, amount held has fluctuated from almost nothing to 
225 kt during the last two years. 
Mozambique No public stocks held. 
South Africa No public stocks held. 
Zambia Aims for 200 kt maize in stock, 375 kt cereals in all, 3 months’ supply; in recent years, often 
held less. 
Zimbabwe Aims for 500 kt of maize, 200 kt of wheat, 3 months supply; in recent years, often held less. 
Source: Mano et al. (2003, cited in Wiggins, 2003). 
 
According to Wiggins (2003), in the three countries that have public stocks, repeated discussions 
have arisen between donors who favour smaller public stocks, and governments that have been 
anxious to keep substantial public physical reserves. The management of public stocks has not 
always been transparent or apparently conducted in the public interest. The Malawian SGR is a 
particular case. In 2000, the government of Malawi commissioned a study, financed by the 
European Commission, to inform future food security policy and to include recommendations on 
the size and management of the SGR. The study recommended that the size of the SGR be reduced 
from its existing level of 167 000 MT to between 30 000 MT and 60 000 MT. The study argued that 
such reduction in size would be sufficient to deal with a localised crisis, and would also reduce 
operating costs. Over the course of 2001, most of the SGR was sold off, largely, it seems, within 
Malawi itself (IDC, 2003, cited in Wiggins, 2003). During 2002, the SGR was replenished to more 
than 200 kt, apparently at a cost much higher than the price of earlier sales. The government has 
been reluctant to disclose to whom and where the grain was sold and how the stock was 
replenished. 
 
5.3.2 Food commodity exchange programme 
The commodity exchange functions are very similar to those of a stock exchange. The exchange 
provides the facility (the trading floor and the trading pits) for futures trading, a governing board 
which establishes and enforces trading regulations, and the clearing house, which operates the 
mechanism of ‘clearing’ all transactions on a daily basis and which accounts for the flow of funds 
on each trade (Schaffner et al., 1998). Such transactions require reliable market information 
systems, particularly in developing countries, such as in the SADC region. This need in Southern 
Africa comes from the realisation that limited scope and restricted access to market intelligence is a 
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major handicap to the efficient operation of liberalised food markets. Without such a system, the 
development of external trade with regional and international markets will also be handicapped. 
 
Lack of knowledge on price levels, trends, freight rates, locations, trade arrangements and food 
requirements in neighbouring countries and regions stifles agricultural development. Producers and 
traders benefit from access to better information on the regional and world market trends in terms of 
prices and quantities (SADC/FAO, 2002). The objective is to explore and develop a system to 
improve market-based grain purchasing and procurement options, including commodity exchange 
and futures markets, such as the SA Futures Exchange (SAFEX). The information system will 
develop the following: (1) the collection and dissemination of regional marketing information on 
grains, especially that relating to maize, wheat, beef, etc., including the quantities, quality, prices 
and locations of regional supplies, and (2) the promotion of a regional commodity exchange/futures 
market, and facilitation of the purchasing of options utilising the revolving regional Food Reserve 
Trust Fund by linking national commodity exchanges (SADC/FAO, 2002). This section aims to 
determine whether hedging through futures and options strategies by way of private commodity 
exchanges either to contract for forward supplies of grains at a fixed price at a future date, or else 
the buying of the (tradable) option in order to acquire grain at a given price at some future time, is 
an alternative to public stocks. 
 
According to Devereux (2003), a final alternative to physical grain stocks is the use of futures 
markets by national governments or SADC as food security insurance. In 2001, SADC Ministers of 
Agriculture commissioned an investigation into this mechanism, which concluded that it should be 
seriously considered as one component of a diversified portfolio of risk management strategies 
against food security threats. According to Devereux (2003), SAFEX was identified as potentially 
having the capacity to manage this scheme, which would, in short, function as follows: Following 
first-round production forecasts (which would usually take place in February in SADC countries), 
the relevant governments (and/or private traders) would decide whether to purchase an option from 
SAFEX to buy maize at a fixed price at a future date – say September or December, depending on 
the size of the projected maize deficit. The cost of this option, at 5% to 10% of the total purchase 
cost, is the ‘insurance premium’ that will either be taken up, sold on or allowed to lapse, depending 
on the actual harvest outcome. If managed at the regional, rather than at the national, level, such an 
approach has the potential to promote intra-regional trade, to strengthen the role of private actors, 
and to reduce the need for national governments to hold either large physical grain stocks or large 
financial reserves (Devereux, 2003). In line with FEWS NET (2001) offers to governments and the 
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private sector, SAFEX offers a cost-effective alternative to holding large physical stocks of staple 
commodities, such as maize (yellow or white) and wheat. These commodities can be purchased in 
South Africa, well in advance of the upcoming marketing season. For example, as soon as a country 
realises that its domestic maize supplies are likely to be in short supply, it could obtain the 
necessary tonnage of maize through SAFEX by purchasing call-options on futures contracts for 
delivery, say in September and December. Doing so would allow countries to secure and guarantee 
the physical availability of the commodity at a specified price (FEWS NET, 2001). 
 
Grain producers, traders and processors will be able to trade better in a ‘free’ market, responding to 
the forces of supply and demand in setting prices, if the proposal (see Appendix 2) that calls for the 
introduction of a second (new) futures contract, which will allow physical settlement through the 
use of maize of an international origin, is implemented. In practice, they all look to the prices 
generated through the formal commodities market that was established following deregulation, 
namely the Agricultural Markets Division of SAFEX, as the benchmark for the prices they ask or 
offer in the ‘spot’ market of daily trading in maize (Vink & Kirsten, 2002). 
 
The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 smoothed the way for a new marketing order 
in the South African grain industry. SAFEX was formed in 1996/7, and introduced the trading of 
derivatives (futures and options) for white maize, yellow maize, wheat, sunflower and beef (though 
the contract for beef was later cancelled). The price for future contracts and options are generated 
on the exchange in the form of ‘bids’ and ‘offers’ and reflect the views of market participants on the 
prices of the specific products at different dates in the future. These instruments are also used to 
hedge price risk. By using the SAFEX market effectively, market participants can minimise their 
price risk, which, in turn, lowers their cost of doing business. These savings can then be passed on 
to the consumer in the form of lower prices for food and other commodities. 
 
Therefore, part of the reason for holding stocks is to guard against the price risk of food grains only 
being available at high prices when needed. An alternative to public stocks is to use private 
commodity exchanges either to contract for forward supplies of grains at a fixed price at a future 
date, or else to buy the (tradable) option to acquire grain at a given price at some future time. If 
there are enough buyers and sellers, such exchanges promise participants a range of possibilities 
that fit their needs for flexibility and for the degree of risk they are willing to bear. Within SADC, 
SAFEX, which is based in Johannesburg, is the largest such exchange (Gravelet-Blondin, 2003, 
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cited in Wiggins, 2003). 
 
FEWS NET (2006) indicated that South Africa has managed to ship out a total of 1.33 million MT 
(of the available surplus of 5.50 million MT) of white maize to destinations all over Africa, with 
1.26 million MT going to SADC member states. The largest single recipient country has been 
Zimbabwe, which received a total of 781,735 MT (between May and January), while drought- 
affected Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia together purchased 273,000 MT. 
According to FEWS NET (2001), the actual need to keep physical reserve stocks varies from 
country to country. The costs involved in physically storing large quantities of cereal stocks are 
often high, typically ranging between US$20 and US$40 per tonne per year, depending on storage 
and other costs. The availability of SAFEX options may well reduce the real need for physical 
reserves, and could result in substantial cost savings. If such a strategy were to be adopted, a 
regional financial reserve could be established in the event that stocks secured through SAFEX are 
actually purchased. 
 
5.4 RISK-COPING FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES 
A government has an important role to play in coping with food insecurity once it has struck as far 
as ensuring financial (cash payments) and in-kind (food transfer) rights for the poor, who entirely 
lack assets. Such government intervention can take the form of food subsidies, food price 
stabilisation, social protection and international food assistance programmes (FAPs). 
 
5.4.1 Food subsidies and food price stabilisation 
Food subsidies and food price stabilisation schemes have been implemented in most nations of the 
world at some time or another. Such schemes affect food price distributions faced by consumers 
(and often producers), thereby influencing food security. However, they have come under 
increasingly intense criticism over the past 20 years, due to the regressive nature of most food 
subsidy programmes. As higher-income individuals purchase more food and thereby benefit more 
from generalised subsidies, such programmes would also be extraordinarily expensive if they were 
to have a substantial impact on the most vulnerable segments of the population (Pinstrup-Andersen, 
1988, cited in Barett, 2002). This section examines the existing regional governments’ interventions 
aimed at subsidising and stabilising food prices and also explores the impacts of these interventions 
on food security in the Southern African region. 
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The research on food price management conducted by IFPRI initially concentrated on the analyses 
of food subsidies and similar government interventions aimed at achieving certain social ends by 
manipulating the prices of staple foods. However, there was some ambivalence about the research, 
due to the realisation that subsidies had adverse economic consequences in the long run, while, in 
the real world, they were important because country governments made them so. The challenge, 
therefore, was to design subsidy systems that would be effective in achieving their social goals, 
while being less damaging to long-term economic growth (Vink & Kirsten, 2002). 
 
In recent decades in Southern Africa there have been serious harvest failures (>25% below average) 
about once every five years, necessitating extensive importing from outside the region at import 
parity prices, which are high, due to the transport costs involved. Furthermore, in these 
circumstances, local food prices have temporarily risen substantially above import parity, thereby 
seriously affecting the welfare of rural food deficit households, as well as of urban consumers. On 
the other hand, in a country such as Malawi, irregular bumper harvests can seriously depress grain 
prices, thereby undermining incentives for continued investment in staples intensification by surplus 
producers. Such periodic depression of prices can lead to cycles of glut, followed by scarcity 
(Poulton et al., 2005). 
 
According to Kalibwani (2005), food-pricing policies in most Southern African countries are 
consumer-oriented. Food prices are ‘fixed’ at a low level that favours consumers who are mostly 
urbanites, which deters producers from increasing their efforts in this respect. In other words, policy 
motivations have been more political than economic, reflecting the expediency of responding urban 
residents who are more visible even though less numerous than rural farmers. According to Bates 
(1981, cited in Kalibwani, 2005), pricing policy finds its origin in the struggle between urban 
interest and their governments, and, in the political reconciliation of the struggle, it is the rural 
producers who bear the costs; they are the ones who bear the burden of the policies designed to 
lower the price of food. Thus, agricultural pricing policies have tended to have adverse impacts on 
incentives to produce food. As observed by Eicher et al. (1982, cited in Kalibwani, 2005), the 
pricing policies also affect the ability of governments to establish and maintain food reserves, as 
well as disrupting employment opportunities in farming, processing and rural industries. 
 
IFPRI presented an overview of its work on consumer food subsidies in the book, Food Subsidies in 
Developing Countries: Costs, Benefits, and Policy Options, edited by Per Pinstrup-Andersen and 
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published in 1988, as cited in Vink and Kirsten (2002), which contains the following arguments on 
the social and economic effects of consumer food subsidies: 
• “It is often argued that subsidies help control inflation by keeping food prices low. Deficit 
financing of explicit subsidies will contribute to continuing inflationary pressures on the 
general price level which may well overtake the one-time reduction in prices of subsidised 
commodities. 
• The impact of food subsidies on trade and foreign exchange depends on the nature of the 
subsidy programme and other existing economic policies. Inflation may contribute to 
increased demand for foreign goods and subsidy programmes themselves can lead to large 
imports. 
• Implicit subsidies, by reducing incentives to produce, may depress exports through lower 
availability of goods to export. 
• Food subsidies can influence employment and economic growth … through price distortions 
and reduced investment in agricultural and other sectors, through improved human capital, 
through the effect on wages and inflation, or through the availability of foreign exchange for 
import of capital goods and raw materials. The net effect on output may be positive or 
negative … there is no evidence that expenditure on food subsidies impedes or fosters output 
and growth. The answer hinges on other distortions and accompanying policies (Vink & 
Kirsten, 2002: 73).” 
 
According to Vink and Kirsten (2002: 73), Pinstrup-Andersen (1988) emphasises that subsidies are 
rarely, if ever, the solution to long-term problems; on the contrary, they usually make such 
problems worse. “Their proper role,” he argues, “is to compensate for the effects of inappropriate 
development strategies, institutional changes, and policy measures.” 
 
Some governments in Southern Africa chose to let state marketing boards continue to maintain the 
reserves on their behalf, while competing for business in open markets; others created specialised 
units for managing such reserves, while a few attempted to keep a combination of physical stocks 
and cash (NEPAD, 2004). NEPAD (2004) has also argued that, in Southern Africa, continued 
attempts to use SGRs to stabilise cereal prices have undermined market incentives for private 
traders to perform normal arbitrage functions that could have satisfied governments’ food security 
objectives. As a result, small farmers who produced surpluses have often been penalised as a result 
of falling prices and lack of markets, which has led them to limit their planting in subsequent years, 
with adverse impacts on overall production and grain availability. Consumers have also faced 
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greater instability in grain markets in terms of available quantities and prices. Experience with 
SGRs in Southern Africa has, thus, been less than satisfactory. 
 
5.4.2 Social protection programmes12 
According to Devereux (2003), social protection means providing social assistance to those who are 
chronically unable to make ends meet, as well as social insurance against transitory fluctuations in 
household access to food. Such a concept describes all initiatives that provide income (cash) and/or 
consumption (food) transfers to the poor, being distinguished from other development interventions 
in that social protection is not intended to promote economic growth, though it is intended to 
alleviate poverty and situations of food insecurity. In general, economic growth aims to alleviate 
poverty and food insecurity, while social protection aims to reduce vulnerability. This section aims 
to determine whether Southern African governments have made a special effort to address the food 
security needs of the poor in the region, as well as to identify the problems facing governments in 
delivering safety net services. 
 
School feeding programmes are one social protection instrument that can contribute to food security 
in the Southern African region. Supplementary and school feeding programmes aim to improve 
nutritional standards for a selected target group (Stevens, 1979). The provision of a meal at school 
relieves a family of the burden of feeding the child at home, especially when food prices are high. 
In 1996, enrolment at one primary school in Malawi rose by 26% after WFP introduced a school 
feeding project (Dil, 1996). Learner performance has also been seen to improve in schools serviced 
by school feeding schemes, with pass rates being proven to increase and drop-out rates to decrease, 
as the cognitive processes of malnourished children were enhanced by their consuming a nutritious 
meal at school. Figure 14 shows that Zimbabwe was the leading WFP beneficiary in the region in 
2004 and 2005, as regards children enrolled in its School Feeding Programme, in terms of which 
429,442 and 1,110,674 children received school meals, respectively. The total number of children 
receiving school meals in SADC was 1,428,304 in 2004 and 2,447,967 in 2005 (WFP, 2006). 
                                                 
12 Social protection programmes referred to in terms of this argument include only long-term food security programmes, 
such as school feeding, social grants and poverty alleviation programmes undertaken in Southern Africa. 
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Source: Adapted from WFP (2006). 
Figure 14. WFP beneficiaries – Children enrolled in school feeding programme in SADC, 
2004 & 2005 
 
According to Devereux (2003), despite efforts to raise enrolment ratios, a common response to 
chronic and transitory food insecurity has been to withdraw children from school. Such a move has 
been documented as a coping strategy adopted during the food crisis in Southern Africa in 2001 in 
all six affected countries,13 even in countries where education is free: during a crisis in livelihood, 
access to education was related to household wealth. Whether education is seen as a basic human 
right or as an investment in a country’s economic future, it is important to find ways of keeping 
children in school by reducing absenteeism and drop-outs levels encountered especially during 
financially straitened times. 
 
According to the government of Malawi (2002, cited in Deveruex, 2003), that particular country has 
sought to improve the quality of life of the poor in the past in spite of the following problems and 
limitations: 
                                                 
13 For evidence of the impact of the 2001/02 food crisis on learner (and teacher) absenteeism in Malawi see Gallagher et 
al. (2003). 
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• Apart from the enforcement of a minimum wage, market-based policies, consisting of price 
controls, price subsidies and minimum wages, when found to be inefficient, fiscally 
unsustainable and mostly of benefit to the relatively well off, were abolished. 
• Administered social protection programmes, consisting of nutrition supplements, free food 
distribution, free input distribution, and food-, cash- and inputs-for-work, were found to be 
generally “fragmented, uncoordinated and poorly targeted, suffering from both inclusion and 
exclusion errors”: pp22. 
• Direct assistance and social welfare transfers administered by the Department of Social 
Welfare, the Malawi Council for the Handicapped and the Department of Disaster 
Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation have been “small in size and limited in coverage, 
largely due to fiscal constraints”: pp22. 
• Informal safety nets, consisting of extended family and community support systems, “have 
become over-stretched and vulnerable to shocks due to increased poverty and the HIV/AIDS 
scourge”: pp23. 
 
The food insecurity experienced in Southern Africa during 2001/02 demonstrated the inadequacies 
of social protection programmes in the region. Lesotho, for example, lacked specific focus on social 
safety net programmes, with poverty reduction and food security strategies being aimed at 
“sustained economic growth and poverty reduction in the context of macro-economic stability” 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 2000, cited in Devereux, 2003: pp21). However, in Mozambique, following 
the rapid growth experienced since the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, poverty and food 
insecurity reduction programmes stressed continued economic growth and improved productivity, 
with almost no mention being made of activities related to social protection or the needs of 
vulnerable groups. Such programmes, thus, failed to achieve the expected results, and activities to 
improve the nutrition situation were mainly confined to increasing agricultural output (Government 
of Mozambique, 2003, cited in Devereux, 2003). Zambia’s range of consumer subsidies on maize 
and agricultural inputs shrunk during the 1980s and early 1990s. As in other countries in the region, 
such market liberalisation undermined smallholders’ access to inputs and reintroduced food price 
volatility – two significant sources of vulnerability during the food crisis of 2001/02. Poverty and 
food insecurity reduction programmes adopted in the region included no measures either to restore 
access to agricultural inputs or to stabilise food prices (Devereux, 2003). 
 
According to Chikwanha-Dzenga (1999, cited in Devereux, 2003), Zimbabwe may have had the 
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fiscal and administrative capacity to implement effective and comprehensive social protection, but 
the failure of its economic growth strategy caused the government to implement an ad hoc series of 
welfare projects, consisting of seed packs and food handouts, that bought electoral popularity, but 
also generated widespread dependence on food aid. “The task to cater for the well-being of 
Zimbabwe’s poor in the rural areas has thus been left largely to the NGOs, with the government 
frequently alleviating immediate suffering through seed packs and drought relief food (Chikwanha-
Dzenga, 1999 cited in Devereux, 2003).” It is unrealistic to extend certain social protection 
concepts, such as social pensions (as adopted in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana), to much 
poorer countries in the region. 
 
In terms of Devereux’s findings (2001), non-contributory state pensions were introduced first in 
South Africa in 1928, with eligibility being extended to white Namibians during the 1940s, but to 
African Namibians only in 1973. Initially motivated by a complex combination of welfare and 
political objectives, including the control of Africa urbanisation and the intent to ‘win hearts and 
minds’ during South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, the social pension has sustained millions of 
poor families for decades. Despite such social pensions reducing the levels of poverty and 
promoting social development, according to Devereux (2001), the social pension in Namibia is 
currently being subjected to close public scrutiny, with concerns that it is poorly targeted and 
‘fiscally unsustainable’, motivating recent proposals to introduce means testing – as in South Africa 
– to reduce the number of claimants, and to restrict payment increases below current inflation rates. 
 
According to Samson (2004), five countries in Africa have non-contributory social pensions: South 
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius. The costs associated with the administration of 
these social pensions vary among these countries when measured as a percentage of the country’s 
GDP, with their forming 3% of that of South Africa was 3% of GDP, 2% of that of Mauritius, 1,4% 
of that of Lesotho, 0,7% of that of Namibia, and 0,4% of that of Botswana (see Figure 15). 
According to Samson (2004), social transfers (pensions) in South Africa support economic growth 
along multiple dimensions, substantially reducing poverty and destitution among all households by 
21% and 32%, respectively. 
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Source: Adapted from Samson (2004). 
Figure 15. Non-contributory social pension costs as % of GDP in SADC 
 
Social grants in South Africa play a critical role in reducing poverty and promoting social 
development, as shown by a study undertaken by EPRI (2004) to evaluate the social and economic 
impact of state old age pensions (SOAP), disability grants (DGs), child support grants (CSGs), care 
dependency grants (CDG), foster care grants (FCGs) and grants-in-aid (GIAs). In terms of health, 
education, housing and vital services, such social grants were found to reduce poverty, regardless of 
which methodology was used to quantify the impact measure or to identify the poverty line 
concerned. The current social security system is most successful when measured in terms of 
destitution, with its impact being smallest when poverty lines ignore economies of scale and adult 
equivalence issues. For instance, social grants in South Africa reduce the poverty headcount 
measure by 4.3%, as measured against the Committee of Inquiry’s expenditure poverty line (which 
possesses no scales). The social security system, however, reduces 45% of the total rand destitution 
gap – an impact which is more than ten times greater (EPRI, 2004). 
 
EPRI (2004), when using the Committee of Inquiry’s aforementioned expenditure poverty line, 
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detected that a 10% increase in the take-up of SOAP reduces the poverty gap by only 1.2%, with 
full take-up being reduced by only 2.5%. The take-up rate for the SOAP is already very high, and 
many of the elderly who are eligible for the pension, but who do not receive it, are not among the 
poorest of South Africans. As a result, extending the SOAP still further has limited potential as a 
poverty reducing measure. Extensions of the DG offer greater promise, although at substantially 
greater expense. A 50% increase in DG take-up would reduce the total rand poverty gap by 1.7%, 
while full take-up would generate a 5.1% reduction. The greatest poverty-reducing potential lies 
with the progressive extension of the child support grant. Extending the eligibility age to 14 would 
reduce the poverty gap by 16.6%, while a further extension to age 18 would reduce the existing gap 
by 21.4%. Increasing the real grant payment (as the government did in 2003) would generate an 
even greater impact. Extending the child support grant to age 14 would yield a 22% poverty gap 
reduction, while an extension to age 18 would reduce the poverty gap by 28.3%. Combining the 
higher CSG extended to age 14 with the full take-up of the SOAP and the DG would reduce the 
total rand poverty gap by 29%. 
 
According to Smith and Subbarao (2003, cited in FFSSA, 2004), in the absence of commitments on 
the part of donors to fund recurrent social protection interventions, the government provision of 
social protection is prioritised in relation to other pressures on limited government expenditure. 
Common characteristics of very poor countries are very low average incomes; the absence of a 
growth path to reduce poverty in the near future; limited resources to fund transfers to the poor, and 
early stages of transition out of subsistence agriculture. Such characteristics serve as barriers 
constraining the implementation of effective public safety nets. According to the Forum for Food 
Security in Southern Africa (FFSSA) (2004), financial dilemmas were not the only factors 
constraining policy choices aimed at social protection. Effective safety net interventions require 
sufficient administrative capacity within government to design programmes, to identify the right 
beneficiaries correctly and to deliver social services to them. In many countries in Southern Africa, 
institutional capacity is still lacking in this respect. 
 
5.4.3 International food assistance programmes 
Two forms of FAPs exist at the international level: food aid and food-related international finance. 
Such programmes are merely cross-border extensions of domestic FAPs, involving the transfer of 
resources into a country for subsequent distribution by the recipient government or NGOs to 
individual beneficiaries thereof (Barett, 2002). Food aid is analogous to food distribution 
programmes, in which donors provide in-kind assistance, most commonly out of their own 
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surpluses. While food-related international finance is analogous to food stamp schemes, the 
recipients are given additional purchasing power with which to enter international food markets. 
Barett (2002) define food aid and food-related international finance, with food aid consisting of the 
international provision of food commodities, usually surplus from the donors, for free or on highly 
concessional terms. Traditionally, half to three quarters of the value of food aid has been free. 
Food-related international finance is a mechanism aimed at helping to improve food-deficit 
countries’ food security without the available resources being directed to local stockbuilding or 
further borrowing. The common objective is to provide medium-term credit on favourable terms to 
support extraordinary food import requirements caused by price shocks or crop failures. Generally, 
FAPs are transfers in cash or in kind, intended to increase food intake and improve participants’ 
nutritional status. This section identifies the existing two forms of international food assistance in 
the region, and describes the delivery or distributional problems facing the recipient governments or 
NGOs in respect of individual beneficiaries, who may contribute to food insecurity in the region. 
 
According to Zondi (2004), food aid has come to represent the best international intervention 
against poverty and food insecurity thus far, thereby entrenching Africa’s dependence, which it 
tried so hard to avoid in the 1970s. Timely food relief was vital during the 1984/85 Sahelian 
famines and the 1992 Southern African food crisis. However, food aid has tended to enter the food 
market in competition with local producers. Creating a taste for foreign foods, which has inevitably 
unlocked the door to commercial imports, such food aid has tended to direct attention away from 
long-term food security policies. According to Kalibwani (2005: 12), despite the humanitarian role 
of food aid in “filling the empty stomachs” and “saving dying children”, food aid has been observed 
to have adverse effects on domestic food production. According to Hopper (1976, cited in 
Kalibwani, 2005), it has not only dulled the political will to develop agriculture, but has also been 
cited as contributing to keeping local food prices at such low levels that indigenous farmers have 
been discouraged from production. Several scholars, echoing the argument about the impact of 
price policies on domestic food production, argue that such policies have discouraged farmers from 
expanding their production and have thus aggravated the food deficits. The rationale for such 
arguments derives from basic economic theory, which suggests that food prices affect both demand 
and supply. If prices are low, the farmer generally gets little for his/her produce, and if too low, 
there is no incentive to produce enough for sale. In Zambia, it is reported that farmers who 
previously produced sufficient maize to sell some to the national market, now produce sorghum, 
millet and tubers for home consumption or else sell to local markets (FFSSA, 2004). 
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In contrast, however, lower prices increase the purchasing power of consumers and decrease the 
purchasing power of producers. And, since government pricing policies tend to lower what would 
otherwise have been the market price, such price policies have adverse effects on domestic food 
production. It is on the basis of such an argument that food aid can be regarded as an obstacle to 
food security (Kalibwani, 2005). Maxwell (2001) agrees that the easy availability of food aid has 
led to the depression of domestic agricultural production, either by way of market forces (by driving 
prices too low) or because it has allowed governments to neglect their farmers. Furthermore, 
artificially low world prices resulting from the subsidies paid by northern governments to their 
farmers have made commercially imported food cheap, especially in countries with overvalued 
exchange rates. 
 
The targeting of food aid to those most in need is difficult, while blanket coverage reduces the 
impact of such aid and increases the related costs. After the 1991/92 drought in Southern Africa, it 
was established that staple food received by way of drought relief and food for work provided only 
about 15% to 25% of the average monthly per capita cereal requirements (Eldridge, 2003, cited in 
FFSSA, 2004). Official reports tended to over-inflate the amounts distributed, and there were 
problems related to delayed distribution due to logistical and organisation constraints, and 
inadequate targeting (Tobaiwa, 1993, cited in FFSSA, 2004). In effect, food aid was expensive 
when compared to commercial imports and locally produced food. Maize food aid to Malawi in 
2003, for example, was estimated to cost US$450 per tonne, compared to the US$220 per tonne for 
commercial imports, and to the less than US$50 per tonne for maize produced domestically using 
free inputs (Levy, 2003, cited in FFSSA, 2004). Such was especially the case for the landlocked 
SADC countries, in which the transport costs were exceptionally high. 
 
Food-related international finance is critical for future growth in the region, particularly given the 
inability of Southern African markets to extend agricultural exports to the EU or the US, or to 
develop diversified economies, due to the dual constraints of OECD protectionism and WTO tariff 
restrictions. According to McCord (2002), NEPAD calculated that aid investment flows of US$35 
billion per year would be required to rejuvenate the SSA regional economy to such a sustainable 
extent that the international development goal growth target of 6% would be met. 
 
According to WFP (2006), WFP devotes more of its resources to Africa than to any other UN 
agency. In 2005, WFP allocated more than 70% of all its operational expenditure to SSA, more than 
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to any other region or continent. For the period 2003 to 2005, the total food procurement from 
Africa amounted to over US$ 579 million. In its mission to move massive quantities of food to 
people in need, WFP is one of the largest transport contractors for logistics services. For example, 
during 2003 it paid approximately US$ 250 million in freight costs to transport providers in several 
African countries. In addition, WFP also buys non-food items (NFI) from the continent to support 
its operations. In 2004, US$ 71.5 million worth of goods and services (35% of the total) was 
procured from Africa. 
 
Table 5.3 shows WFP food purchases in SADC countries from 2003 to 2005, with WFP purchasing 
a total of 512, 106/mtn, equal in value to US$91 million in 2003. In 2004, its food purchases 
amounted to 317, with 944/mtn equal to US$75 million, while, in 2005, WFP food purchases 
increased to 573, 219/mtn, equal to US$114 million in the region (WFP, 2006). 
 
Table 5.3. WFP – Food purchases in SADC, 2003–2005 
Country Quantity (mtn) Value (US$) Quantity (mtn) Value (US$) Quantity (mtn) Value (US$) 
 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 
Angola 3,863 766,115 532 88,506 350 105,700 
DRC 2,220 815,733 844 257,227 8,141 2,916,133 
Lesotho 6,069 1,140,250 35,738 8,153,677 19,613 3,497,974 
Malawi 26,002 4,467,594 17,482 5,579,385 35,669 9,826,467 
Mozambique 16,750 3,151,707 17,495 3,847,791 9,031 2,248,839 
Namibia 2,747 179,047 5,447 1,034,396 2,534 410,206 
South Africa 324,625 54,147,084 107,562 25,586,541 345,263 57,525,703 
Swaziland n.a. n.a. 2,467 554,766 2,941 582,789 
Tanzania 60,441 12,659,140 38,587 9,460,488 86,504 22,128,963 
Zambia 61,973 11,499,442 85,002 17,736,130 5,7173 13,584,449 
Zimbabwe 7,416 2,511,000 6,788 2,835,705 6,000 1,482,300 
Total 512,106 91,337,112 317,944 75,134,612 573,219 114,309,523 
Source: WFP (2006). 
Note: n.a. = not available 
 
Despite such extensive WFP aids, according to McCord (2002), aid to Africa generally has 
decreased by 43% over the past decade, and residual aid flows focus increasingly on humanitarian, 
conflict resolution and structural adjustment initiatives, in effect reducing funding available for 
more conventional development. Accordingly, the amount of aid provided as a percentage of gross 
domestic investment has decreased significantly across the region, particularly in the post-conflict 
countries of Mozambique and Angola. Despite such a decrease, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia 
remain highly dependent on concessional aid flows. Though Zambia reduced its aid dependence 
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significantly during the late 1990s, it still remains highly dependent on aid, which comprises more 
than 40% of the total government revenue, while, in Malawi, aid accounts for more than 30% of the 
total revenue, and, in Lesotho, for 10% of such. 
 
Given the secular downward trend of aid over the past decade, and the negative response of the G8 
to the NEPAD proposal in June 2002, it is unlikely that the downward trend of aid to Africa will be 
reversed in the coming years. While vertical interventions against specific problems, such as HIV or 
malaria, may attract additional funding, it is unlikely that there will be significant additional aid 
flows for social or infrastructural development. Lastly, the addition of only US$1billion to the 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) fund by the G8 in response to the NEPAD proposal for an 
extended debt relief programme also indicates that increased resource flows to the region are not a 
G8 priority (McCord, 2002). 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Available data and the literature addressed in this chapter have shown how wide-ranging 
government interventions aimed at sustaining food security throughout the Southern African region 
is proving too costly for the anticipated future. Therefore, financial resources have to be combined 
with political resolve to counter existing problems, although competencies within governments have 
to be developed to ensure long-term food security in the region.  
 
This chapter described the following findings in relation to the interventions adopted so far to 
counter the problem of food insecurity in the SADC region: 
 
Firstly, food security intervention focused on the reduction of risk: Of the different schemes that 
have been undertaken under the auspices of the SADC Food Security Programme, REWU has had 
the greatest role to play in reducing hunger and malnutrition in the region. At the time of the 2002 
food crisis in the region, for example, the EWS succeeded in listing the extent of production and the 
availability of cereals in the region. However, to date EWS has fared less well in relation to the 
following of non-climatic incidents. Until now, the EWS has tended to collect data on behalf of 
governments and donors, with significantly less concern for the best interests of private activity and 
civil society. The focus of its concerns can be seen in the light of such a project being completely 
reliant on donations from associates for its functions, however. 
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Due to the lack of capacity of the RDMTC, which was established earlier with SADC help, minimal 
planning occurred. SADC therefore lacked the ability to react successfully and sustainably at a time 
of crisis, so that most national governments were not well prepared for the events that took place in 
2001/02, and were unable to cope with the crisis effectively. 
 
Secondly, food security programmes focused on mitigating risk: Persistent regional food insecurity 
experienced as a result of the hunger and starvation caused by the droughts and floods suffered 
during 1992, 1995 and 2001/02, especially when faced with severe foreign currency shortages at 
national level, emphasised the value of stocking grain reserves within the SADC countries 
themselves. In addition, the negative impact of storage and opportunity costs, as well as the pressure 
of having to administer such reserves in a cost-effective and fair way in the face of the demands 
made by influential lobby groups whose demands fluctuate over time, depending on market 
conditions, have to be considered. 
 
In relation both to the public and the private sectors, SAFEX holds potential as a facilitator of the 
accumulation of extensive stocks of staple cereals, such as maize and wheat. With the 
implementation of such a system allowing for administration to take place at the regional rather 
than at the national level, the adoption of such an approach would serve to encourage intra-regional 
trade, reinforce the function of private actors, and diminish the need for state governments to 
maintain either large grain stocks or extensive monetary reserves. Accordingly, this new 
development may well benefit from a process of regional harmonisation directed at supporting 
national actions. 
 
Finally, food security involvements focused on coping with risk: Food subsidies and food price 
stabilisation systems have come under increasingly severe criticism due to most financial assistance 
programmes aimed at fostering a situation of food security being essentially regressive, as it is the 
wealthy who tend to prosper from the additional food supplies and to benefit most from widespread 
subsidisation. Such interventions would also be extremely costly to implement in such a way that 
they bring about wide-spread relief to the poorest of the poor. Due to food-pricing strategies in most 
Southern African countries being notably consumer-oriented, agricultural pricing policies have 
tended to suppress any incentives to produce food, as well as forestalling governments from 
instituting and maintaining food reserves. The adoption of such strategies has also reduced 
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opportunities for employment in the farming, processing and rural industries. 
 
Some governments in the region, such as that of Malawi, that have consistently aimed at attaining a 
better quality of life for their poor, have had to face numerous bureaucratic bottlenecks and 
restrictions. Controlled safety net programmes – nutrition supplements; free food distribution; free 
input distribution; food-, cash- and inputs-for-work – have tended to be disjointed, unco-ordinated 
and inappropriately targeted. Direct support and social constructivist transfers have been few in 
volume and narrow in scope, mainly due to the prevailing financial constraints. Furthermore, 
although the WFP has worked hard to improve the learner–teacher ratio, a standard reaction to 
situations of chronic and transitory food insecurity in the region has been to withdraw learners from 
the educational system. 
 
Lesotho still has no discernible poverty reduction and food security strategies designed to expand its 
economy in the long term or to promote its macro-economic stability. The poverty and food 
insecurity reduction programmes that have been implemented in Mozambique since the end of the 
civil war, have largely aimed at diversifying the economy and enhancing productivity, with little 
discussion of how to cope with at risk groups. Similarly, in Zambia poverty and food insecurity 
reducing interventions have failed to include any means by which to improve agricultural inputs or 
to stabilise food prices that were affected by structural adjustment programmes. Zimbabwe may 
have the economic and managerial competence to implement successful social protection 
programmes of a wide enough scope to deal with the needs of the local populace. However, the 
collapse of its economic development policy caused the Zimbabwean government to establish 
welfare projects aimed both at pleasing voters, which tended to deepen reliance on aid. More 
positively, social grants (such as those implemented in South Africa) played an important role in 
decreasing poverty and encouraging social development, despite their being less successfully 
targeted and economically sustainable in some SADC countries (such as Namibia). 
 
Impoverished countries experienced minimal average revenue, inadequate growth aimed at poverty 
reduction in the near future, insufficient capital to support transfer of assets to the poor and a basic 
shift away from subsistence agriculture, which all constrained the establishment of efficient public 
safety nets. However, financial problems were not the only issues restricting social protectionist 
policy options. Successful interventions require that governments are competent enough at 
managerial level to design programmes, to identify the beneficiaries who will most benefit from 
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interventions and to deliver social services to them. However, in several Southern African countries, 
such competency is still lacking. 
 
Despite the humanitarian intent of food aid programmes, such intervention has been observed to 
affect home food production adversely. Food aid strategies have, in effect, often discouraged 
farmers from intensifying their production, thus leading to food deficits, in line with basic economic 
theory, which claims that food prices influence both demand and supply. In addition, food aid to 
landlocked countries, such as Malawi, is prohibitive, when seen in the context of economy-based 
imports versus locally produced food. Moreover, numerous difficulties abound in regards to delays 
in distributions due to transportation and administration problems and inappropriate targeting. 
 
Although WFP aid has proved of great significance to Africa, monetary support generally has 
declined by forty-three percent, with residual aid flows focusing more on humanitarian conflict 
resolution and structural adjustment programmes, resulting in the decreased funding of overall 
development. Fiscal aid flows to Africa are expected to decline even more over the coming years, 
with funding becoming less accessible, especially in the near future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The contribution of regional trade integration to food security 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the face of globalisation, regionalism, especially in Africa, has received much more attention 
than in the past, as a result of growing fears of African marginalisation (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). 
Although the circumstances and objectives vary among the different SADC countries, success could 
be achieved in the regional, if they were all to satisfy certain criteria. According to the World Bank 
(1986), in order to succeed in terms of regional trade, integration should meet at least three criteria. 
First, a region should contain some countries with a food surplus and some with a food deficit. 
Second, an adequate storage, transport, and communication system should link the countries, so that 
food supplies can flow between them. Third, the countries should have a high degree of political 
unity – which is, perhaps, the most important and the most difficult precondition to satisfy. This 
chapter aims to clarify the problems facing regional trade integration in Southern Africa, in the light 
of the fact that African countries are too small on their own to negotiate with the powerful trading 
blocs. 
 
One of the primary arguments in favour of regional integration is that small economies cannot 
successfully compete on their own. The UN and other international organisations have studied this 
issue since at least the 1940s as part of their research into the decolonisation process. The 
subsequent literature emphasises the following problems faced by small economies (USAID, 2003): 
¾ Their small domestic resource base limits the capacity for transformation, resulting in less 
diversified economic activity. 
¾ There are limited opportunities for economic development, with a greater dependence on 
external factors, leading to increased economic instability and vulnerability. 
¾ A high level of dependence on a few primary products for export leaves small economies 
vulnerable to external shocks and natural hazards. 
¾ Small countries present few(er) opportunities to realise economies of scale. 
 
Future food demands will require a dramatic improvement in domestic agricultural production, and 
in the marketing and trade of cereals in the region. Domestic production is still low, with trade 
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policies not yet being harmonised and trade transaction costs still being high (Van Rooyen, 1997, 
cited in Van Rooyen, 2000). A regional approach, enabling agriculture to contribute positively to 
the problems of food security, poverty and employment, is urgently required. According to Vink 
(1992), there are basically two models for economic regionalism: sectoral co-operation and trade 
integration, in both of which the agricultural sector features prominently. Trade integration has the 
potential to yield substantial benefits, primarily because it reduces both tariff and NTBs to trade, 
providing member countries with broader markets for their commodities, while enhancing the 
transferability of resources to optimal production functions in various economic sectors. Sectoral 
co-operation facilitates the sharing of regional resources and information, knowledge and 
experience in activities such as research and training. Trade integration and sectoral co-operation 
between countries, operating within different transformation phases; therefore contribute both 
directly and indirectly to sustainable economic growth, food security and development in a region. 
 
Regional trade integration is generally seen as a means of fostering economic growth and 
development through increased intra-regional trade and cross-border investment (Chauvin & 
Gaulier, 2002). According to Mayer and Thomas (1997), a critical assumption made is that trade 
integration among developing countries is a mechanism for fostering industrial development and 
diversification, rather than for merely enhancing trade flows between constituent countries. While 
the removal of barriers to international trade is necessary for regional industrial development, it is 
not a sufficient condition. Access to a larger market clearly enables individual countries to exploit 
economies of scale and thus to develop industrial capacity. According to McCord (2002), even 
within unequal regional economic development some benefits may accrue to less developed 
countries from regional integration through the exchange of goods, as well as by extending the 
region’s capacity for growth by expanding the resource base and facilitating structural 
transformation. Such benefits may spread to the less developed countries in the region by way of 
cross-border flows of resources, goods and labour. However, within the region such spread is 
restricted, due to an inadequate transport and communications infrastructure, as well as to social and 
political factors. In order to promote flow within the region, the removal of barriers to such a 
transfer of labour and capital would be required. Nevertheless, the debate on trade liberalisation and 
growth is still open, with the increasing integration of the world economies having revived interest 
in regional integration schemes.  
 
As a result of Africa having experimented with economic integration for some time now, it has 
developed around 11 economic blocs, including the Economic Community of Western African 
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States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and SADC 
(Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). According to Vink and Kirsten (2002), the three most important trade 
relations in the Southern African region include SACU, which exhibits the deepest level of 
integration, SADC, and the South Africa–Zimbabwe bilateral agreement. Of the extra-regional 
influences, the Lomé (and now Cotonou) preferences, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) of the USA, and the separate bilateral agreement of South Africa with the EU are most 
influential.  
 
6.2 ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE IN SADC 
Over the past 15 years, growth performance has been relatively poor in Southern Africa, as the 
region experienced slow growth, with declining levels of GDP per capita. It is unlikely that most 
countries in the region will meet the 6% growth levels required to halve poverty by 2015. However, 
the structure of the regional economies was such that they were competitive, rather than 
complementary. The objective of this section is to determine the economic structures, and the 
growth performances among countries, in the SADC region. 
 
The SADC countries fall into two broad groups over the long-term: those that rely on agriculture 
and those that are mineral-based (see Table 6.1). The primary economic activity of the DRC, 
Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique centres on the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2006). 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), the Mauritian economy has, for quite some time, been 
driven by the agricultural sector, though sometimes the manufacturing sector outweighs the sugar 
industry as the main pillar of the economy. The mainstay of the Seychelles economy is services, as 
a result of the relative importance of its tourism sector. The mining sector also continues to be one 
of the most important sectors for most of the SADC countries, including Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Botswana and Angola. According to Mayer and Thomas (1997), the structural 
characteristics of the regional economies were such that they were competitive rather than 
complementary, with countries producing a similar range of primary products and competing for 
export markets. Indeed, the lack of a diversified production structure in the SADC region is 
frequently cited as the main obstacle to the successful integration of, and economic development in, 
the region. 
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Table 6.1. Economic structures of the SADC countries (% share of GDP), 1980–2005 
  Agriculture, value added Industry, value added Manufacturing, value Services, value added 
Country (% of GDP)               (% of GDP)  added (% GDP)          (% of GDP)  
  **1980 **1990 *2005 **1980 **1990 *2005 **1980 **1990 *2005 **1980 **1990 *2005 
Angola  n.a. 17.9 8.0 n.a. 40.8 66.0 n.a. 5.0 4.0 n.a. 41.2 26.0 
Botswana 11.0 4.6 3.0 45.1 56.4 51.0 5.3 4.9 5.0 43.9 39.0 46.0 
DRC 25.3 30.1 46.0 33.1 28.2 25.0 14.3 11.0 4.0 41.6 41.6 29.0 
Lesotho 24.6 23.4 17.0 26.5 33.7 41.0 n.a. n.a. 19.0 48.9 42.9 41.0 
Malawi 43.7 45.0 35.0 22.5 28.9 19.0 13.7 19.5 11.0 33.7 26.1 46.0 
Mauritius 12.7 12.1 6.0 25.9 32.2 28.0 15.3 23.6 23.0 61.8 55.7 66.0 
Mozambique 37.1 37.1 23.0 34.4 18.4 30.0 n.a 10.2 15.0 28.5 44.5 47.0 
Namibia 11.6 11.8 10.0 57.6 38.3 32.0 9.4 13.9 12.0 30.8 49.9 58.0 
Seychelles 6.8 4.8 3.0 15.6 16.3 28.0 7.4 10.1 20.0 77.5 78.9 69.0 
South Africa 6.2 4.6 3.0 48.2 40.1 31.0 21.6 23.6 19.0 45.6 55.3 66.0 
Swaziland 23.7 13.7 12.0 32.0 43.4 48.0 22.3 35.9 39.0 44.3 42.8 40.0 
Tanzania n.a. 46.0 45.0 n.a. 17.7 18.0 n.a. 9.3 7.0 n.a. 36.4 38.0 
Zambia 15.3 20.6 19.0 42.6 49.1 25.0 7.8 14.0 12.0 42.1 30.3 56.0 
Zimbabwe 15.7 16.5 22.0 29.0 33.1 28.0 21.6 22.8 14.0 55.3 50.4 50.0 
                         Note: n.a. = not available. 
                    Source:  
                    * World Development Indicators (2006). The World B.ank 
                    **World Development Indicators (2001). The World Bank. 
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According to McCord (2002), during the late 1990s, only Angola, Malawi, Mauritius and 
Mozambique attained the 5% growth floor estimated to be a prerequisite for preventing an increase 
in the number of their citizens living in poverty, while the other countries in the region fell below 
such a floor (see Table 6.2). Angola, Malawi and Mozambique also reached the 6% growth target 
estimated as the condition for reducing poverty by half by 2015. Growth rates for 2000 indicate 
that, within the region, only Botswana and Mauritius may be able to sustain their GDP growth 
above the 6% target in the near future. All other countries in the region were found to be facing 
low-growth scenarios, indicating a continuing fall in GDP per capita, with the SADC average for 
2000 falling to 2,8% GDP growth, while in the same year the DRC and Zimbabwe experienced 
severe growth reductions, of 15,0 and 6,1% respectively. According to the World Bank (2006), 
while, in 2005, Angola (15%), Mozambique (8%) and the DRC (7%) experienced considerable 
growth, above that set as the growth target for the Millennium Development Goal, Zimbabwe was 
the only country in the region that remained with negative growth, due to political unrest and its 
disadvantageous macro-economic policy. The SADC average for 2005 increased to 4,3% GDP 
growth, which meant that the SADC was doing better, though it was still operating at below the 
target level of 6%. 
 
Table 6.2. Basic economic growth data for Southern Africa, 1990–2005 
SADC Population GDP US$ GDP per capita   Average Annual Real Growth 
Members (millions) (billions) (constant US$)   Rate  
      % p/a  
  2005* 2005* Av.2000–2004* 1990–94** 1995–99** 2000** 2005* 
Angola  15,9 28,0 801,5 −5,9 6,8 4,9 15,0 
Botswana  1,8 9,4 3396,5 4,6 4,8 6,0 4,0 
DRC 57,5 7,0 86,8 −8,6 0,9 −15,0 7,0 
Lesotho  1,8 1,5 516,4 4,4 3,9 2,5 1,0 
Malawi  12,9 2,1 162,3 1,0 7,3 3,0 3,0 
Mauritius  1,2 6,4 4035,9 5,4 5,2 7,5 5,0 
Mozambique  19,8 6,6 241,2 2,6 8,7 3,8 8,0 
Namibia  2,0 6,1 1831,0 4,3 2,8 4,0 4,0 
South Africa  45,2 240,2 3132,4 0,2 2,3 3,0 5,0 
Swaziland  1,1 2,7 1337,3 3,8 2,9 2,4 2,0 
Zambia  11,7 7,3 345,5 0,2 1,3 4,0 5,0 
Zimbabwe  13,0 3,4 520,7 2,1 3,1 −6,1 −7,0 
SADC Average     1,5 4,0 2,8 4,3 
Sources: 
*World Development Indicators (2006). 
**Lewis (2001, cited in McCord, 2002). 
 
According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2003), the barriers 
 138
to growth within the SADC region have been found to be substantial, including: 
1) macro-economic policy, characterised by a lack of internal macro-economic balance, 
overvalued currencies, and high rates of inflation (Jenkins & Thomas, 2000, cited in USAID, 2003); 
2) taxation and fiscal adjustment, characterised by a lack of indirect and direct tax policy co-
ordination and the persistence of capital controls (Leape, 2000, cited in USAID, 2003); 
3) trade policy, characterised by overlapping membership and incoherent rules of origin and 
trade tariff treatment of SADC member countries in different preferential trade arrangements 
(Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002); 
4) foreign direct investment, characterised by political and economic instability; pervasive 
inept bureaucracy and inefficiency; a lack of regulatory transparency; an underdeveloped private 
sector; restrictions on movements of persons; the underdevelopment of capital markets and the 
persistence of capital controls; the lack of regional product standards; shortages of skilled labour; 
low productivity, and undue restrictions on land ownership (Hess, 2000, cited in USAID, 2003); 
5) micro-economic considerations, characterised by supply-side constraints relating to the 
provision of physical infrastructure, education and training, and finance; the transfer of technology 
and information; market development activities; political concerns regarding potential job losses 
from integration, especially in ‘sensitive industries’, as identified in the SADC Protocol on Trade; 
the lack of definition of priorities for launching private sector growth, especially in micro-, small, 
and medium-sized enterprises; concerns about predatory behaviour by local, regional and 
international firms; substantial labour market differentials between organised labour in South Africa 
and workers elsewhere in the region; and underdeveloped human resource capacities (Maasdorp, 
2000, cited in USAID, 2003). 
 
In conclusion, positive outcomes of the regional neo-liberal economic stance have been a general 
reduction of fiscal deficits throughout the region and a significant decrease in general inflation 
during the 1990s and 2000 (see Table 2.2). Nevertheless, economic growth in the SADC region was 
found to be lagging behind other economic blocs in the developing regions, and the region’s GDP 
growth, at the time of this study, was still far below the target of 6% defined in NEPAD as being a 
minimum requirement for sustained economic development; accordingly, its contribution to food 
security is still in doubt. In addition, the features of the regional economies were competitive rather 
than complementary. Thus, non-diversified production composition in the SADC region is 
commonly quoted as being the key obstacle to the development of integration and economic 
advancement in the region. 
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6.3 SACU 
SACU is the longest standing regional integration arrangement in Southern Africa, albeit a relic of 
the colonial era. Economic integration between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
(the BLS countries) goes as far back as 1891. In 1915 the agreement was extended to South-West 
Africa (now Namibia), after the South African forces defeated the German army and took over 
administration of the territory during the First World War. The current SACU agreement came into 
force in 1969, after the BLS countries had all gained their independence (Mayer & Thomas, 1997). 
This section provides an overview of the economic characteristics of SACU, reveals whether 
Southern African economies have interventionist or protectionist trade regimes, on both their export 
and import sides, and identifies the problems facing existing economic blocs and regional trade 
agreements in Southern Africa, as well as the contribution made by these groupings to regional food 
security. 
 
Five members of SACU have close economic relations going back over a century, with four of its 
members also forming part of a monetary union.14 The defining characteristic of SACU is the 
economic dominance of South Africa in relation to the size of the other four members. The BLNS 
countries depend heavily on South Africa for a significant proportion of their trade, investment and, 
in some cases, (migrant) employment (Kirk & Stern, 2003). Kirk and Stern (2003) also found that 
South African companies dominate the business landscape in the BLNS countries. The BLNS 
countries source most of their imports from South Africa, although their exports are more 
geographically diverse. Moreover, the commodity pattern of South African exports to the BLNS 
countries differs significantly from that of its exports to the rest of the world. Whereas South Africa 
continues to export predominantly resource-based goods, the BLNS represent a significant market 
for South African consumer goods and services (Kirk & Stern, 2003). The data in Table 6.3 show 
the BLNS being dwarfed by South Africa in terms of economic and population size, with the former 
having experienced higher growth rates, and with Botswana having a higher level of GDP per 
capita. Over the past two decades, Botswana has experienced much higher growth rates than have 
all other member states (and most of the world), based on the successful exploitation of its diamond 
reserves. The mining industry dominates the economy, accounting for over 30% of the GDP, 
although its share is declining as trade, financial and government services expand. In contrast, 
manufacturing accounts for less than 5% of the GDP (Kirk & Stern, 2003). 
                                                 
14 The Common Monetary Area includes South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. Botswana withdrew from its 
predecessor, the Rand Monetary Area, in 1974. 
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Table 6.3. SACU countries’ basic data, 2000 
Country Population 
(million) 
GDP 
($ billion) 
GDP 
per capita $ 
Average Growth 
Rate 
1990–2000 
Botswana 1.7 5.65 3,424 4.8 
Lesotho 2.16 0.88 407 4.2 
Namibia 1.76 3.47 2,006 4.2 
South Africa 43.8 125.6 2,864 1.7 
Swaziland 1.0 1.28 1,308 3.4 
SACU 50.42 136.88 2,715 1.9* 
Source: IMF Annual Financial Statistics (2001/2002) and World Bank African Development 
Indicators (2002, cited in Kirk & Stern, 2003). 
* Weighted by 2000 GDP. 
 
According to Kalenga (1999), the Southern African economies have led interventionist and 
protectionist trade regimes for quite a long time. On the import side, the extensive use of restrictive 
licensing systems, high tariffs with escalated and cascading structures, a varying degree of import 
prohibitions and tight foreign exchange controls were implemented. On the export side, there were 
substantial implicit and explicit export taxes and the prohibition of certain items as exports. 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), the reason behind the taking of such measures was the 
promotion of industrialisation through import substitution, and the raising of government revenue. 
Chauvin and Gaulier (2002) have also argued that most SADC countries have considerably reduced 
their trade policy related to NTBs, such as quantitative restrictions on imports. However, significant 
NTBs still exist, remaining the most critical obstacles to trade. Such NTBs include quantitative 
restrictions on certain imports, such as maize, wheat and dairy products. Other NTBs relate to 
surcharges on imports; customs documentation and related procedures; border-related controls; the 
transportation of goods and persons; foreign exchange bottlenecks, which tend to discourage trade 
transactions; delays in payments, and clearance and settlement systems. In almost all countries in 
the region, the highest rates are applied to consumer goods, middle rates to intermediate goods and 
lower rates to capital goods and raw materials. 
 
Reforms, in terms of the IMF/WB structural adjustment programme, have brought about changes 
since the mid-1980s. Subsequently, countries in the region committed to reducing their tariffs under 
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the Uruguay Round outcome. Participation in regional arrangements further led to the liberalisation 
of intra-regional trade among some SADC countries, which has resulted in lower tariff rates and 
less dispersion in tariff regimes in individual countries (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). According to the 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) (2003), the Namibian government, for example, 
has privatised support services, such as tractor and seed provision, and agricultural boards no longer 
either set prices or procure agricultural products. Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi have liberalised 
their exchange rates, decontrolled their pricing systems and abolished the setting of pan-territorial 
and uniform prices by their agricultural boards. 
 
According to the ESRF (2003), regional trade initiatives have proliferated around the world, 
including in Southern Africa. During the past two decades, the Southern African region has 
witnessed a growing number of regional co-operation and regional integration initiatives, including 
COMESA, SADC, SACU, the East Africa Co-operation (EAC), the Indian Ocean Commission 
(IOC), the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which are all 
involved in economic and regional co-operation. The current membership of regional institutions in 
Southern Africa is shown in Table 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.4. Membership of regional organisations in Southern Africa 
Country SACU CMA SADC COMESA CBI 
Angola   X X  
Botswana X  X   
DRC   X X  
Lesotho X X X   
Malawi   X X X 
Mauritius1   X X X 
Mozambique   X  X 
Namibia X X X X  
Seychelles   X X X 
South Africa X X X   
Swaziland X X X X X 
Tanzania   X  X 
Zambia   X X X 
Zimbabwe   X X X 
Source: ESRF (2003). 
 
According to the ESRF (2003), a new economic environment has emerged within SADC with the 
adoption of the Protocol on Trade in 1996 and its implementation, which started in 2000. 
Theoretically, the aim of the protocol is to remove restrictions on trade by eliminating import and 
export duties and eliminating NTBs. Unfortunately, the intended fostering of trade in the SADC 
region faces many challenges, including: 
• the freer movement of goods and services across borders; 
• improved competitiveness and quality in terms of the imposition of standards; 
• greater striving towards the harmonising of trade policies; 
• the imposed conformity of trade policies in the SADC with global economic requirements, 
in accordance with WTO regulations; 
• diversification in tradable commodities, according to each country’s comparative advantage; 
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and 
• the membership of SADC countries in other trading blocs, such as COMESA, IOC, ACP, 
SACU and the EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), overlapping in the field of trade policies. 
 
Since most SADC economies are predominantly agriculture-based, with food dominating such trade 
among SADC countries, enhanced trade in agricultural products potentially provides a tool for 
fighting poverty, promoting integration, and increasing economic growth, food security and welfare 
in the region (ESRF, 2003). 
 
6.4 SADC 
The desire to address food security problems within a regional context was first expressed as early 
as 1980 in the Southern Africa region, now officially known as SADC. According to SADC/FAO 
(2002), the objectives of SADC are to  achieve development and economic growth; to alleviate 
poverty; to enhance the standard and quality of life of all the peoples of Southern Africa, and to 
support the socially disadvantaged by means of regional integration. However, in order to achieve 
complementarity between national and regional strategies through institutional framework. This 
section provides a historical background to the formation of SADC, and aims to determine whether 
SADC, as an economic community, will foster economic growth and development through 
increased intra-regional trade and cross-border investment. 
 
According to Chauvin and Gaulier (2002), SADC evolved out of the SADCC. The latter was 
created in 1980 and was more intended to provide a bulwark against the apartheid system prevailing 
in South Africa than to foster a regional trade arrangement. SADCC became SADC in 1992, 
broadening its concerns to the facilitation of regional economic integration. The entrance of South 
Africa into the Community in 1994 enhanced the viability of SADC as an economic community. 
Currently, SADC encompasses 14 members. According to the World Bank (2001), the 14 member 
states of SADC represent a total population of approximately 200 million people.15 Three countries 
(the DRC, South Africa and Tanzania) account for almost two-thirds of the total population in the 
region (see Figure 8 in Chapter 2). 
 
According to Rousseau et al. (2002), the total area of SADC is 9 277 million km2. The large 
                                                 
15 In 2004, the total population in the SADC region consisted of 219 million people (see column 3 in Table 2.9). 
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variance in the relative size of the member countries is clearly illustrated by the fact that fewer than 
half of the countries comprise 88% of its total surface area (see Figure 16 and the SADC member 
states map, Appendix 3). The DRC, Angola and South Africa cover close on 52% of the area 
covered by the Community. The relatively small geographical surface areas of Mauritius and the 
Seychelles resulted in them having the highest population density figures – 578 and 177 persons per 
km2 respectively. Botswana and Namibia had by far the lowest population density figure – 2,8 and  
2 persons per km2, respectively. Compared with other countries in, for instance, Europe and Asia, 
the population density in SADC is relatively low. Average population density figures, however, 
tend to be misleading, since high concentrations of people occur in a few metropolitan and urban 
areas. 
Source: Adapted from Rousseau et al. (2002:3). 
Figure 16. Total land area of SADC 
 
According to SADC (2001), agriculture forms a key sector in the economy of the SADC member 
states, contributing about 13% of the region’s GDP. The sector is dominated by small-scale 
farming, with average land holdings of less than 1 hectare. It is estimated that the livelihood of 70% 
to 80% of the region’s population depends on agriculture. Economic development will, therefore, 
only happen if agricultural productivity is enhanced. Most economies of the SADC member states 
are agriculture-based, with their economies depending on exports of traditional or primary 
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agricultural products, while they import most of their manufactured goods, including agricultural 
inputs, such as machinery and fertiliser. 
 
According to SARPN (2003), SADC countries differ geographically, economically and in their 
levels of development. Some members of the Community, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, the 
DRC, Angola, Namibia and South Africa, have sea outlets, while others, like Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, are landlocked. Climatic conditions are not uniform, resulting in the 
production of different crops and differences in cropping patterns, which indicate different 
vulnerabilities to food crises. Some countries, such as Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, 
are persistently prone to drought and famine. 
 
According to SARPN (2003), countries like Botswana and Namibia have relatively limited arable 
land and have correctly placed their emphasis on the livestock sector, meaning that they could 
exhibit extensive demand for crop products. These countries are rich in minerals, livestock and 
petroleum. Countries that are supply-rich in terms of agroproducts include Tanzania and South 
Africa. These two countries are endowed with different weather conditions and abundant arable 
land, allowing for the farming of different crops, and are also well positioned to facilitate trade, as 
they have sea ports and borders on many other countries. Other countries, such as Malawi, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, though, have climatic conditions that are conducive to the production of 
adequate food. However, they have recently been hit by a drought that precipitated a food crisis. 
This is an opportune moment for supply-rich countries, such as Tanzania, to ameliorate the situation 
through the export of food crops to the food crisis countries in the region.  
 
According to SADC/FAO (2002), in 1999, the combined GDP for SADC was estimated at 
US$178,3 billion. The economies of SADC member states were structurally varied and at different 
stages of development. South Africa’s GDP of US$131 billion, which showed that this was the 
region’s most developed economy, was larger than the combined GDP of all other SADC members. 
Inflation rates within SADC also varied during the period, from hyperinflation in Angola (248%), 
the DRC (45,3%) and Zimbabwe (60%), to relatively low levels of inflation in Mozambique (5,5%) 
and South Africa (5,5%). While SADC region economies grew at a combined rate of 3% in 2000, 
the substantial external debt of individual member states is still one of the region’s greatest 
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challenges. Vink and Kirsten (2002) found that the total SADC GDP was around US$18216 billion 
in 2000, while the average GDP per capita was US$1 761. However, there were wide variances, 
with seven SADC countries being classified as least-developed economies (Angola; the DRC; 
Lesotho; Malawi; Mozambique; Tanzania, and Zambia). 
 
According to USAID (2003), the new trade negotiations in the WTO offer a multilateral forum for 
the SADC region to take advantage of a rules-based system for trade and development. Most 
countries17 have agreed to the WTO, and the Doha Development Agenda offers many opportunities 
and challenges. New structures in the global trading system and governance can increase the 
region’s market access and clarify its rights in the international trading framework. However, they 
also bring obligations, including the duty to surrender a degree of sovereignty over trade and 
investment. Also, as a consequence of continued global trade liberalisation, there will be a 
continuing erosion of the preferences enjoyed by SADC countries. According to the ESRF (2003), 
the SADC region has made substantial progress in matters of trade liberalisation under the structural 
adjustment programmes that have been in effect since the mid-1980s. Countries in the region have 
liberalised their exchange rates, privatised their marketing boards, decontrolled their pricing 
systems and removed their quantitative restrictions, among other measures. Jenkins, Leape and 
Thomas (2000, as cited in USAID, 2003), state that, nevertheless, trade liberalisation still has far to 
go in the region. Jenkins et al. suggest that the SADC FTA should not be viewed as an end in itself, 
or as an alternative to the more general removal of trade restrictions, but rather as a means of 
improving competitiveness in Southern Africa, so that the region can take full advantage of wider 
trade and investment opportunities. USAID (2003) also proposes that the SADC FTA be viewed as 
one of a series of trade arrangements in which Southern African countries participate, and suggests 
that an SADC–EU FTA would be a logical follow-on to the South African and SACU FTAs with 
the EU. According to McCord (2002), while the EU–SA trade agreement will primarily benefit 
South Africa, the WB has calculated that it is also likely to have secondary economic benefits for 
the wider region, in terms of increased regional production and exports. Europe remains the 
region’s top trading partner, although it has lost market share in recent years to Asia, Japan, Italy, 
Germany and the US, while, in terms of AGOA, exports to the USA are likely to increase 
substantially in the future. 
 
                                                 
16 According to the World Bank (2006), the total SADC GDP was US$320,7 billion in 2005, excluding that of Tanzania 
and the Seychelles (the sum of column 3 in Table 6.2). 
17 The fourteen SADC member countries. All are WTO members, except for the Seychelles, which is a WTO observer. 
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Recently, trade between SADC member countries has been on the rise, though the levels of imports 
and exports differ from country to country (see Table 6.5). For example, Tanzania imports more 
than what it exports to SADC countries. While imports from SADC countries accounted for 13% of 
total market share in 2000 and 2001, exports accounted for 4% only (ESRF, 2003). According to 
the ESRF (2003), to Malawi, SADC represents a very important market for both imports and 
exports. However, the country’s regional trade with other SADC members remains relatively minor. 
For Namibia, its main trading partner, South Africa (under the sponsorship of SACU) dominates 
trade, accounting for 99,84% of its imports and 99,38% of its exports. Zambia’s agricultural exports 
have varied from year to year. In 1997 and 1998, agricultural exports to SADC countries grew by 
21% and 33% respectively. However, these gains were reversed by declines in agricultural exports 
of 23% and 26% in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Zambia imports various agricultural products from 
SADC member countries. 
 
Table 6.5. Selected recent trends in intra-SADC trade 
Country Key Points 
South Africa  Rapid growth of agricultural exports to SADC member states, primarily of high value 
products. 
 Imports of agricultural products from SADC countries are typically confined to a small 
number of products with substantial variability in flow from year to year. Much slower 
growth in imports than exports. 
 
Namibia  Trade remains dominated by SACU. 
 Angola represents an important potential market. 
 
Zambia  Erratic, though upward, trend in non-traditional agricultural exports. 
 Increased imports, especially of primary and high value products, primarily from South 
Africa. 
 
Malawi  Declining trade with SADC in regards to both exports and imports. 
Tanzania  Share of exports to SADC in total increased from 3.3% in 1990 to 3.9% in 2000. 
 Share of imports from SADC (with the flow dominated by South Africa) increased from 
1.2% in 1990 to 12.4% in 2000. 
 
Source: ESRF (2003). 
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Transport is a key sector in as far as creating a dynamic imports–exports nexus for intra-SADC 
trade, but the capacity and efficiency of the transport system in the region were weakened by a lack 
of investment and poor performance by the transport sector, which adversely affected export 
performance and market development. Transport costs depend on physical distance and the capacity 
and efficiency of the transport system concerned (ESRF, 2003). The cost of transporting a tonne of 
maize from/to numerous SADC countries to/from South Africa is shown in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6. Transport costs, 1999/2000 
Port of Origin Gauteng Road US$/tonne 
Luanda 165.5 
Gaborone 15.2 
Maseru 23.0 
Lilongwe 97.7 
Maputo 24.2 
Windhoek 50.6 
Lusaka 73.2 
Harare 55.6 
Swaziland 35.1 
Dar-Es-Salaam 155.3 
Cape Town 53.4 
Durban 23.6 
 Durban sea freight (US$/tonne) 
US Gulf Port* 25.49 
Argentina* 33.01 
Source: Vink et al. (2002). 
* Includes freight costs, insurance and discharging costs. Insurance is 0,3%, while discharge costs were estimated at 
7,5% of the product value. 
 
According to the ESRF (2003), costs were computed on the basis of a load size of 32 tonnes. Road 
transport costs include toll road costs and cross-boarder charges, as well as security costs, where 
applicable. For a Gauteng-based manufacturer, it was cheaper to transport maize from the US Gulf 
ports via Durban than from some selected countries within the SADC region, including Angola 
 149
(Luanda), Malawi (Lilongwe), Zambia (Lusaka), Namibia (Windhoek), Zimbabwe (Harare) and 
Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam). The relatively low costs of sea freight for bulk products, even over long 
distances, highlight the importance of international trade linkages. 
 
In terms of intra-regional investments, McCord (2002) states that South African investment flows 
were increasingly directed towards the Southern African region. Between 1995 and 1998, South 
Africa invested R2 500 million in SADC counties, becoming one of the dominant sources of 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the region. South African FDIs were concentrated in the 
mining, retail and wholesale, hotel and leisure sectors, and the manufacturing, as well as the 
finance, sectors. These FDIs are predominantly market and resource seeking in nature, while Vink 
et al. (2006) have argued that South African firms have shown themselves to be quite adept in 
investing in other African countries, particularly in SADC economies (see Table 6.7). South African 
FDIs are generally recognised as being capable of significantly improving the growth and 
development prospects of SADC countries. In this respect, the rapid inroads that South African 
investors have made in selected sectors are a welcome development. 
 
Table 6.7. South African FDI assets by selected African countries, 31 December 2003 & 2004, 
R million 
  2003 2004   
      % of Total Direct Investment, 
      2003/2004 average 
Total Foreign Assets – DFI 180 507 216 660   
        
Botswana 551 619 0.30 
Lesotho 204 256 0.12 
Swaziland 937 841 0.46 
Namibia 1 151 840 0.52 
Zimbabwe 2 033 645 0.72 
Mauritius 4 106 8 116 3.01 
Mozambique 5 071 4 396 2.42 
Zambia 415 412 0.21 
Rest of Africa 1 369 7 476 2.10 
      
Africa’s share in FDI assets 15 837 23 601 9.84 
Source: SA Reserve Bank (2005, cited in Vink et al., 2006). 
 
According to Vink et al. (2006), the leading sectors for FDI inflows in SADC countries, other than 
South Africa, are extractive industries, mining and oil exploration and production. Such investments 
tend to create enclave activities with severely limited spillovers into the host economies. Investment 
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in agriculture and in the industrial activities that operate as forward and backward linkages to 
farming could, from a developmental point of view, have a more positive and wider impact than 
investment in mining and oil production. A dollar spent on FDI in these activities could produce a 
higher social return than a dollar spent on mining, which might, in fact, produce negative social 
returns. 
 
According to UNCTAD (2001, cited in Kamidza et al., 2002), in regards to extra-regional 
investment, SADC’s share of FDIs dropped from US$5,3 billion in 1998 to US$3,9 billion by the 
year 2000, due to the bad relations between some countries and donors. The inflows into Angola, 
South Africa and Mozambique dropped sharply by 72,8%, 58,4% and 36,4%, respectively. Table 
6.8 shows that FDIs to Zimbabwe fell from US$444 million in 1998 to US$50 million and US$30 
million in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Similarly, Botswana and Malawi’s FDIs fell from US$96 
million and US$70 million in 1998 to US$37 million and US$60 million in 1999, before falling 
further the following year to US$30 million and US$51 million, respectively. 
 
Table 6.8. FDI inflows by country, 1989–2000 (US$ million) 
Country 1989–1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Angola 215 472 181 412 1114 2471 1800 (a) 
Botswana −29 70 70 100 96 37 30 
DRC −2 1 2 1 1 1 1 (a) 
Lesotho 169 275 286 269 262 136 223 (a) 
Malawi 12 25 44 22 70 60 51 
Mauritius 24 19 37 55 12 49 277 
Mozambique 21 45 73 64 213 382 139 
Namibia 70 153 129 84 77 111 124 
Seychelles 20 40 30 54 55 60 56 
South Africa 60 1241 818 3817 561 1502 877 
Swaziland 67 44 22 −15 165 90 −37 
Tanzania 15 150 149 158 172 183 193 
Zambia 90 97 117 207 198 163 200 (a) 
Zimbabwe 13 118 81 135 444 59 30 (a) 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (2001, cited in Kamidza et al., 2002). 
Note: (a) = estimate. 
 
Countries were not only failing to penetrate foreign markets and to harness significant flows of 
FDIs, but were also carrying a huge debt burden that hindered economic growth and development. 
As shown in Figure 17, countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
South Africa and Malawi had huge debt problems that were consuming 46,6%, 25,3%, 21,1%, 
20,0%, 15,6%, 13,9% and 11,4%, respectively, of total receipts from their limited export of goods 
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and services. Indeed, some of these countries were so poor that their debt burden was not only 
retarding economic growth and development, but was also becoming economically exhausting and 
unsustainable, politically destabilising and ethically unacceptable (Kamidza et al., 2002). 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2001). 
Figure 17: Total debt service as % of exports of goods and services for selected countries in 
Southern Africa, 1999 
 
Although debt reduction was much improved in more recent years in SADC, according to the 
World Bank (2006), in 2004, debt in Angola decreased to 15%, in Lesotho to 5%, in Mauritius to 
7%, in Mozambique to 5%, in South Africa to 6% and in Tanzania to 5%. Botswana was 1% in debt 
in 2003, Malawi was 8% in debt in 2002 and Zambia was 20% in debt in 2000. Debt still currently 
remains high in Southern Africa, causing a huge problem in as far as achieving development and 
food security in the region is concerned. 
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6.5 TRADE POSITION OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE REGION 
South Africa is the hub of economic growth in Southern Africa, with traditional cross-border trade 
in food staples, livestock and rural raw materials occurring across the continent (Vink et al., 2002). 
According to the service group of Anastasia Gerkis (TSG, 2004), South Africa is the powerhouse of 
the region, as it is the largest economy in SADC, despite the fact that considerable economic growth 
is taking place in many regional economies, although off a low base. The evident concentration of 
industrial activity in only a small number of SADC countries, notably South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(at least prior to certain recent uprooting political and economic changes in the latter), is due to a 
number of factors. According to the service group of Anastasia Gerkis (TSG, 2004), such factors 
include market size, effective demand, infrastructure and telecommunications, the geographical 
location of important services, as well as the prevalent macroeconomic and political environment. 
Evidence from across the region suggests that investment in the manufacturing sector has flourished 
in countries with relative macroeconomic and political stability and with environments that are 
conducive to investment initiatives. This section explores South Africa’s trade position among the 
rest of the member states of the SADC region, and identifies its existing regional trading partners. 
 
According to TSG (2004), the structure of the South African economy has historically been shaped 
by high levels of protection at a sectoral level, together with a broad spectrum of subsidies, tax 
breaks and other incentives. However, during the 1990s, the South African economy reflected 
growing export orientation. Given its past focus on protectionism, the extent to which the 
composition of manufacturing output has been influenced by the changing trade regime, especially 
during the 1990s, has been of importance in terms of helping to determine future government policy 
and manufacturing potential. The share of total exports occupied by manufacturing has grown in 
importance, while traditional exports have declined relatively. As is evident from the data in Table 
6.9, during the first half of the 1990s, manufacturing accounted for 39% of all exports. By 2000, 
this amount had risen to 51%. 
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Table 6.9. South Africa’s sectoral share in total exports (1991–2000) 
Sector 1991–1995 % share 1996–2000 % share 
Manufacturing 38.5 50.7 
Mining 45.0 29.1 
Transport 5.1 6.1 
Trade 4.3 5.5 
Agriculture 4.2 4.8 
Business services 2.4 3.3 
Community services 0.3 0.3 
Electricity 0.1 0.1 
Construction 0.0 0.0 
All industries 100 100 
Source: TIPS; Onyango & Cassim (2002, cited in TSG, 2004). 
 
In terms of agriculture, according to SARPN (2003), South Africa dominates trade in the region, 
exporting far more to the SADC region than it imports from SADC. Geographic proximity allows 
South Africa to compete with third world suppliers. While it imports a narrow range of products 
from SADC countries, such imports have fluctuated considerably over time. South Africa’s imports 
constitute an opportunity for SADC suppliers to South Africa’s agribusiness sector. According to 
SARPN (2003), South Africa’s agricultural exports (particularly in terms of its high value products) 
to SADC have grown rapidly over the past decade, though slower than have total exports in general. 
While total agricultural imports have increased, the growth rate has been lower than that of exports, 
hence the agricultural trade balance favours South Africa. South Africa’s imports of agricultural 
goods also include an increasingly large component of goods that were not imported to any 
significant degree in the past from SADC countries. Such findings are in line with those of Vink 
and Kirsten (2002), as shown in Table 6.10, who observed that agricultural exports had grown 
rapidly, especially since 1990, though agricultural imports had grown even faster. Despite such 
rapid growth in agricultural trade, the overall growth in the total number of exports and imports has 
occurred even faster. 
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Table 6.10. Trends in South Africa’s agricultural exports, 1980–2000 
  1980 1990 2000 
Exports       
Total SA exports (Rm) 19915.4 60770.0 253809.0 
Total agricultural exports (Rm) 2052.5 5289.8 15819.0 
Agricultural exports as % of total exports 10.3 8.7 6.2 
Imports       
Total SA imports (Rm) 14381.3 44141.5 227918.0 
Agricultural imports (Rm) 369.2 2203.3 96437.0 
Agricultural imports/total imports (%) 2.6 5.0 4.2 
Exports + imports/total production (%) 34.5 34.5 57.5 
Agricultural terms of trade (Agric. exports/Agric. imports) 5.56 : 1 2.4 : 1 1.6 : 1 
Source: Vink & Kirsten (2002).    
 
South Africa’s contribution18 to the growth regional product (GRP) of SADC dominates at 72% 
(see Figure 18), with the remaining 13 countries contributing an aggregate 28%. The second largest 
economy was found to be that of Tanzania, with its relatively meagre contribution of 4,5% 
(Rousseau et al., 2002). According to Rousseau et al. (2002), with the exception of the DRC, all 
member countries registered positive growth during the period 1994 to 1999. It should, however, be 
kept in mind that a country like Mozambique, with an average annual growth of 9,1%, grew from a 
relatively small economic base. All the member countries, with the exception of the Seychelles, 
Zambia and the DRC, were growing at a rate higher than that of South Africa. 
                                                 
18 South Africa’s GDP was US$240,2 billion in 2005 (see column 3 in Table 6.2). 
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Source: Adapted from Rousseau et al. (2002:19). 
Figure 18. Growth regional product, 1998 
 
According to McCord (2002), South Africa will continue to dominate the regional economy, and, 
without major new investment flows to the region or OECD subsidy reductions, the economic 
prospects for the more marginal economies are unlikely to show positive change. South Africa will 
continue its dual economic growth path with a growing services sector based in the metropolitan 
areas, while its manufacturing and agricultural sectors will continue to shed jobs and contract in 
response to international competition, leading to increasing unemployment and economic 
polarisation. Faltering growth in South Africa will be of particular concern to the BLNS countries, 
which are all heavily reliant on the South African market. 
 
Table 6.11 provides a broad overview the main imports and trading partners of some SADC 
countries’. South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe were a prominent source of imports for 
the region during the 1996. Given the dominance of primary commodities in the SADC region’s 
productive base, it is not surprising that most countries in the region (excluding South Africa), due 
to their incapacity to produce a sufficient quantity of manufactured goods for their own use, needed 
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to import them. Manufactured goods account for approximately 70% of regional imports (Mayer & 
Thomas, 1997). Despite this fact a decade ago, the case is still being remainig in the region. 
 
Table 6.11. Main imports and trading partners of SADC countries 
Country Main imports and trading partners 
Angola Capital equipment, foodstuffs, vehicles/parts, textiles/clothing, medicines (USA, Cuba, 
Portugal, Brazil) 
Botswana Foodstuffs, vehicles/transport equipment, textiles, petroleum (South Africa, Switzerland, UK, 
USA) 
Lesotho Manufactured products, live animals, machinery, transport equipment, textiles, petroleum 
(South Africa) 
Malawi Machinery, manufactured products, construction/transport equipment, petroleum (South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, UK, Japan) 
Mauritius Not available 
Mozambique Tea, tobacco, manufactured products, petroleum, machinery (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Saudi 
Arabia, UK, Portugal) 
Namibia Foodstuffs, vehicles, machinery, chemicals/plastics, petroleum (South Africa) 
South Africa Machinery, motor vehicles, textiles, chemicals, oil, scientific instruments and metals (Germany, 
USA, Japan) 
Swaziland Manufactured products, machinery, petroleum, food products (South Africa) 
Tanzania Manufactured products, machinery, petroleum, food products (Saudi Arabia, UK, Zimbabwe, 
Japan) 
Zambia Consumer goods, machinery, transport equipment, food, fuel (South Africa, UK, Zimbabwe, 
Japan) 
Zimbabwe Petroleum, finished manufactured goods and equipment, machinery/transport, chemicals (South 
Africa, UK, Japan, USA, Germany) 
Source: Bronstein et al. (1996, cited in Mayer & Thomas, 1997). 
 
In recent years, the EU has become the region’s top trading partner, accounting for more than one 
third of all imports and 47% of total SADC exports. The EU has increased in importance as an 
export market for South Africa since the implementation of the EU–SA Trade, Development and 
Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) (SADC/EC, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative 
Programme, 2002–2007 Draft, n.d.). 
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According to TIPS (2007), a large proportion of SA’s imports come from countries that have a 
comparative advantage in the production of manufactured goods. Commodity-based economies in 
the rest of Africa and the Americas produce a relatively small proportion of South Africa’s imports, 
while OECD countries, China and certain Asian countries with a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing, make up a significant proportion of South Africa’s imports (see Table 6.12). 
Regional export patterns revealed that South Africa’s main export partners reflected the country’s 
comparative advantage in the production of primary commodities for countries with a comparative 
advantage in the production of manufactured goods. Thus, South Africa’s exports largely go to the 
EU, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and Japan, all developed regions with a 
comparative advantage in the production of manufactured goods. SADC countries import a 
relatively significant proportion of South Africa’s exports. However, a less significant proportion of 
the country’s imports originate in SADC countries.  
 
Table 6.12. South African exports and imports by region, 2003 
Region Exports 2003 Share of total Imports 2003 Share of total 
  (R-million) (%) (R-million) (%) 
SADC 24,911 8.6 7,554 2.5 
NAFTA 32,379 11.1 28,684 9.4 
EU 93,445 32.1 124,781 40.7 
MERCOSUR 1,994 0.7 10,027 3.3 
Japan 26,518 9.1 20,942 6.8 
China 6,459 2.2 23,011 7.5 
(Other) Africa 12,209 4.2 6,504 2.1 
Oceania 7,783 2.7 8,174 2.7 
(Other) Americas 1,279 0.4 1,436 0.5 
(Other) Asia 39,201 13.5 70,795 23.1 
(Other) Europe 8,534 2.9 4,191 1.4 
Other 36,417 12.5 270 0.1 
Source: TIPS (2007). 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Regional trade integration could protect and develop trade among neighbouring countries through 
agreements that range from reducing trade barriers to harmonising internal policies, at the same 
time as world trade will also benefit if regional trading relations assist members to grow without the 
hindrance of protectionist policies that restrain trade with outside countries. Nevertheless, many 
difficulties, such as the following, impede assimilation and economic progress in the SADC region: 
• Economically, SADC countries largely rely on agriculture and minerals, with the countries 
concerned generating associated primary goods for export. Over the past one and a half 
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decades, economic growth has been comparatively slow in Southern Africa, which has only 
experienced a slow improvement, with declining levels of GDP per capita. So, it is doubtful 
that the majority of the countries in the region will meet the growth levels necessary to 
accomplish the reduction of poverty by mid-2015. 
• South Africa dominates SACU in terms of economic and population size, when compared to 
its other four members, resulting in South African companies dominating the business 
landscape of the BLNS. The BLNS countries rely on South Africa for a large percentage of 
their trade, investment and migrant labour.  
• Southern African markets have directed the interventionist and protectionist trade system for 
quite some time now. On the import side, the negative impact of restrictive licencing 
systems, high import taxes, fluctuating degrees of import exclusions and tense foreign 
exchange controls was widely felt. On the export side, taxation and restriction on exports 
hampered trade.  
• The SADC states are parts of other trading alliances, such as COMESA, IOC, ACP, SACU 
and EU–FTA, unifying them in their struggle for the harmonising of mutual trade policies.  
• Agriculture is a basic sector in the economy of the SADC member countries, accounting for 
more than ten percent of the region’s GDP. Economic expansion will thus only take place if 
agricultural efficiency is improved. However, several major problems face the agricultural 
sector. Low output and repeated crises (droughts, floods and conflicts) are of an ongoing 
nature in the SADC, obstructing lines of supply.  
• NEPAD has acknowledged FDIs as an approach by means of which growth in the continent 
may be funded. Studies have revealed that the region is not a preferred target of FDIs, as, in 
various cases, their impact has been adversely influenced by the relationship between 
member states and both domestic and foreign sponsors . In terms of intra-regional 
investments, South African firms have led investment on the African continent, especially 
where SADC countries are concerned. 
• SADC member states, especially the landlocked countries, suffer from high transport costs, 
causing imports to be high-priced. In cases of regular harvests, market prices are roughly 
equivalent for imports. However, the high production costs also influence exports, causing 
prices to be exceptionally high. Such unreasonable prices have been due to the logistical 
infrastructure having been undermined by a lack of investment and the inefficiencies of the 
transport sector in the region. 
• Though the South African economy is marked by high levels of protectionism at a sectoral 
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level, combined with wide-ranging financial support, tax breaks and other incentives, South 
Africa is still the powerhouse of the region, due to its comparative macro-economic and 
political stability and an environment that is conducive to investment activities. 
• South Africa’s exports (in the form of primary commodities) largely go to the developed 
regions of the world, such as the EU, NAFTA and Japan, who experience a comparative 
advantage in the production of manufactured goods. Currently, the EU is the region’s top 
trading partner, accounting for more than one-third of all imports and nearly half of the total 
number of SADC exports. The EU has expanded as an export market for SA since the 
implementation of the EU–SA TDCA, even though it has lost market share in current years 
to Asia, Japan, Italy, Germany and the USA. However, in terms of AGOA, exports to the 
USA are expected to increase significantly in the coming years. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Findings and recommendations 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises the key findings on the different issues addressed in the study, makes 
recommendations based on the findings, and identifies issues related to the main problem of the 
study, which could not be addressed or adequately explored within the limited scope of the research 
undertaken and which still require further investigation. 
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section summarises the main findings of this thesis, based on the available data and the 
literature on the different issues addressed as part of the study, as well as making brief 
recommendations, based on the findings, as to how the work can be improved. 
 
7.2.1 Findings and recommendations regarding Chapter 2: Food security: a literature 
review 
This chapter aimed to familiarise readers with the theoretical a literature review of food (in)security 
by articulating and clarifying the definitions of food (in)security and discussing the historical 
perspective on food security. Of particular importance was the discussion of the causes of food 
insecurity in Southern Africa. The available data and the literature on the different issues addressed 
in Chapter 2 lead to the following findings:  
 
(1) The definitions of food (in)security (Appendix 1) indicated that food security can be 
clarified at individual and household, as well as at national and regional, levels. The three levels are 
inter-related, as regional food insecurity status cannot be well assessed without due consideration 
being given individual, household, and country levels. The definitions made clear that there is a 
basic difference between food self-sufficiency, agricultural development and food security. For 
these reasons, it is recommended that food security should not be confused with agricultural 
development, and should not be narrowly defined as food self-sufficiency in terms only of national 
food availability. 
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(2) The historical perspective on food security concept explored three fundamental shifts that 
have taken place since the 1970s: 
• at the level of analysis, a shift from global and national to households and individuals; 
• in terms of scope of analysis, from a narrow ‘food first’ perspective to a broader ‘livelihoods’ 
perspective; and 
• in terms of the assessment of food (in)security, from objective (measured) indicators to 
subjective (self-reported) perceptions. 
 
For these reasons, it is recommended that developing a conceptual framework of thinking on food 
security in Southern Africa, and relating this to particular historical food events is important for 
opening up the environment to international initiatives, as well as to the process of food security 
planning in the SADC region. 
 
(3) The lack of rainfall (intense drought) and massive floods were the main causes of extensive 
harm to people, as well as damage to their assets, domestic animals and food crops. Such natural 
disasters posed exceptional threats to the social and economic advancement of the SADC region, 
culminating in a situation of food insecurity. For such reasons, it is recommended that developing 
and implementing weather-risk insurance be regarded as of critical importance to Southern African 
countries. As defined by NEPAD (2004), such a form of insurance consists of a form of crop 
insurance, adopted to counter exposure to unfavourable weather fluctuations in terms of volumes 
produced rather than harvested. For example, an insurance product for sale to farmers could be 
based on a maize production index devised to analyse data recorded at a weather station near the 
location of the client. In addition, SADC should develop and implement irrigation projects through 
intergovernmental organisations aimed at land and water resource development, particularly where 
lakes and river basins transcend national boundaries, in order to reduce dependence on rainfall. 
Increasing irrigation efficiency through better control and allocation of water can often double 
crop yields, even with existing technologies. Moreover, SADC should invest in livestock, as the 
food security role of livestock in a remote rural area may be critical: the income of the inhabitants 
of such an area depends on livestock, due to its relatively drought-resistant nature and because 
acquiring livestock is often the main means by which poorer people can escape food insecurity. 
Furthermore, SADC should also invest in fisheries, because fisheries are expected to contribute 
significantly to the future economic growth and food security of the region. 
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(4) Poor macro-economic performance has come about as a result of increased external debt and 
ongoing food price inflation, inconsistent food policies, and successive years of civil war. Such 
problems have been exacerbated by high unemployment rates, unsuccessful policies aimed at 
associating land reform with tenure issues, and the lack of purchasing power due to the limited 
scope of income opportunities, especially in the rural areas of the SADC region. All such 
economic problems have been identified as worsening the levels of food insecurity experienced in 
Southern Africa. In order to overcome macro-economic problems in Southern Africa, it is 
recommended that macro-economic decisions need to be taken in regard to institutional structure 
and the design of the national economy, the rate of growth, the direction of growth, the distribution 
of income, trade policy, exchange rate, the management and supply of credit, interest rates, and 
many other related issues.. In addition, an adequate expansion and diversification of non-farm 
activities aimed at providing job and income-generating opportunities for those at present who are 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods is required in order to solve the ongoing food 
problems experienced in the SADC region. Such expansion and diversification will be especially 
critical in countries where landless agricultural labourers constitute a significant segment of the 
rural population. In addition, land reform policies in the region should be applied simultaneously 
with the integration of non-agricultural land, as the amount of arable land that is currently 
available is still relatively limited in several countries in the region. 
 
(5) Inappropriate food security strategies in some SADC countries, the failure of governance, 
both in terms of lack of accountability and in opposition to democratisation, and financial 
mismanagement are common features of poor governance and mismanagement that have played a 
crucial role in contributing to the situation of food insecurity in Southern Africa. For these reasons, 
it is recommended that economists should pay more attention to political analysis than to 
economic analysis, as political considerations are critical to any alternative policy package that 
might be proposed. In fact, some argue that political instability is often a direct cause of food 
insecurity, as approximately half of the famines in Africa have been directly caused by wars. 
 
(6) The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Southern Africa has been found to be the highest in the 
world, which complicates the task of fighting hunger and strengthening the livelihoods of the poor 
in Southern Africa. The pandemic was recognised to be creating large new vulnerable groups and 
rapidly eroding food and livelihood security in the region. Of particular importance, the losses of 
adult agricultural labour potential (see Table 2.4) may be negatively affecting the possibility of 
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establishing food security in the region through decreasing the extent of area both planted and the 
amount of yield. In addition, household income changes, combined with high morbidity and 
mortality costs, resulted in fewer financial resources being available to spend on food, which also 
threatened household food security in the region. Furthermore, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 
Southern Africa is disrupting the flow of knowledge and competencies from effectively being 
transferred from one generation to the next, as well as the possibility of the division of labour 
among generations. For these reasons, it is recommended that governments and international 
organisations need solid intervention and guidance as to the cost-effectiveness of alternative kinds 
of investments made to finance the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the chronic poverty alleviation 
programmes in the SADC region. HIV/AIDS must be considered the most serious development 
problem in the region, due to its sapping of agricultural and food security resources, which, though 
widespread is neither clearly visible nor quantifiable, as well as to the fact that no publicly funded 
emergency-type programme exists in Southern Africa. 
 
(7) As increases in production or incomes in one part of a country can offset decline in another, 
data accumulated collectively usually hides more than it reveals. The reasons underlying continuous 
poverty and food insecurity in Southern Africa were found to vary among different countries in the 
region, but tended to comprise transitory shocks to production systems, weak economic growth 
performance resulting from unsuccessful macro-economic policies, the unstable payments situations 
and the highly distorted patterns of income and capital allocation resulting from past colonial 
policies, the high unemployment rate and issues relating to the insecurity of land tenure. For these 
reasons, it is recommended that macro-economic policies for alleviating poverty and food 
insecurity need to be well understood by all stakeholders involved, including governments, as food 
crises will continue to occur in SADC countries unless greater macro-economic stabilisation is 
attained. Alleviating the unemployment problem in SADC would require improvement of 
agricultural and manufacturing production, enhanced skills levels and greater access to finance. 
Transparent and accountable representative rural land institutions and laws that protect the land 
rights of minority groups are also urgently needed. (See 7.2.1(4) for more recommendations on land 
reform.) 
 
(8) The combination of high human fertility with low human mortality has generated an average 
annual population growth rate of 2% in Southern Africa. Rapid population growth has seen an 
increase in the demand for agricultural products, especially foodstuffs. In view of the fact that the 
population is growing faster than is agriculture (1.5%) in the SADC region, increasing pressure on 
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agricultural land has been seen. Because existing increases in food production have come about as a 
result of the expansion of the amount of land that has been brought under agricultural production 
rather than from an increase in yield, such expansion is ill-equipped to meet the needs of an 
expanding population in the long run. Such expansion diminishes the degree of accessibility to 
arable land in the region. For these reasons, it is recommended that farming be intensified, rather 
than extended. SADC member states should focus their efforts on expanding their area of land 
under irrigation, with water being sourced from the Zambezi River and its tributaries. 
 
7.2.2 Findings and recommendations regarding Chapter 3: Domestic food production in 
Southern Africa 
This chapter aimed to familiarise readers with the main reasons behind food self-insufficiency that 
have made SADC countries vulnerable to reliance on food imports, and to highlight that domestic 
food production is highly risky and severely limited by the constraints of nature. 
 
Food self-sufficiency can be considered as the ability of a country to meet the aggregate food needs 
of its citizens primarily from its domestic resource base, which means that the domestic food 
production of a country must be sufficient to meet its food demands. Although maize (which is the 
main staple in the region), fruit, vegetable and livestock production has doubled over the long term 
in the region, the analysis revealed that an increase derived from an expansion in the area planted 
rather than an increase in yield would generate crises in land utilisation when combined with 
continuous population growth. Chapter 3 summarised the following key problems encountered in 
relation to domestic food production in the SADC region: 
 
1. Domestic food production will continue to act as the major source of food supply 
throughout Southern Africa for the foreseeable future, despite such a supply being highly risky and 
severely limited by the constraints of nature, especially when viewed in the light of the increasing 
frequency of natural disasters (droughts and floods). However, inadequate political support of, and 
lack of investment in the sector, the instability of the world market and an increasingly unfair trade 
situation have all served to compound the problem. Furthermore, civil strife and wars have 
prevented SADC member states from reaching their full potential in regards to their agricultural 
output. For these reasons, it is recommended that weather-risk insurance be taken out and that 
irrigation projects should be developed (see section 7.2.1(3)). Policies are needed that will 
strengthen and diversify food production capacity, such as land reforms that will ensure better 
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access and entitlement to land for productive use. Moreover, as recommended by Vink et al. (2002), 
the intensification of agriculture should be encouraged, especially among small farmers, production 
technology should be improved and market linkages should be made more accessible. At the same 
time, care must be taken to avoid damage to the environment, which is often vulnerable to the 
impact of acute population pressure. 
 
2. Prevailing grain production performance in the region in the late 1990s has turned into a 
regional deficit in recent years, as production in Zimbabwe (the region’s second largest producer in 
the past) has more than halved, compounding the impact of a harvest which failed across the region 
for a combination of climatic and political reasons, and which was exacerbated by reductions in 
state subsidies for seeds and fertiliser in Zambia and Malawi. For these reasons, it is recommended 
that policy intervention occur in the area of public investment allocations to agriculture, as, in many 
countries in the region, government inputs to agriculture and rural development are extremely low, 
resulting in the need to allocate adequate resources to support agricultural production at all levels. 
Some direct measures aimed at the short-term assistance of small farmers, such as low-cost, simple 
technology packages and improved cultivation practices, could increase smallholders’ food 
production levels and lead to increased domestic food production. Similarly, improved credit 
arrangements could result in high returns to smallholders in the short term. Seeds and inorganic 
fertilisers should be made easily available to small farmers, in order to ensure that staple crop yields 
are adequate. The use of improved seeds and fertilisers is important for both short- and long-term 
production. The long-term boosting of food production, especially in those countries affected by 
food deficits, would involve a combination of human and capital investments, institutional 
arrangements, agricultural and macro-economic reform and political commitment. Additional 
investment is required in technology, research and human resource development. 
 
3. Due to the increase in area planted to maize, the trend in maize production in the SADC 
region over the past 10 years has shown that most countries experienced better maize crops from 
1999/2000 to 2002/03 than following on the severe regional drought of 1991/92, when multiple 
droughts were experienced. In some SADC countries, such as Zimbabwe, for example, average 
maize production fell during the same period, as, apart from the poor crop growing conditions 
experienced during 2001/02 and 2002/03, the downward trend has been aggravated by the 
imposition of the land resettlement programme, which resulted in the undermining of the 
commercial farming sector. For the past four rainy seasons (2000−2003), the BLS countries have 
endured consecutive years of drought, which adversely affected agricultural production (food and 
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cash crops) and, hence, the livelihoods of the affected communities. Extended periods of food 
insecurity and the impact of HIV/AIDS have weakened the resilience of households and set back 
agricultural recovery. For these reasons, it is recommended that, since maize is most widely 
consumed in Southern Africa, a radical change in per capita income is required in the region. 
Because, as argued by Van Rooyen et al., (1996, cited in Van Rooyen, 2000), high maize 
consumption is likely to continue for many years, unless fundamental per capita income changes 
take place, accompanied by a preference for other commodities, such as some wheat products and 
vegetables (e.g. potatoes), which tend to have a higher income elasticity. 
 
4. The SADC was found not to be self-sufficient in wheat production. Approximately half of 
SADC wheat consumption is currently imported, while South Africa and Zimbabwe, the two largest 
producers of wheat, must, nevertheless, import still more wheat to meet the requirements of flour 
millers. South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe produce more than half of their domestic wheat 
requirements, while Tanzania produces more than one-third. The remaining SADC countries all 
produce less than ten percent of their requirements, with minimal production in Mauritius, 
Mozambique and Swaziland. The decline in recent years has mainly been due to the effects of 
drought on yields in parts of South Africa, the region’s main producer. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that an increase in wheat per capita consumption can only be achieved by means of 
trade, as the region is, by and large, unsuited to wheat production. The elimination of protective 
trade barriers, as currently maintained in Malawi and Mauritius, is critical for the rest of the SADC 
member states over the coming years in order to encourage intra-SADC trade and to maintain food 
security in the region. 
 
5. As regards the supply of other cereals, such as sorghum and millet, the majority of the 
SADC countries depend largely on domestic production. Levels of trade in small grains were low 
among the SADC member states. In Malawi and Tanzania, cassava was the largest source of 
calories after maize. Rice production in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique has declined in the 
region, with Mozambique, the leading producer of the past in this respect, being severely stricken 
by drought, tropical storms and cyclones. Generally, a deficit in key food staples has made the 
supply situation critical in Southern Africa, as most countries import more than is available from 
domestic production. For these reasons, it is recommended that attention be paid to boosting the 
production of those food crops, namely rice, sorghum, millet, cassava, sugar and vegetables, for 
which demand is increasing in some SADC countries. 
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6. Even with the increase in livestock production in the SADC region over the past four 
decades, transboundary animal diseases, such as FMD, CBPP, ASF, RVF, and ND, have negatively 
affected the livelihoods of millions of farmers in the region, hampering their possibilities of 
benefiting from the rapid increase in animal production and trade expected in the coming years, 
which might otherwise offer them the opportunity to escape from hunger and poverty. Other 
problems encountered were overstocking, poor breeding stock, and inadequate support services for 
the control of diseases that spread across national boundaries. For example, in a country such as 
Malawi, the importance of livestock (especially cattle) to rural livelihoods has declined over time, 
as a result of increasing population pressure and diminishing grazing land, as well as increased 
insecurity in the region. For these reasons, it is recommended that traditional livestock productivity, 
especially that of small ruminants, pigs and poultry, be boosted in the region in order to alleviate 
poverty, as well as to create job opportunities for many more women. Facilitating disease control 
through the strengthening of existing, and the development of new, regional control disease 
strategies is advisable. The implementation of such strategies should be funded by means of 
regional investment aimed at countering the spreading of transboundary diseases; the regulating of 
stock movements by improving cross-border control measures; the establishing of disease-free 
zones (DFZs); the facilitation of the access of farmers in the area to international markets; the 
constructing and/or rehabilitating of quarantine facilities at border points; the ensuring of effective 
veterinary public health control measures, and the strengthening of zoo-sanitary capabilities. 
Strengthening of national border controls and commodity inspections alone will not sufficiently 
prevent transboundary animal diseases, especially FMD, from spreading. A regional plan aimed at 
the containment and progressive control of the disease at its source in areas where such disease is 
still endemic is needed. 
 
7. The average fish catch for the past five years has been over two million tonnes per annum, 
of which about two-thirds of such landings were from marine waters. Namibia, South Africa and 
Angola were responsible for nearly 80% of the total regional fish landings (see Figure 10). An 
aggregate GDP growth rate of 3.4% was experienced in 2000, which was significantly below the 
growth target of 6% required for sustainable economic development in Africa. In terms of 
employment, Tanzania was the SADC country that employed most people in fisheries (see Table 
3.8), followed by Zambia, Angola, Malawi, Namibia and Mozambique. However, Namibia, Zambia 
and Angola were the SADC countries provided the most job opportunities in this field. 
Accordingly, marine fisheries provide a large, though decreasing, proportion of foreign exchange 
earnings for Mozambique and Namibia, as weak monitoring, control and surveillance has led to 
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commercial overfishing and unlicensed fishing has had a negative impact on artisanal fishing. For 
these reasons, it is recommended that enhancing the existing fisheries agreements currently existing 
between the coastal SADC countries and the EC is crucial to increasing the proportion of foreign 
exchange earnings acquired by means of accessing the EU. In addition, strengthening monitoring 
and control mechanisms is important to reduce commercial overfishing and unlicensed fishing, 
enabling fisheries to contribute significantly to future economic growth and food security in the 
region. 
 
8. The SADC region is facing major fruit and vegetable losses due to the unavailability of 
technical storage facilities in the production areas and at the markets in the urban parts. Despite 
inadequate packing methods and transportation, the production of fresh horticultural products for 
export has grown rapidly in a number of Southern African countries, including South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, over the past decade. Southern Africa has also benefited from a large 
market for their horticultural produce, vegetables and fruits in the EU, particularly the UK. 
However, in recent years the EU has tried to exclude African horticultural produce from its markets 
by subsidising its own farmers. The EU farming subsidy has taken a variety of forms planned to 
attain a number of different goals. Policy mechanisms have ranged widely from income support, 
through price support and border measures aimed either at limiting imports or at removing surplus 
production through the encouragement of exports. As many countries used a combination of such 
mechanisms as part of their agricultural policy, they tended to be largely interdependent. 
Accordingly, such policies led to EU farm prices being higher than average world prices, resulting 
in the majority of developing countries, including Southern Africa, having a current trade deficit. 
For these reasons, it is recommended that bilateral and multilateral agreements be signed between 
the SADC and the EU in order to identify and guarantee markets for non-traditional agricultural 
exports, allowing for the diversification of production, as well as for the development and 
expansion of markets. However, more emphasis on technological improvements of storage and 
transportation facilities, changes in the international trading environment (WTO current round of 
global agricultural negotiations must result in a fair set of rules for poor countries), and export-led 
growth and agricultural diversification into HVFs for SADC are crucial. 
 
9. The low per capita food production trends experienced in Southern Africa over the past two 
and a half decades have led to a rapid widening of the gap between production and consumption, 
causing the region to be unable to feed itself. Historically, the average annual growth rate of food 
production per capita was negative in every country in Southern Africa, so that even a relatively 
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minor drought in the past few years has been enough to push regional supplies below a safe 
threshold. Due to inefficiencies experienced in the farming sector since the second half of the past 
decade cereal output has actually declined per ha as well as per capita. The major causes of such a 
decline have included inadequate government investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural 
research, as well as, in some cases, a reduction in fertiliser subsidies due to budget deficits and 
structural adjustments. So far, certain unprecedented factors have also been at work, including the 
imposition of disruptive land redistribution programmes and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Generally, the decline in food production in the region has formed a fundamental part of the 
agrarian crisis, with various reasons for production shortfalls, among them being transboundary 
animal diseases, adverse climatic conditions, massive floods and intense droughts, which caused 
extensive harm to the inhabitants of the region, as well as damage to their property, livestock and 
crops. For these reasons, it is recommended that insurance aimed at countering weather-associated 
risks (see section 7.2.1(3)), the development of irrigation projects (see 7.2.2(6)) and transboundary 
animal disease control mechanisms be implemented. 
 
7.2.3 Findings and recommendations regarding Chapter 4: Trade in Southern Africa 
This chapter was aimed at providing readers with a brief overview of trade in Southern Africa, in 
terms of the comparative advantages of the different SADC countries, as well as in terms of their 
export earnings, commercial food imports, terms of trade and international trade. 
 
Developing nations are conventionally raw material exporters and manufactured goods importers, 
which is still largely the case in Southern Africa. The region was, furthermore, found to be reliant 
on trade, with exports accounting for more than half of its GDP, compared to a range of 8% to 28% 
for the rest of the world, with many of the SADC countries depending on only one export product. 
The result was that trade in the region faced many different problems. Chapter 4 summarises the 
findings in this respect, including the following:  
 
A. On the global level, SADC countries have comparative advantages in fairly similar products 
in which they are well endowed (primary goods) (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). However, 
they have the same type of disadvantages in respect to machinery and road transport (manufactured 
goods). Such a finding suggests that complementarity as a technique of encouraging trade might be 
difficult to adopt among SADC countries. For these reasons, it is recommended that a suitable 
measure of diversification take into account all economic goods and services in the region. Exports, 
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especially diversified exports of manufactured products, are critical for enhancing productivity. 
Productivity would also be boosted by way of educational endeavours; the opening up of 
investment opportunities, such as those aimed at increasing increases; increased competition; 
technology transfer, and the improvement of human capital. 
 
B. Even with the combined exports of goods and service having increased in the region over 
the long term (see Table 4.8), most SADC countries (excluding South Africa) have proved to be 
dependent on the production of a single commodity, such as oil (in the case of Angola); tobacco (in 
the case of Malawi); manufacturing (in the case of Lesotho); diamonds (in the case of Botswana), 
and copper (in the case of Zambia), with a single commodity representing almost half of their total 
exports. Sugar has been the main SADC export, followed by edible fruit and nuts and beverages. 
Such exports have tended to be highly concentrated in a few products, many of which are not 
important imports in other African countries. Such a situation limits the potential import of any 
regional trade agreement. For these reasons, it is recommended that suitable measures to increase 
industrialisation and trade diversification (see section (7.2.3(a)) are needed in the region in order to 
increase the number of manufactured exports and to decrease its heavy dependency on single 
primary commodity exports. 
 
C. Although maize imports declined after the 2002 situation of food insecurity in the SADC, 
maize imports level were still approximately threefold higher than was the case in the preceding 
three decades (see Figure 12). South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania and Seychelles were the least 
dependent on SADC imports. As regards maize imports in the region, only South Africa produced 
enough maize to meet its own needs, with its surplus being more than sufficient to cover the 
combined deficit of all other SADC countries. For Mauritius and Tanzania, such a situation may be 
seen in terms of the long-lasting relationship that they have enjoyed with other members of the 
Eastern Africa Community. In contrast, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe rely heavily 
on SADC imports, with more than half of their imports originating in SADC. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that the goal of food security in Southern Africa be considered as a regional 
objective, rather than as a national objective alone. Thus, certain countries with particularly good 
conditions for producing large surpluses of food at a price that is competitive with world prices 
should specialise in food production for export to food-deficient countries. However, such a 
programme of specialisation in food export to neighbouring countries will require a certain amount 
of protection from unfair competition in food exports from other continents. The need, therefore, 
exists for bilateral and multilateral agreements among the SADC states. Furthermore, efforts should 
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be made to generate realistic estimates of cross-border trade flows in order to enhance the accuracy 
of food balance and food security analyses being undertaken in the region. 
 
Due to increased regional demand and stagnant production levels, imports of wheat in the SADC 
region have increased over the past decade. However, projections are limited in regard to the 
development of globally competitive wheat production in the region, especially in regard to certain 
policies aimed at reducing or removing levels of protection over the coming years amongst SADC 
member states. Recently, only Malawi and Mauritius (both at 0%), of all SADC member states, 
apply exceptionally high levels of protectionism to their domestic milling industries. In spite of 
reform of trade policies in most SADC countries for at least the past decade, as well as the 
achievement of considerable improvement in this area, numerous tariff, non-tariff and technical 
barriers, which impede intra-regional trade, still remain, and may undermine the ability of SADC 
countries to maintain national food security through commercial food imports. For these reasons, 
appropriate recommendations have been made in the previous paragraph (see section 7.2.3(c)). 
However, wheat is only second in popularity after maize in the SADC countries, as most wheat 
products tend to show high income elasticity. Unless the tastes of consumers in the SADC region 
change, an increase in wheat per capita consumption can only be achieved by means of trade, as the 
region is unsuitable for the production of this crop. 
 
D. An unfavourable movement has occurred in terms of trade over the past 15 years in the 
SADC region, as only four countries, Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe and the DRC, experienced a 
favourable movement in this direction (see Table 4.12). As the terms of trade for all commodities, 
except oil, are expected to remain on the decline, the region is likely to continue to lose world share 
in most commodities. Such terms have experienced deterioration as a result of pressures exerted by 
oversupply, aggravated by domestic support for developed agricultural produce (such as cotton, 
sugar and dairy) and technological developments in the processing industry that reduce produce 
margins. For these reasons, it is recommended that co-operation in global fora strengthen 
negotiating positions and facilitate agreement on issues of mutual concern. In order to achieve such 
co-operation, SADC may require technical assistance with building capacity in trade policy and 
identifying strategic interests and potential allies, whether foreign or domestic. Improved market 
and production infrastructure, more efficient production techniques and better management will all 
boost the competitiveness of Southern African agriculture. In any case, more needs to be done to 
improve the region’s terms of trade. 
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E. The key objection of the developing countries to developing international trade has been 
that, when it comes to agricultural trade, industrialised countries espouse their belief in 
liberalisation, while practising protectionism, as wealthy nations have both the ability and the assets 
to put into action a range of policies in terms of International Trade Agreements on Agriculture, 
requiring extensive investment aimed at domestic support and export subsidies. In contrast, 
developing countries, even when similarly regulated, often lack sufficient fiscal resources to 
counterbalance the developing countries in respect to trade deficit. For that reason, agriculture is the 
economic sector that most needs fixed tariff cuts. Moreover, in terms of welfare, developing 
countries stand to gain more from the liberalisation of their own agricultural trade barriers (see 
Table 4.14) than from the freeing of other goods from such restraints. 
 
The support granted food production in the EU and other OECD countries has been aimed at 
increasing food production in such a way as to distort trade by applying tariffs and NTBs to 
imports, as well as by promoting exports. Such subsidisation has resulted in exploitation of the poor 
in developing countries, preventing the viable development of a properly functioning and fair global 
food system. As a consequence, the current international trade system fails to ensure reasonable and 
competent trade based on considerations of fairness, and prevents fair entrance to markets for 
developing countries, such as Southern Africa. For these reasons, it is recommended that changes in 
the international agricultural trading environment be undertaken, as, WTO current round of global 
agricultural negotiations must result in a set of rules that is fair towards poor nations (see 7.2.2 (8)). 
 
7.2.4 Findings and recommendations regarding Chapter 5: An assessment of food security 
programmes in Southern Africa 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an assessment of existing food security programmes in 
Southern Africa and to give the readers a general idea of whether policies that are intended to 
address the issue of food security in the region are, indeed, successful. 
 
Based on the available data and the literature regarding the different types of food security 
programmes (namely risk reduction, mitigation and coping) outlined in this chapter, the conclusion 
can be drawn that the intent of broad government involvement to maintain adequate levels of food 
security for the majority of Southern Africans is unforeseeable in the near future. A greater range of 
monetary and fiscal resources and political motivation will therefore have to be utilised. In addition, 
adequate managerial capability in governments is necessary in order to guarantee long-term food 
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security in the region.  
 
The findings discussed in this chapter revealed the following: 
 
First, in terms of food security intervention aimed at reducing risk, among the diverse plans that 
have been put into practice under the auspices of the SADC Food Security Programme, REWU has 
had the most impact to date in its efforts to decrease hunger and malnutrition within SADC. SADC 
has, over the past several years, learned how to manage such an EWS according to regional cycles, 
with the additional support of national EWSs. Due to such monitoring, when the 2002 food crisis 
broke, it came as no surprise. Early warnings had been given well in advance, due to the monitoring 
of levels of production and the accessibility of cereals in the region. Unfortunately, to date early 
warning systems have been less good at monitoring non-climatic shocks, such as conflict, and the 
spreading of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Such collecting of information has not yet fully maximised 
in terms of livelihoods, with the freedom to investigate markets, trade and prices being restricted. In 
addition, the EWS mainly monitors the production of cereals, and not that of the other, non-cereal 
staple foods, such as cassava. Furthermore, to date, the EWS has tended to gather information on 
governments and donors, rather than on private enterprise and civil society, with the scheme being 
totally dependent on assistance from member states for its input (see Table 5.1). For these reasons, 
it is recommended that the SADC’s REWU take the lead in developing new analytical methods and 
mechanisms for capturing the food security implications of alternative food crops (such as cassava), 
in collaboration with member states and key stakeholders, including significant role players in the 
private sector and civil society. However, the SADC member states need to commit to continuing 
their contributions and to looking for appropriate means of investing in such a project. 
 
The RDMTC that had been built up under SADC sponsorship had not been working, so that there 
was little forward planning or discussion, with SADC lacking the basic capability to react 
efficiently and sustainably in response to a disaster, as few national governments were ready to cope 
with crises such as that of 2001/02, as they lacked appropriate strategies. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that the SADC disaster management mechanism be fully operationalised and that it 
should play a more significant role in supporting and co-ordinating the behaviour of SADC 
countries in emergency situations. 
 
Second, in terms of food security interventions aimed at mitigating risk, due to the frequent 
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occurrence of regional food insecurity and in response to hunger and starvation following the 
droughts and floods experienced during 1992, 1995 and 2001/2, particularly in the face of the 
severe foreign currency shortages encountered at national level, the significance of maintaining 
national grain reserves was emphasised. In addition, many negative factors have to be considered: 
storage costs; opportunity costs (difficult to estimate, due to the unpredictability of price 
movements subsequent to the purchase of the stock, but, at the least, including the interest payable 
annually); and the demands of controlling the stock efficiently and impartially in the face of 
dominant lobby groups, whose demands are expected to diverge over time, depending on market 
conditions. For these reasons, it is recommended that staple grain reserves be located strategically 
in remote areas so that there will be sufficient food supplies for all areas of the country in the event 
of a food shortage. In addition, accessibility to food should not have to depend on the transportation 
infrastructure. To ensure food production on a sustained basis, as well as an income to farmers and 
increased access to food by the majority of the population, a guaranteed minimum price for food 
crops managed through national and regional strategic food reserves in SADC is necessary. 
 
For the public and private sectors of SADC, SAFEX offers the best option as regards keeping large 
amounts of staple commodities, such as maize (yellow or white) and wheat, in reserve. With its 
focus on regional management, such an approach offers to stimulate intra-regional trade, to support 
the role of private actors, and to decrease the need for national governments to hold either large 
physical grain stocks or large financial reserves. For these reasons, it is recommended that more 
effort be invested in exploring the feasibility of alternatives, such as grain futures markets. This is 
another area that could benefit from regional (SADC) co-ordination aimed at complementing 
national activities. Moreover, the introduction and implementation of a new futures contract, 
allowing for the utilisation of maize on a worldwide basis is urgently needed. 
 
Finally, in terms of food security interventions aimed at coping with risk, food subsidies and food 
price stabilisation schemes have come under increasingly strong condemnation over the past twenty 
years due to the regressive nature of food subsidy programmes, with better off individuals being 
capable of buying more food and thereby of gaining more from generalised subsidies, while being 
exceptionally expensive as a means of assisting the most vulnerable segments of the population on a 
large scale. For these reasons, it is recommended that the need for subsidies could be reduced by 
adopting appropriate institution-based strategies and policy modifications. 
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On the other hand, food-pricing policies in most Southern African countries were consumer-
oriented, as food prices were fixed at a low level that favoured the urban consumer. Thus, 
agricultural pricing policies have tended to adversely impact on incentives to produce food, limiting 
the ability of governments to establish and maintain food reserves, and restricting job opportunities 
in farming, processing and rural industries. For these reasons, it is recommended that food-pricing 
policy change occurs in Southern Africa geared more towards economic development than towards 
the bolstering of political concerns. Nevertheless, buffer stocks (in the form of national and strategic 
food reserves) can be used to stabilise staple food prices in order to offset fluctuations in domestic 
production or world prices, thus reducing vulnerability to famine. 
 
Despite some governments in the region, such as that of Malawi, having tried to improve the quality 
of life of the poor in the past, they have had to face countless problems and limitations, as 
administered safety net programmes – nutrition supplements, free food distribution, free input 
distribution, food-, cash-, and inputs-for-work – tended to be disorganised, relatively unco-
ordinated and poorly targeted. In addition, direct aid and social welfare transfers have been 
relatively insignificant, due to economic limitations. In addition, casual safety nets – the extended 
family and community support systems – have tended to become over-stretched and vulnerable to 
shocks, due to increased poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Furthermore, although WFP has 
made considerable efforts to raise school enrolment ratios, a common response to chronic and 
transitory food insecurity in the region has been to remove children from school. For these reasons, 
it is recommended that governments and donors co-operate, co-ordinate (in order to fill the policy 
gaps) and accurately target the vulnerable groups when designing and implementing food security 
programmes in the region. Also, whether education is seen as a basic human right or as an 
investment in a country’s economic future, it is important to find ways of keeping children in school 
– by effectively reducing absenteeism and drop-out levels – during times of food insecurity. 
Education is an area that requires human capital investment in order to ensure long-term food 
security in Southern Africa, because educational attainment has been proven to have positive direct 
effects on the adoption of new technologies, as well as on agricultural productivity. 
 
No explicit attention has been paid to social protection policies in Southern Africa. In Lesotho, for 
example, no specific focus has yet been lain on social safety net programmes, poverty reduction and 
food security strategies aimed at ongoing economic growth and poverty reduction in an effort to 
ensure macro-economic stability. Since the end of the conflict in the early 1990s, Mozambique’s 
poverty and food insecurity reduction programmes have heavily emphasised continued economic 
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expansion and improved output, with no mention being made of actions correlated to the needs of 
vulnerable groups. Therefore, such programmes have failed to obtain the expected results; and 
activities to improve food security have largely been confined to trying to increase agricultural 
production. In addition, in Zambia, two significant sources of vulnerability to food insecurity were 
encountered: poverty and food insecurity reduction programmes included no measures to restore 
access to agricultural inputs or to stabilise food prices that were adversely affected by structural 
adjustment programmes. Moreover, Zimbabwe, which may, have had the fiscal and administrative 
capacity to implement effective and comprehensive social protection programmes, failed to do so, 
due to its economic growth strategy causing the government to implement self-seeking policies 
which bought electoral popularity, but which also generated widespread dependence. Social grants 
played a significant role in reducing poverty and supporting social development only in South 
Africa, as they tended to be inadequately targeted and fiscally unsustainable in other SADC 
countries, such as in Namibia. 
 
Generally, impoverished countries in the area tended to be afflicted by many problems, such as very 
low average incomes, the absence of strategies aimed at reducing poverty in the near future, limited 
resources to fund transfers to the poor and early stages of transition out of subsistence agriculture. 
All such problems act as barriers constraining the installation of effective public social protection 
programmes. The failure to realise policy options aimed at the economic betterment of those in the 
region was worsened by the incapacity of several countries in the SADC to administer social 
protection programmes effectively. For these reasons, it is recommended that such programmes be 
developed still further to protect the poor and most vulnerable groups in the region from hunger and 
starvation. Effective interventions require sufficient organisational capacity within government to 
allow for the designing of suitable programmes, the correct identification of the right beneficiaries 
and the delivery of targeted social services to them. Building institutional capacity, therefore, 
involves enhancing the skills of public and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector staff in 
policy analysis and programme planning and implementation. 
 
Despite the compassionate intention of those offering food aids to the starving millions, such 
intervention has been observed to have unfavourable effects on domestic food production. Some 
scholars have argued that food aid policies discourage producers from increasing their production, 
thereby worsening food shortages. Such points of view are grounded in basic economic theory, 
which holds that food prices affect both demand and supply. Holding such a view seems justifiable, 
as, if prices are low, a producer tends to make only a small profit, while, if they are excessively low, 
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the tendency is to move from commercial to survival farming, which obviates the need to sell at 
such low prices. In Zambia, for example, many farmers refocused their efforts on growing crops 
such as sorghum, millet, sweet potato and cassava to secure their personal survival. Such refocusing 
of effort could negatively impact on food security, resulting in even less access to food in the 
marketplace. Furthermore, food aid was found to be extremely expensive in landlocked countries 
such as Malawi when compared to commercial imports and locally produced food. Moreover, late 
deliveries occurred due to logistical and organisation restraints, and insufficient targeting. For these 
reasons, it is recommended that SADC review its own responses and activities aimed at facilitating 
and supporting national efforts to prevent food insecurity, and, in collaboration with member states 
and key partners, refocus on strengthening regional co-ordination and the ability to respond 
timeously in the event of a humanitarian emergency occurring in future in Southern Africa. 
 
Even with the generous WFP aids to Africa, financial aid has almost halved, with the rest of the aid 
supply being concentrated even more on humanitarian conflict resolution and structural adjustment 
activities, leading to the declining support of conventional development. Besides, financial aid 
flows to Africa are likely to be cut even more in future, and the likelihood of other forms of debt 
assistance is out of the question in the near future. While vertical interventions against specific 
problems, such as the transmission of HIV or malaria, may prove the focus of further subsidies, it is 
unlikely that substantially more aid will be accessed for social or infrastructural development. For 
these reasons, it is recommended that SADC member states carefully identify bottlenecks that could 
be avoided in a future emergency by introducing more appropriate policies and mechanisms to 
create an environment that encourages and co-ordinates the work of humanitarian agencies in 
emergency relief situations. 
 
7.2.5 Findings and recommendations regarding Chapter 6: The contribution of regional 
trade integration to food security 
This chapter briefly clarified the problems facing regional trade integration in Southern Africa and 
the inability of relatively weak African countries to negotiate effectively with powerful trading 
blocs. 
 
Regional trade integration has the potential of yielding substantial benefits, primarily because it 
reduces tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, providing member countries with broader 
markets for their commodities, while, in addition, enhancing the transferability of resources to 
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optimal production functions in various economic sectors. Unfortunately, there are many obstacles 
to successful integration and economic development in the region, including the following: 
1) The SADC countries fall into two broad groups: those that depend on agriculture and those 
that are mineral based (see Table 6.1). The nature of regional economies is that they tend to be 
competitive rather than complementary in respect of countries producing a similar range of primary 
products and competing for similar export markets. The need for diversified production in the 
SADC region was commonly cited as forming the central barrier to the successful integration and 
economic development of the region. However, over the past decade, growth performance has been 
moderately poor in Southern Africa, which has experienced slow growth (on average, 4.3%), with 
declining levels of GDP per capita (see Table 6.2). It is, therefore, unlikely that most countries in 
the region will meet the 6% growth levels required to reduce poverty by half by 2015, in line with 
the Millennium Development Goals, leaving their contribution to food security in the region still in 
doubt. For these reasons, it is recommended that sufficient diversification of production take place 
in the region (see section 7.2.3(a)). Furthermore, measures to increase industrialisation and trade 
diversification are needed to decrease the region’s heavy dependency on primary commodity 
exports. There is need for complementary policies to promote the best interests of the SADC 
countries. 
 
2) The defining feature of the SACU was found to be the dominance of South Africa in terms 
of the size of its economy and population, in contrast to that of the other four members (see Table 
6.3). South African companies dominate the business landscape in the BLNS, with these countries 
largely depending on South Africa for most of their trade, investment and, in several cases, migrant 
labour possibilities. The mining industry leads the economy, accounting for over 30% of the GDP, 
even though its share is in decline, due to the expansion of trade, financial and government services. 
The BLNS countries have experienced higher growth rates, with Botswana having a higher level of 
GDP per capita and much higher growth rates than all other member countries (and the majority of 
the world), based on the full exploitation of its diamond reserves. However, manufacturing accounts 
for less than 5% of the GDP in SACU. For these reasons, it is recommended that measures be taken 
to increase industrialisation of the region by increasing the manufacturing potential of the region 
and by decreasing dependency on primary (mining) exports and reliance on only one country (South 
Africa). 
 
3) Southern African economies have maintained interventionist and protectionist trade policies 
for quite a long time. On the import side, the broad use of restrictive licensing systems, high tariffs 
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with different measures of import bans and fixed foreign exchange controls have been employed. 
On the export side, extensive export taxes and the exclusion of certain items for export have 
prevailed, despite the majority of SADC countries having greatly reduced trade policies associated 
with NTBs, such as quantitative limits on imports. However, wide-ranging NTBs still are the most 
significant barriers to trade, quantitatively restricting such imports as maize, wheat and dairy 
products and impeding the automatic import licensing method. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that the complex and confusing tariff structure of SACU countries in relation to other 
non-SACU SADC countries be eliminated in order to promote intra-SADC regional trade. 
 
4) SADC countries are members of other trading block, such as COMESA, the IOC, the ACP, 
SACU and EU–FTA, which overlap with each other in their attempts to harmonise trade policies 
(see Table 6.4). However, SADC trade regulations should adapt to those of the global economy, in 
terms of WTO conventions, such as enhanced competitiveness and the imposition of certain 
standards of quality. Furthermore, tradable commodities should expand according to each country’s 
comparative advantage and the freer movement of goods and services across borders. For these 
reasons, it is recommended that differences between intra-SADC bilateral agreements and regional 
policies be eliminated in order to avoid problems of overlapping, while the harmonising of policies 
is also vital to Southern African development. 
 
5) Agriculture is the main economic activity of the SADC member states, accounting for 
approximately 13% of the region’s GDP. Economic growth will, hence, only occur if agricultural 
efficiency is enhanced. Unfortunately, at present there are a number of key challenges facing the 
agricultural sector, such as low productivity and oft-felt disasters (droughts, floods and conflicts), 
which, in some areas, are so regular that they disrupt supply. Although the regular occurrence of 
natural disasters tends to be factored into the overall equation, little forward planning or 
consultation takes place and SADC currently lacks the capacity to respond to disasters efficiently 
and sustainably. A number of efforts, such as food aid, food imports by governments, the 
development of strategic maize reserves, and the supply of seeds as part of relief programmes, have 
been directed at dealing with the impact of disasters, but have had little impact on the overall food 
situation. Moreover, some countries, such as Botswana and Namibia, have relatively little arable 
land, while they could have enormous demand for crop products. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that designing the appropriate policies and making the right investments in 
agriculture will effectively place the region on the right path to food security. However, a policy-
based approach cannot suffice to prevent future food shortages if the public institutions that 
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implement the proper policies and programmes do not function effectively. Investments in 
agriculture could take the form of the development and diffusion of disease-resistant or higher 
yielding crop varieties, the dissemination of improved natural resources management, improved 
delivery of inputs and the more efficient marketing of agricultural production. Also see section 
7.2.2(1) and (2) for further recommendations. 
 
6) Despite NEPAD having identified FDIs as a suitable vehicle for the financing of 
development on the continent, studies have shown that the region is not appropriate for such, as, in 
many cases, the flow emanating from such investment is principally influenced by the nature of the 
relationship existing between states and investors, both domestic and foreign. For instance, Zambia, 
Malawi and, currently, Zimbabwe have experienced problems with donors, resulting in decreasing 
FDIs flows (see Table 6.8). As a result, SADC’s share of FDIs dropped from US$5,3 billion to only 
US$3,9 billion, largely consisting of sharp declines of inflow into Angola, South Africa and 
Mozambique. In addition, countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
South Africa and Malawi (see Figure 17) have experienced overwhelming debt due to their 
relatively high numbers of total imports in relation to their limited number of exports of goods and 
services. In terms of intra-regional investments, South African investment flows were becoming one 
of the dominant sources of FDIs in Africa, and in the SADC region in particular (see Table 6.7). 
South African FDIs were found to be concentrated in the mining, retail and wholesale, hotel and 
leisure, manufacturing and finance sectors, although FDIs that essentially appear to be market and 
resource seeking in nature can considerably enhance the growth and development prospects of 
SADC countries. For these reasons, it is recommended that effective political reforms be urgently 
undertaken in the region by means of building up solid relations between governments, donors and 
private investors that seek to encourage investment in agriculture and in industrial activities rather 
than in extractive industries, mining and oil exploration and production. However, South Africa has 
successfully managed to penetrate the regional market. What is needed from the rest of the 
countries in the region is to be able to direct South African FDI flows to their national priority 
industries focused on development, rather than on those prioritised in terms of South African 
economic interests. 
 
7) SADC countries, especially those which are landlocked, have high transport costs (see Table 
6.6), making imports expensive. Given a normal harvest, market prices are usually below import 
parity. In contrast, the high costs entailed during production also affect exports and so the price 
tends to exceed what would be acceptable in terms of export parity. The ability and competency of 
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logistical arrangements in the region have been destabilised by lack of investment and losses 
experienced in the transport sector. For these reasons, it is recommended that the integration of 
transport infrastructure and services be treated as essential to the free movement of goods and 
services throughout the region and in relation to the rest of the world markets, as well as to the 
reduction of transport costs. 
 
8) Although South African economic activities have historically been based in high levels of 
protection at sectoral level, collectively, within a broad framework of financial assistance, tariff 
breaks and other incentives, South Africa still is the motivational force in the region (see Figure 18 
and column 3 in Table 6.2), due to its relative macroeconomic and political stability, as well as its 
economic environment that is conducive to investment initiatives. For these reasons, it is 
recommended that South Africa remove its technical barriers, such as its demand for the 
maintenance of quality standards, so that intra-regional trade can increase in the SADC member 
countries. 
 
9) An investigation into South Africa’s key export partners has revealed the country’s 
comparative advantage in the production of primary commodities in respect of countries with a 
comparative advantage in the production of manufactured goods, such as the EU, NAFTA and 
Japan. Recently, the EU has become the region’s major trading partner, absorbing more than one-
third of all its imports and supplying 47% of total SADC exports. The EU has grown in importance 
as an export market for South Africa from the first functioning of the EU–SA TDCA, even though it 
has lost market share in later years to Asia, Japan, Italy, Germany and the USA, with exports to the 
USA in terms of AGOA raising hopes for further exports to this country in the near future. 
Although the EU–SA trade accord will largely affect South Africa favourably, the World Bank has 
stated that such an accord is also expected to have secondary economic benefits for the whole 
region in terms of better regional production and exports. For these reasons, it is recommended that 
SADC maintain positive relations with the EU, although intra-regional trade is the primary 
objective of economic growth in the region. The two types of trade policies should complement one 
another, and trade integration in SADC should aim to develop the capacity and nature of both extra- 
and intra-regional trade. Nevertheless, SADC should promote fair competition between businesses 
in the region in order to motivate extra-regional exports. 
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In formulating food security policies in Southern Africa, considering an integrated approach to food 
security, development and agriculture in the region is crucial. Food security policies should, 
therefore, be guided by a holistic approach, giving attention to the availability of food at macro 
level, the access to and distribution of income, the improved production capacity for acquiring food 
at household level, and the utilisation of nutritious food by individuals. 
 
The problems of food insecurity in Southern Africa outlined in this study cannot all be solved, or 
even addressed, by such a study. Many issues related to the main problem covered in the study are 
either not discussed or are inadequately explored, given the limited scope of the research. Further 
investigations based on the collection and analysis of primary data are required in order to enable 
the problem to be addressed more clearly as regards the implementation of long-term food security 
programmes. Of the many challenges existing in this area, the following require further 
investigations more urgently: 
¾ In most countries agriculture forms the basis of the economy, and will continue to be the 
major source of food supply throughout Southern Africa. However, agriculture is lagging 
behind demographic growth in the region, resulting in increased poverty and hunger for its 
inhabitants. The challenge, therefore, still remains of how to increase food production by 
way of agricultural expansion in such a way as to meet the future needs of the growing 
population in the region. 
¾ Many of the problems regarding food security in the region are not the result of a lack of 
knowledge about what policies to adopt or the result of an absence of information that can 
be used in support of decision making, but rather a possible result of the inadequate 
implementation of effective policy. Given the current fiscal (economic and financial) and 
administrative (institutional) constraints, and a context of reduced government 
interventionism in the economy (free market), the question that needs to be answered is: 
How can governments and donors work together in partnership with private, civil society 
organisations and NGOs to deliver effective food security services to vulnerable poor 
citizens in the region? 
¾ Since food subsidies and food price stabilisation systems have come under progressively 
more powerful criticism over the years, due mainly to the regressive nature of food financial 
support programmes, higher-income persons buy more food and gain more than do those 
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with a low income, who are more vulnerable. However, food-pricing strategies in the 
majority of Southern African countries are consumer-oriented, which clashes with any 
motivation to produce food in the region. The challenge, therefore, still remains as to how to 
design well-targeted food policies, such as food subsidy and food price stabilisation 
programmes aimed at addressing social concerns related to high, volatile food prices. Such 
unrealistic pricing currently limits access to food by poor households. The key consideration 
is what would be less damaging to long-term economic growth and food security in the 
region. 
¾ Another major issue for further consideration and research relates to the role of the women 
in food security in Southern Africa. Women, especially those who are heads of households, 
in rural areas play a significant role in agricultural production, particularly in food 
production. As their role as food producers and agents of food security in the region still has 
to be recognised, the reason for such lack of recognition, as well as how to cope with such a 
lack of recognition needs to be considered. 
 
None of these questions is new for agricultural economists or rural development specialists, but 
generating better and clearer answers lies at the core of policy improvement, so that proper 
designing and implementation, aimed at achieving long-term food security in the region, can take 
place. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The last chapter of this research thesis has summarised the main findings of the causes of food 
insecurity in Southern Africa, based on the literature reviewed. Similarly, the chapter has also 
recommended some of the challenges that still remain as main obstacles to the attaining of food 
security in Southern Africa. 
 
The investigation was carried out using the explanatory structure and systematic framework of the 
qualitative methodology of narrative study, in order to reveal the roots of food insecurity grounded 
in individuals and households residing in the SADC region. The research concentrated mainly on 
the availability of food and the ability to acquire it, in an attempt to ascertain how balance between 
supply and demand in the food security equation can be secured. The study has used documentary 
records to examine the problem; as such publications clearly expose the nature of the problem. 
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Achieving food security in the SADC region is regarded as a major problem for the SADC 
countries. Southern Africa is the one of the most prominent areas worldwide presently facing 
temporary and constant food insecurity (in the form of malnutrition), as well as ongoing anxieties 
regarding food insecurity crises (in the form of famine). Due consideration has to be paid to the 
reason behind such insecurity and what can be done about it. This thesis concentrated on causes of 
food insecurity in Southern Africa, in an effort to find some responses to these questions, as have 
been outlined in this chapter. 
 
The core problems relating to food availability in the region lie at the agricultural level. SADC has 
been plagued by low output and ongoing disasters, which have exacerbated supply-related 
problems, as have inadequate support of the sector, a lack of enterprise, the volatility of the world 
market and, increasingly, the inequitable trade situation. Other key issues compounding the problem 
have been: trade obstacles, such as tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers, especially the unduly 
complicated tariff structure of the SACU countries in relation to that of other non-SACU SADC 
countries; the high transportation expenses especially encountered in landlocked countries, due to 
the incapacity and ineffectiveness of the transport method in the region, resulting from a lack of 
investment in, and the poor performance of, the transport sector. The lack of diversification in the 
SADC region was cited as the central barrier to successful trade integration and economic growth in 
the region. All such problems impact on the supply of food in the region. 
 
On the demand side of the food security equation, the major problems as regards access to food in 
the region were found to lie in the lack of food entitlement (poverty) due to inadequate economic 
expansion resulting from failed macro-economic policies; fluctuations in output; extremely 
distorted models of revenue and capital distribution resulting from colonial policies imposed in the 
past; irresponsible governance opposed to democratisation, and financial misconduct. Rapid 
population growth in the region has accelerated the demand for agricultural commodities, especially 
foodstuffs, and restricted access to arable land still further. The prevalence of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic was making even more difficult the tasks of combating hunger and boosting the 
livelihood of the poor, by shrinking the amount of skilled agricultural labour potential in Southern 
Africa. A lack of financial and managerial competence (in the form of inadequate policies) was the 
major limitation to the implementation of successful poverty and food insecurity improvement 
programmes in the region, as wide-reaching government intervention aimed at sustained food 
security in the region was not a viable proposition for the near future. 
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Overall, based on the findings outlined in this chapter, it can be concluded that food insecurity in 
the SADC region is due to problems experienced both on the supply and demand sides of the food 
security equation. Food insecurity status in some countries of Southern Africa seems to be acute 
(famine), such as in the case of Zimbabwe and Malawi, though generally dire cases of food 
insecurity are transitory, taking the form of chronic food insecurity (i.e. malnutrition). SADC has, 
however, not been able effectively to counter food insecurity in the region, due to few lessons 
having been learned from the 1991/1992 food insecurity crisis that could be applied during the 
2001/2002 food crisis. 
 
Lastly, the eradication of food insecurity in Southern Africa requires, in the long term, increasing 
the actual earnings of households, so that they can be able to buy enough food, whatever the 
immediate situation. Such an increase can come about in the following ways: (1) by giving those 
who experience chronic food insecurity the chance to earn a satisfactory income and by 
guaranteeing an adequate food supply by way of domestic production, through increasing 
productivity and food security at the household level, and (2) by increasing food imports by 
removing tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, and investing in the transport 
infrastructure of the SADC region. Fair and unified implementation of the above could serve to 
reduce food insecurity in Southern Africa by a substantial amount. 
 186
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Definitions of food (in)security, 1975–1996 
 
1. “Availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs … to sustain a steady 
expansion of food consumption … and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” (UN, 1975, 
cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
2. An operational definition: “The probability of food grain consumption in developing countries 
falling below a desired level due to a fixed upper limit on the food import bill they can afford and 
an unfavourable combination of poor harvest and world food grain prices” (Reutlinger, 1977, cited 
in Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1995). 
 
3. “A condition in which the probability of a country’s citizens falling below a minimal level of 
food consumption is low” (Reutlinger & Knapp, 1980, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
4. “Everyone has enough to eat at any time – enough for life, health and growth of the young, and 
for productive effort” (Kracht, 1981, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
5. “Freedom from food deprivation for the entire world’s people all of the time” (Reutlinger, 1982, 
cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
6. “Ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food 
they need” (FAO, 1983 cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
7. “The stabilization of access, or of proportionate shortfalls in access, to calories by a population” 
(Heald & Lipton, 1984, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
8. “A basket of food, nutritionally adequate, culturally acceptable, procured in keeping with human 
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dignity and enduring over time” (Oshaug, 1985, in Eide et al., 1985, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
9. “Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Two essential 
elements are ‘the availability of food and the ability to acquire it’. Food insecurity, in turn, is the 
lack of access to enough food” (World Bank, 1986). 
 
10. “Food security means always having enough to eat. People reach food security by: 1. having 
land and resources to grow food, or 2. having employment which pays enough to buy food” 
(Zipperer, 1987, cited in Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1995). 
 
11. “A country and people are food secure when their food system operates efficiently in such a 
way as to remove the fear that there will not be enough to eat” (Maxwell, 1988, cited in Maxwell, 
1996). 
 
12. “The ability … to satisfy adequately food consumption needs for a normal and healthy life at all 
times” (Sarris, 1989, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
13.  a) In recent years, food security has come to be defined as “the ability of a country or region 
to assure, on a long term basis, that its food system provides the total population access to a timely, 
reliable and nutritionally adequate supply of food” (Van Zyl & Coetzee, 1990). 
 
 b) “Food insecurity exists when members of a household have an inadequate diet for part or 
all of the year or face the possibility of an inadequate diet in the future” (Phillips & Taylor, 1990, 
cited in Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1995). 
 
14. “Enough food available to ensure a minimum necessary intake by all members” (Alamgir & 
Arora, 1991, cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
 
15. “Food security is when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to 
sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. It requires food 
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availability, food access and food utilization/consumption” (USAID, 1992, cited in Maxwell & 
Frankenberger, 1995). 
 
16. “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Proposal for a new SAFEX futures contract aimed at achieving market efficiency 
 
The SAFEX Agricultural Market Division (AMD) has become the pricing mechanism for regionally 
produced coarse grains and oilseeds. However, it fails to allow for the adequate pricing of 
premiums or discounts based on international imports, due to the lack of physical delivery built into 
the current listed futures contract, which only allow for delivery of ‘maize of African origin’. This 
proposal calls for the introduction of a second futures contract, which will allow for physical 
delivery of maize of international origin (Vink & Kirsten, 2002). 
 
In this proposal, Vink and Kirsten (2002) argue that international grain is priced on the basis that it 
could readily be imported/exported based on either a surplus or shortage arising in the local market, 
allowing for variations in certain factors, such as the exchange rate, transport differentials and 
freight. The determination of import and export parity is thus largely a function of supply and 
demand. However, parities assume that imported grains can be freely substituted for local grains in 
an environment in which local price levels are not synchronised with international prices. In 
practice, this is not the case. Although only a small percentage (less than 10%) of futures contracts 
result in physical delivery, the possibility that any contract can physically settle inhibits speculative 
activity. As indicated above, that possibility does not extend to the current futures contract.  
 
Such a situation results in the following: 
• Grains are being imported only if a South African buyer confirms the transaction. This 
causes the South African buyer to hedge his/her exposure before the confirmation of the trade 
by buying grain in the local market. Upon confirmation, s/he will sell his/her hedge to the 
importer and take delivery of the imported product. This price action will often be undetected 
by the market, as the exact tonnage imported is not in the public domain. The market will, 
however, detect the initial buying pressure, which will result in the skew favouring of 
demand. 
• Should an opportunity for arbitrage occur between the international and the local price, an 
international trader would not be able to avail him/herself of it by selling maize of 
international origin, as s/he would not be able to deliver onto a hedge position on SAFEX if 
s/he were unable to find a local buyer. As such anomalies usually exist only for a short 
period of time, it is crucial that the trader be able to settle a hedge contract in terms of 
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physical delivery if prices deviate from the arbitrage position. Currently, s/he will only 
liquidate his/her physical position by finding a willing buyer (miller) in South Africa. 
Clearly, in a fast-moving market such an undertaking can be very risky, as prices might 
fluctuate in a disadvantageous direction before a buyer can be found which would inhibit 
arbitrage activity. 
• South African maize trades at a premium in the international market, due mainly to quality 
considerations during any given trading year. The premium reached in the international 
market differs from time to time, based on a number of factors, resulting in it being higher or 
lower than the long-term premium. Such fluctuations result in the entire crop being priced at 
the prevailing premium, even if only a relatively small proportion is exported in terms of 
premium order. Such transactions are also not always conducted in the public domain. 
 
How is parity pricing achieved? 
In the process of price discovery, it is clear that provision must be made, from time to time, to 
determine what the actual premium on South African origin white maize is. The market also 
needs to be able to arbitrage white maize of international origin with maize of South African 
origin in order to create a truly market-based import parity price. Currently, the contention is that 
the international market delivers inferior quality white maize compared to that produced locally. 
This opinion is vested in perceptions of quality and the genetically modified (GM) nature of the 
international market. These quality issues are addressed through the phytosanitary requirements 
imposed by trade and industry and enforced by customs on maize of international origin. 
 
The argument for the introduction of a ‘non-African origin’ maize futures contract 
Although not the perfect solution, the introduction of a ‘non-African origin’ maize futures contract 
may solve some of the aforementioned issues in a market-friendly manner. This contract will be 
substantially the same as the current listed contract, with the only difference being that delivery of 
other (such as that of USA origin) maize will be allowed in order to achieve physical settlement of a 
futures contract. Such settlement could currently be achieved by way of grain storers issuing their 
certification on the basis of the agreed grade. Technically a grade two classification would allow the 
co-operatives to store maize of foreign origin with South African stocks of second grade quality, 
which, as a rule, the industry tends to separate from first grade maize. 
 
The Exchange already lists a grade two maize contract, so that a technical adjustment is all that is 
required in order to allow for delivery. 
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Advantages  
• The major advantage of the introduction of such a futures contract will be the access that it 
would grant to northern hemisphere maize whenever there is a regional shortage, which 
would result in the local market reverting to import parity. So doing would obviously ensure 
transparent regional food security. 
• The market’s transparent and market-related determination of the premium on local 
production would not result in a ‘supernormal’ premium for an extended period of time. Such 
a situation would result in the dynamic pricing of a factor (whether it is premium or discount) 
on which the majority of market participants cannot currently obtain information. 
• The option of whether to use imported or domestic maize in the milling industry would then 
become a factor of price, as the market would then essentially have to choose between two 
different products. If imported maize were truly of an inferior quality, then milling losses 
would discount that of South African origin. The size of such a discount would then 
compensate the buyer for any losses incurred, which, in turn, would result in substitutability. 
• No single entity would be able to squeeze the market in terms of exports or reduced crop 
forecasts in the event of adverse weather conditions. 
• Although imported maize might be quality deficient, such inferior quality, in itself, should 
not disallow physical settlement. Maize is frequently imported to South Africa, as is the case 
at present. Delivery onto a futures contract would not require desertion of current quality 
standards, as it is intended that the imported product be of the same quality as that currently 
required by customs and market practice. 
• The price premium on white maize will also, in all probability, distort the production of 
yellow maize, as the difference in price amounts to more than R400.00 per tonne at present. 
As these products are physically essentially the same, the country would, in all likelihood, 
import yellow maize for the feed industry. It will make little difference whether this maize 
reaches the market via over-the-counter contracts or by means of delivery onto a futures 
contract through SAFEX. The benefit to be gained from participating in such an exchange 
will be the transparency of the process and the quantity delivered, which would ensure long-
term price conversion between the local and the international market. 
• Finally, a price risk instrument would exist that would enable the international trade to hedge 
price risk in the sub-region. As maize is frequently imported to SADC, a local futures 
contract allowing for international delivery would go a long way to managing price risks 
exposures for international commodity traders. 
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Conclusion 
Although the introduction of an international origin maize futures contract would not alleviate 
absolute price pressure due to prevailing external factors, it would allow for the implementation of a 
transparent price discovery mechanism for determining true premiums and discounts, based on the 
global grain market. Such a mechanism would ensure the immunity of the market from individual 
players and their perceptions, as well as allow them to exercise free choice. As such, the rules of 
global supply and demand would then be able to rule expeditiously. Ultimately, such a situation 
would contribute to greater transparency in relation to regional food security, without necessitating 
having to resort to interventionist policy making. Ultimately, all market participants would then 
stand to benefit in the long run. 
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APPENDIX 3 
SADC Member States Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.asosh.org/SADC/sadcmap.htm. Accessed on 03/07/2006. 
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